In April 2023, the long-smouldering political fault lines in Sudan burst into open war between the national military, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). What began as a struggle over integration of the RSF into the army, and control of the state machinery, has morphed into a multi-dimensional conflict: ethnically driven violence, regional power competition, deep humanitarian collapse—and mounting accusations of genocide. At the heart of the crisis lies Sudan’s historical fault-lines: Darfur, identity politics, state fragility, and the legacy of decades of military rule.
Into this fray stepped Gulf and regional actors—most notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—whose roles in arms, logistics and finance have drawn sharp scrutiny. Meanwhile, the war’s consequences roam far beyond Khartoum, reaching into Darfur, South Sudan’s oil corridors, the Red Sea security belt, and global markets for gold, weapons and refugees.
This report unpacks: (i) the war’s origins and actors; (ii) the Darfur dimension and genocide claims; (iii) the Gulf/foreign-actor involvement (especially the UAE); (iv) the South/North interplay and regional implications; (v) current dynamics and humanitarian trends; (vi) plausible outcomes; and (vii) what to watch moving forward.
Historical background: Sudan’s fragile state
Colonial legacies & post-colonial cleavages
Sudan’s contemporary fault-lines date to its colonial era and post-colonial state formation. The Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1899-1956) left a diverse society with multiple identities (Arab/“African”, Muslim/non-Muslim, North/South) and weak state infrastructure. The north’s dominance and militarised governance built tensions in the marginalised south and in the western region of Darfur.
Two civil wars and the Darfur crisis
From 1983 to 2005, the Second Sudanese Civil War raged between the north and what became the south, killing some 2 million according to one source. (Council on Foreign Relations)
In 2003 Darfur erupted: ethnic armed groups rose up, the regime backed the Janjaweed militias, and atrocities followed. Some 300,000 or more died, millions were displaced, and the term “genocide” was widely invoked. The Janjaweed would later morph into the RSF. (Wikipedia)
South Sudan’s secession in 2011 removed one major cleavage—but left Sudan with tremendous structural vulnerabilities: a brittle economy, oil-dependence, powerful military/paramilitary forces, and weak civilian institutions.
The post-Bashir transition and RSF rise
In 2019 popular protests toppled President Omar al‑Bashir. A transitional government attempted a civilian-military arrangement, but the continuity of the security apparatus—the SAF and RSF—would prove decisive. The RSF (formally created c.2013) drew from Janjaweed networks and quickly built economic and political power. (kas.de)
By 2021 a military coup led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan (SAF) and RSF leader Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) set the stage for competition over who would integrate the RSF into the army, who would control the gold, and who would dominate Sudan’s governance. Negotiations repeatedly collapsed.
The 2023-present war: actors and key theatres
The flashpoint: April 2023 and broadening war
In April 2023 fighting erupted when the RSF and SAF clashed in Khartoum and elsewhere, following breakdowns over RSF integration deadlines. The conflict spread quickly—from Khartoum into Darfur, Kordofan, and other peripheral regions. (Wikipedia)
From the beginning, the RSF leveraged its networks in Darfur, tribal alliances, fast-moving forces and experience; the SAF relied on conventional army, air power, and alliances (including foreign drone support). The war swiftly became national-in-scale.
Key actors
- SAF: the regular army under al-Burhan, holding Port Sudan (Red Sea access) and parts of the northeast.
- RSF: under Hemedti, originally Janjaweed-derived, strong in Darfur and expanded rapidly. (valleyinternational.net)
- Regional actors:
- Egypt backing SAF diplomatically and logistically. (Wilson Center)
- Iran supplying drones to SAF (per multiple reports).
- Gulf states (UAE in particular) implicated in RSF supply chains.
- Chad, Libya, South Sudan as transit zones for weapons and logistics.
- Other armed groups inside Sudan (e.g., SPLM-North, Tamazuj) aligning variably.
Major theatres
- Darfur: A core flash-point. RSF offensive power was strong, local militias aligned with RSF, and civilian protection evaporated. The UN Panel reported credible mass-atrocity evidence in West Darfur. (documents.un.org)
- Khartoum & Central Sudan (Gezira, White Nile, etc.): Urban combat, shifting front-lines. SAF made gains by 2024–25. (ACLED)
- Oil and pipeline corridors: Tied to South Sudan and external flows; strategic for revenue and regional ties.
- Red Sea & Port Sudan: Crucial for exports and foreign influence; maintaining Port Sudan is essential for SAF’s survival.
