An assessment of the military and strategic position as of 21 August 2026
There is a recurring pattern at the beginning of modern wars. Governments describe their objectives confidently, military superiority appears measurable, analysts calculate force ratios, and predictions emerge that the decisive phase will take weeks or months. Then the enemy adapts.
That has happened spectacularly in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion, launched on 24 February 2022, is now approaching four and a half years of continuous warfare. Moscow failed to capture Kyiv or destroy the Ukrainian state in the opening campaign. Yet Ukraine also failed to expel Russia, and Russian forces still occupy approximately 20% of internationally recognised Ukrainian territory. Peace negotiations exist intermittently, but on 21 August Moscow was still insisting that any settlement recognise the “realities on the ground”, while Washington acknowledged that a rapid resolution was unlikely. (Reuters)
Something remarkably similar has happened in the newer Middle Eastern war. The United States and Israel launched large-scale coordinated attacks on Iran on 28 February 2026. The operation killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior Iranian commanders and struck military and nuclear-related facilities. President Donald Trump subsequently suggested that the central objectives of the campaign could be completed within weeks. Almost six months later, the Islamic Republic remains in power, Iran retains substantial missile and regional capabilities, the nuclear question is unresolved, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted, and an attempted ceasefire has largely collapsed. (Reuters)
So who is winning?
The answer depends on what “winning” means. If it means destroying more targets, controlling more territory or possessing greater conventional military power, there are relatively straightforward answers. If it means achieving the political objectives for which the war was started, the picture becomes very different.
Ukraine: Russia has the land, but not the victory it expected
Russia remains the stronger power in conventional terms. It has a much larger population, a substantial defence-industrial base, large missile and drone inventories and the ability to sustain enormous casualties. Most importantly, it possesses territory. Roughly one-fifth of Ukraine remains under Russian occupation, including Crimea and large portions of the east and south. (Reuters)
Territory matters. A war cannot be judged entirely by percentages on a map, but possession creates bargaining power. If hostilities were frozen tomorrow along the existing line, Russia would physically retain a substantial part of Ukraine and the land corridor to Crimea.
That represents an undeniable Russian advantage.
Yet the battlefield situation is considerably less favourable to Moscow than the simple territorial figure suggests.
Russian advances since the major territorial changes of 2022 have generally been extraordinarily slow. A July 2026 CSIS assessment estimated Russian advances around some major axes at only tens of metres per day and concluded that Russian territorial control actually contracted during April and May 2026. CSIS estimated Russian battlefield casualties at around 1.4 million since February 2022, although wartime casualty statistics from all sides must be treated cautiously. (CSIS)
Ukraine has also demonstrated that Russia’s gains are not irreversible. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in August that Ukrainian forces had regained approximately 745 square kilometres during 2026. Russia, meanwhile, claimed the capture of 19 settlements during its summer campaign. Neither set of battlefield claims should be treated as perfectly precise, but together they describe something important: this is no longer a battlefield on which one army is simply advancing and the other retreating. Territory is changing hands locally while the strategic front moves very slowly. (Reuters)
Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated drone war has become central to this change. Ukrainian forces are striking logistics centres, ammunition stores, military facilities and energy infrastructure deep inside Russia and Russian-occupied territory. ISW reported in August that Ukrainian operations against Russian logistics and the expansion of Ukrainian drone-controlled “kill zones” were reducing Russia’s operational tempo. (Institute for the Study of War)
This matters because Ukraine cannot realistically compete with Russia shell-for-shell, missile-for-missile or soldier-for-soldier indefinitely. Its answer has increasingly been engineering rather than mass: drones, automation, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, distributed manufacturing and relatively inexpensive weapons attacking expensive targets.
Russia has adapted in turn.
Its most important present advantage may therefore not be territorial movement but its growing capacity to punish Ukraine from the air. Russia has expanded long-range drone infrastructure and intensified missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Civilian casualties rose sharply during the summer. On 19 August a major attack on Kyiv killed 17 people, while Ukrainian authorities said shortages of Patriot interceptors were limiting their ability to stop ballistic missiles. Ukraine says allied deliveries of missile interceptors in 2026 have fallen to roughly one-third of their 2025 level. (Reuters)
The Middle Eastern war is actually contributing to this problem. Western and particularly American air-defence resources have competing demands elsewhere.
Ukraine also continues to face a problem Russia does not face to the same degree: dependence on outsiders. NATO and European states remain heavily committed, and mechanisms such as the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List continue financing critical American systems. Allies announced another $1 billion package in June, while European governments are again meeting to discuss increased support. (Reuters)
But dependency creates uncertainty. Moscow can reasonably calculate that political priorities in Washington, Berlin, Paris or London may eventually change. Ukraine cannot make the same calculation about Russian war production disappearing.
Russia, however, has its own clock ticking.