Darfur, genocide claims and what’s happening now
What’s happening in Darfur
The RSF, supported by allied Arab militias and local networks, have been accused of ethnically targeted attacks—especially against the Masalit, Fur, Zaghawa and other non-Arab groups in West Darfur. The UN Panel’s January 2024 report documented attacks on Masalit civilians, including mass graves, destruction of villages, and forced displacement. (documents.un.org)
Recently the siege of El Fasher (North Darfur’s capital) has become emblematic: months of blockade, hunger, bombardment, forced civilian movement, and then RSF seizure in October 2025, followed by credible reports of mass executions. (Wikipedia)
Aid groups report famine-level conditions in large parts of Darfur, life-saving aid obstructed, hospitals hit by drones (e.g., Saudi Maternal Teaching Hospital in El Fasher hit January 24 2025). (Wikipedia)
Is it genocide?
On 7 January 2025, the United States determined that the RSF and allied militias had committed genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur. This formal determination was based on the targeted nature of violence, e.g., killings of boys, abductions/rapes of young women, destruction of Masalit villages. (Wikipedia)
However:
- International consensus on the use of the term “genocide” remains contested; legal processes (e.g., International Court of Justice) are slow and jurisdictionally constrained.
- The war continues on multiple fronts, meaning accountability is deferred and real-time mass killings may yet outpace formal responses.
Why the mass-killings matter now
- El Fasher’s fall in late October 2025 marks the RSF’s control of all state-capitals in Darfur and a major power shift: de-facto RSF dominance in the region.
- With state institutions collapsed, RSF-governed Darfur may become a semi-autonomous zone or client territory.
- For civilians, the implications are profound: large-scale displacement, hunger/famine, destruction of social infrastructure, and disappearance of protective governance.
The UAE, the Gulf and external proxies
The Gulf chessboard: why Sudan matters
For the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Sudan offers strategic value: Red Sea access, gold mining concessions, agriculture land deals, regional influence against Islamist agendas, and a base for projecting power in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea corridor. (ISPI)
As the war in Yemen fades and global shipping routes (via Bab el-Mandeb) matter more, Sudan’s geopolitical location grows in importance. The UAE has sought to hedge by engaging with both SAF and RSF—but allegations suggest more active backing of the RSF.
What exactly is the UAE alleged to be doing?
- Arms exports & logistics: The UN Panel (Jan 2024) noted “credible” claims that the UAE supplied arms/vehicles to RSF joing raids and weapons flows in Darfur. (documents.un.org)
- Gold and finance networks: Investigations suggest RSF-controlled gold mines have sold gold via UAE-based company networks, enabling financing of paramilitaries.
- Transit hubs: Routes via Chad, Libya, South Sudan used for weapons, mercenaries and logistics. (Wikipedia)
- Political/diplomatic cover: The UAE has hosted conferences, offered Sudan aid pledges, and attempted to position itself as mediator—even as it is accused of facilitation.
- Denials: The UAE denies having supplied weapons to RSF (calling the claims “ludicrous” in a UN Security Council session). (AP News)
The U.S.-UAE-Sudan triangle
The United States courts the UAE as a key partner in the Gulf for Middle Eastern strategy (Iran containment, Red Sea security). At the same time, the U.S. sanctions RSF for genocide and urges arms embargo compliance. The conflict between these two objectives creates strategic dissonance: can the U.S. press the UAE when it remains a valued security partner? Critics argue Washington’s leverage has been weak.
The result: what looks like a proxy war where the RSF receives external backing (allegedly via the UAE) even as the U.S. publicly condemns genocide and sanctions the RSF.
The North-South dimension and regional spill-overs
South Sudan (oil & economy)
Although South Sudan became independent in 2011, its economy remains linked to Sudan via oil pipelines and infrastructure. When Sudan’s war disrupted flows, Juba’s economy suffered. Limited exports have resumed, but interstate tension persists. Any renewed shutdown by Khartoum of pipelines will hit South Sudan’s fragile economy.
Refugee flows are also significant: large numbers of displaced Sudanese cross into South Sudan, straining its already weak institutions. (Wikipedia)
Regional destabilisation
- Chad and Libya: Weapons and fighters flow through these transit states, making the conflict regionalised. (Wilson Center)
- Red Sea security: Port Sudan’s control is geopolitically vital; fragmentation harms shipping routes and maritime security.
- Refugee and displacement burden: Sudan’s collapse threatens to create destabilising cross-border movements and humanitarian overload in neighbours like Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and South Sudan.
Humanitarian catastrophe & state collapse
Scale of suffering
- Over 11.8 million displaced (internal and cross-border) as of late 2025.
- Famine: parts of Darfur already at famine levels; food production collapsed; prices soared; aid access blocked. (Wikipedia)
- Infrastructure destroyed: hospitals, markets, schools – many non-functional. Drone/hospital attacks documented. (Wikipedia)
- Civilian casualty toll uncertain but extremely high: thousands killed in belligerent attacks, many more from famine/disease.
State institutions unravel
The central government’s authority is fractured. SAF holds some corridors; RSF controls large swathes of Darfur and other areas. Governance, rule of law, civilian services are collapsing. Economic collapse looms: oil revenues drop, gold mining is informalised, informal payments dominate.
Current dynamics (late 2025)
Shift in momentum
Recent reports suggest SAF has made some gains (e.g., in central/southern states) while RSF consolidation in Darfur advances. (ACLED)
The fall of El Fasher in October 2025 marks a pivotal moment: a RSF victory in the last major SAF-held city in Darfur. Reports of horrific executions followed. (Wikipedia)
Meanwhile arms flows intensify: drones, surface-to-air missiles, heavy artillery are more widely reported. The war is escalating in technology and geography. (The Washington Post)
Proxy escalation
Foreign involvement is deeper: Iranian drones for SAF, alleged UAE supply lines for RSF, multiple regional actors contributing logistics. The conflict is less “domestic” and more a chessboard of regional ambitions. (Wilson Center)
Humanitarian access remains blocked
Aid agencies continue to report major obstacles: parties restrict convoys, sieges are used as tactic, civilians remain trapped. El Fasher’s siege reduced civilians to near-starvation. (The Guardian)
Possible outcomes
Outcome A: Consolidation & de-facto partition
The RSF consolidates full control of Darfur and maybe western Kordofan; SAF retains Port Sudan, east and northeast. Sudan fragments into zones of control—militarised, ungoverned, and humanitarian disasters.
Risks: permanent humanitarian limbo, ethnic cleansing legacy entrenched, cross-border spill-over, gold/arms trafficking hubs become semi-states.
Outcome B: War of attrition
Neither side can decisively win; fighting continues at high cost, front-lines stable-ish but deadly. Human suffering deepens, famine expands, regional instability rises. Most likely near-term.
Outcome C: Negotiated settlement (with heavy caveats)
Peace talks resume, external pressure successfully brings in Gulf/Egypt/Iran & UAE; ceasefire followed by phased political process and accountability framework. Requires strong incentives and credible guarantors.
Challenges: accountability for genocide/atrocities, dozens of armed factions, external patronage networks, massive humanitarian debt.
Outcome D: Fragmentation into warlordised zones
State collapses further; local warlords, armed actors, criminal economies dominate. Sudan becomes less of a country and more a terrain of fight-for-resource fiefdoms. Regional consequences deep.
What to watch in the next 3-12 months
- Darfur massacre monitoring: Especially around El Fasher and West Darfur—mass graves, executions, ethnic targeting.
- Arms/weapon flows: Satellite imagery, customs records that show UAE or other states’ involvement in RSF resupply.
- Political diplomacy: New Gulf brokered initiatives: will UAE, Saudi, Egypt push SAF/RSF toward truce? Will the U.S. leverage the UAE?
- Oil pipelines and South Sudan interactions: Any shutdowns or disruptions will reverberate in Juba and beyond.
- Famine declarations and humanitarian access: Watch for formal “famine” declaration in new zones; key aid routes remain closed.
- Sanctions and accountability mechanisms: U.S. and EU sanction rounds; ICJ or ICC activity; will any senior leaders face charges?
- Red Sea/port security implications: If Port Sudan suffers assault or damage, global shipping may be impacted.
Conclusion
Sudan today is not simply a civil war—it is the convergence of historical state fragility, identity politics, paramilitary ascendancy, regional power-games, and catastrophic humanitarian collapse. The designation of genocide by the U.S. and the mounting evidence of mass killings in Darfur elevate the stakes from crisis to atrocity. At the same time, the UAE’s alleged role as arms and logistics enabler of the RSF places a gulf state at the heart of an African war—a stark reminder of how regional ambitions and global value chains (oil, gold, arms) intertwine with human suffering.
Unless external patronage is constrained, humanitarian access is massively scaled up, and a credible accountability/truce track is implemented, the likeliest scenario remains a war of attrition with partition-by-default and decades of trauma ahead. In many respects, Sudan is the mirror of what happens when power vacuums, broken social contracts and un-checked militia ascendancy meet: devastating human cost, state collapse, and a region destabilised.