The wartime economic boom produced by enormous state expenditure is fading. Moscow reduced its 2026 growth forecast to only 0.4%, while high interest rates, sanctions, taxation and the diversion of resources towards military production are placing growing pressure on civilian industry. Even prominent Russian businessmen have publicly complained about economic conditions. (Reuters)
Ukraine’s strategy therefore increasingly appears to be an attempt to make time work against Russia: prevent a decisive breakthrough, destroy logistics and energy assets, keep Russian casualty rates high, maintain Western support and gradually increase the economic cost of continuing the war.
Russia’s strategy is almost the mirror image: remain militarily and politically durable for longer than Ukraine and its supporters, continue applying pressure to Ukrainian society, exploit manpower and missile advantages, and eventually force negotiations from a position in which Russian territorial possession becomes permanent.
So who is winning in Ukraine?
At present, Russia has the stronger negotiating position because it holds approximately 20% of Ukraine and can still impose enormous destruction. On that narrow measure, Russia is ahead.
But Russia is not achieving anything resembling the decisive victory envisaged in February 2022. Ukraine remains independent, heavily armed, increasingly integrated with Europe and capable of striking targets hundreds of kilometres inside Russia. Russian forces have paid an extraordinary price for relatively small additional territorial gains.
Equally, Ukraine cannot credibly claim victory while one-fifth of the country remains occupied and its cities remain vulnerable to sustained Russian bombardment.
The best description in August 2026 is therefore a strategic stalemate with a Russian territorial advantage but an increasingly contested battlefield initiative.
Russia is ahead on the map. Neither side is close to winning the war.
The US–Israel–Iran war: overwhelming firepower meets strategic survival
The Iran conflict is even more revealing because the conventional imbalance is enormous.
There is little doubt which side would win a traditional contest of air forces, intelligence systems, precision strike capabilities and high-end military technology. The United States possesses capabilities Iran cannot remotely match, while Israel has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to penetrate Iranian airspace and intelligence networks.
The opening campaign illustrated this brutally. The February attacks killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior military commanders and severely damaged Iranian infrastructure. Iran’s political leadership was decapitated to a degree that would have paralysed many states. (Reuters)
Yet Iran did not collapse.
The Islamic Republic’s deliberately layered political and military structure survived. Mojtaba Khamenei formally succeeded his father, while the Revolutionary Guards became even more important within the wartime state. Reuters subsequently reported that real power had increasingly migrated towards the IRGC and national-security apparatus. (Reuters)
That survival itself changed the definition of victory.
American and Israeli objectives have at various times included eliminating or severely restricting Iran’s nuclear programme, degrading its ballistic missiles, weakening Hezbollah and other Iranian-aligned forces, limiting Tehran’s regional power and, at the most ambitious end, encouraging regime change.
After six months, none has been decisively achieved.
Most strikingly, the nuclear question remains unresolved. The IAEA’s first post-war assessment reported little observable change in the underlying nuclear issue and said inspectors still lacked reliable knowledge of the location and condition of important enriched-uranium stocks. Destroying facilities is not the same thing as destroying technical knowledge, nuclear material or the political decision to pursue a programme. (Reuters)
Iran therefore provides a textbook example of the difference between military destruction and strategic defeat.
The US and Israel can destroy Iranian installations. Iran cannot prevent every strike. But Tehran does not need to defeat the United States Air Force to deny Washington victory. It needs to survive, retain the ability to retaliate and impose costs greater than Washington is politically willing to continue paying.
The Strait of Hormuz has become its most powerful instrument.
Before the war, roughly one-fifth of global crude oil and LNG flows passed through the strait. By August, traffic had collapsed. Reuters reported periods in which only single-digit numbers of commodity vessels crossed each day; on 21 August just seven were recorded. Oil flows through the strait have fallen dramatically from pre-war levels, although exact quantities vary and some vessels operate without normal tracking. (Reuters)
This transforms Iran’s geography into a strategic weapon.
Iran cannot economically survive indefinitely with its own exports blockaded. But neither can the wider world treat Hormuz as irrelevant. By threatening shipping, attacking vessels and creating sufficient uncertainty to deter commercial traffic, Tehran can export part of the cost of the war to countries that are not participants in it.
Oil prices have consequently remained elevated, with Brent closing above $94 a barrel on 21 August. Higher energy costs feed inflation throughout Europe, Asia and the United States. (Reuters)
That is asymmetric warfare on a global scale.
Iran is nevertheless paying an immense price.
Its economy is in severe distress. Reuters reported inflation of approximately 66% in July and food prices up dramatically year-on-year. Infrastructure has been damaged, the currency has weakened, unemployment has risen and the US naval blockade has restricted Iran’s ability to export oil and import goods. Washington is now preparing an even tougher sanctions regime. (Reuters)
If the war becomes principally a contest of economic endurance, Iran begins from a far weaker position.
But America is not fighting without costs either. The Pentagon put the direct cost of the campaign at $37.5 billion by July, with additional funding required. American personnel have been killed and hundreds injured, while the conflict is consuming expensive precision weapons and air-defence interceptors. (Reuters)
There is also a political price. A Reuters/Ipsos poll in August placed President Trump’s approval at 33%, while 80% of Americans surveyed believed the Iran war would be prolonged. High petrol prices have made a distant conflict directly visible to American voters. (Reuters)
Iran’s regional network compounds the problem. Tehran’s partners are not a single centrally controlled military alliance, and the term “Iranian proxies” can obscure significant independence among them. Nevertheless, Hezbollah, the Houthis and armed groups in Iraq give Iran multiple theatres through which pressure can be exerted.
Houthi activity around the Bab el-Mandeb creates a second threat to maritime trade. Iranian-aligned Iraqi forces create risks for American and Gulf facilities. Lebanon has intermittently become part of the confrontation. Gulf states themselves have been drawn closer to the conflict despite attempting to avoid becoming direct combatants. (Reuters)
This makes the war extraordinarily difficult to terminate because there is no single battlefield on which victory can be declared.
So who is winning the Iran war?
If one measures military dominance, the answer is unquestionably the United States and Israel. They can penetrate Iranian territory, destroy infrastructure and impose damage at a level Iran cannot reciprocate conventionally.
If one measures economic damage, Iran is also clearly losing. Its economy is being squeezed far harder than America’s or Israel’s.
But if the original objectives included eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme, neutralising its missile capability, collapsing the Islamic Republic or removing Iran as a major regional security problem, the US–Israeli campaign has not delivered victory.
Iran has survived. Its government remains functional. Its security apparatus has consolidated power. Its nuclear programme has not been verifiably eliminated. It retains the ability to threaten US bases, neighbouring states and global shipping.
A Reuters assessment following the June ceasefire described Iran as battered but intact and noted that the United States had failed to achieve its most ambitious objectives. (Reuters)
The current judgement is therefore almost the reverse of Ukraine:
The United States and Israel are winning the conventional military contest, while Iran is so far winning the more limited strategic contest of avoiding defeat.
Neither amounts to overall victory.
Why are both wars proving so difficult to end?
The two conflicts look radically different, but they share a fundamental characteristic: the stronger military power is trying to convert material superiority into political submission, while the weaker side is trying simply to remain viable long enough to make that submission too expensive.
Russia discovered this in Ukraine. Its military superiority did not make Ukrainians accept Russian political control.
The United States and Israel are discovering something similar with Iran. Destroying air-defence systems, command centres and nuclear facilities does not necessarily compel a large state of more than 90 million people to accept another country’s political terms.
Modern technology also favours survival in unexpected ways. Cheap drones threaten expensive equipment. Missiles can circumvent conventional front lines. Commercial satellites make surprise harder. Distributed production replaces destroyed factories. Electronic warfare changes tactics within weeks. A state that survives the first attack can learn remarkably quickly.
The economics of war have changed as well. Ukraine attacks Russian refineries and logistics. Russia attacks Ukrainian infrastructure. Iran attacks maritime commerce. The United States blockades Iranian exports. Wars are increasingly contests between interconnected industrial, financial, energy and information systems rather than simply armies occupying terrain.
Most importantly, neither losing side yet believes that accepting the opponent’s terms would be preferable to continuing the war.
That is the real reason there is no obvious end date.
Conclusion: who is winning?
In Ukraine, Russia is presently ahead in the most visible metric: territory. It controls approximately one-fifth of Ukraine and retains formidable missile, manpower and industrial advantages. But its original objective of subjugating Ukraine has failed, its territorial advances are extraordinarily slow, casualties and economic costs are immense, and Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to regain ground and conduct increasingly effective deep strikes.
Verdict: slight Russian advantage, but strategic stalemate.
In the US–Israel–Iran war, the United States and Israel possess overwhelming conventional superiority and have inflicted immense physical and economic damage. But Iran has accomplished the minimum requirement for an asymmetric strategic victory: it has not been defeated. Its regime survived the killing of its supreme leader, its nuclear question remains unresolved, its missiles and regional networks remain relevant, and its ability to disrupt Hormuz has imposed costs on the entire world.
Verdict: US–Israeli tactical and military superiority, but no strategic victory; Iran remains battered but undefeated.
The uncomfortable possibility is that both wars could continue for considerably longer.
Russia believes time may eventually fracture Western support for Ukraine. Ukraine believes technological adaptation and the accumulating economic cost of war can make Russia’s present strategy unsustainable. Washington believes military and economic pressure can eventually force Tehran into concessions. Tehran believes endurance, regional escalation and disruption of global energy markets can make continued American involvement politically unacceptable.
Each side therefore possesses a theory explaining why tomorrow may be more favourable than today.
And as long as every major belligerent believes that, compromise remains more frightening than another month of war.
That is why neither conflict presently looks close to ending—and why asking simply who is winning may ultimately be less important than asking which side will first decide that continuing to fight offers less than negotiating from the position it already has.
The key distinction I would retain from the paper is: Russia is currently somewhat ahead in Ukraine because territory is the ultimate bargaining asset, whereas the US and Israel are militarily dominant against Iran but have so far failed to turn that dominance into the political outcome they sought. In neither war would I describe the present leader as being close to victory.
Given how quickly both fronts are moving, I can also monitor them and produce an updated “who is winning?” assessment when the strategic balance materially changes.