Global politics in 2025 is defined by an intense struggle between the long-dominant Western hegemonic order (led by the United States) and a rising coalition of powers centered around the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and their partners). Recent events – from protracted war in Ukraine to a sudden flare-up of direct conflict between Israel (backed by the U.S.) and Iran – highlight a shift toward multipolarity. Western leaders have at times underestimated the BRICS grouping, while employing tactics (such as trade tariffs and sanctions) to stymie its influence. Meanwhile, commentators critical of U.S. policy argue that these efforts have backfired, accelerating the decline of Western dominance.
BRICS: Emergence and Western Underestimation
Western officials and analysts have often been skeptical of BRICS’ significance. This attitude was starkly illustrated by a recent gaffe from U.S. President Donald Trump. In mid-2025, Trump mistakenly identified Spain as the “S” in BRICS (which in reality stands for South Africa) during a televised interview – a shocking display of ignorance, as critics put it[1][2]. Trump’s erroneous statement – “They’re a BRICS nation, Spain. Do you know what a BRICS nation is?” – not only caused embarrassment in Washington but also “head-scratching and jitters” in Madrid, where officials feared the U.S. might impose punitive tariffs based on this misunderstanding[1][2]. This incident underscored how dismissively some in Washington viewed BRICS; the U.S. “dominant view” had long been that the diverse BRICS economies could not mount a real challenge to the U.S.-led international order[3].
Such complacency is now being challenged by reality. In recent years, BRICS has expanded its economic and diplomatic ambitions. The bloc admitted new members (including major regional players like Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in 2023–24) and openly explored mechanisms to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. BRICS has become “a sandbox for experimentation with various non-USD instruments” – from payment systems in local currencies to commodity trading hubs outside dollar markets[4]. These initiatives gained momentum especially after Western sanctions on Russia in 2022, as many countries in the Global South sought “more maneuvering space amid waning U.S. preeminence”[5]. In short, a growing number of nations (including some traditional U.S. partners) are “cozying up to America’s adversaries like China and Russia” and embarking on long-term projects to hedge against U.S. dominance[5].
To be sure, the BRICS coalition faces internal divisions and limitations that temper its immediate effectiveness. A recent summit in Kazan (October 2024) highlighted that simply “adding more letters doesn’t make the BRICS more functional.” The 43-page summit communiqué was filled with platitudes masking underlying tensions, and there was a noticeable lack of unified action – for example, BRICS members offered Russia little concrete help in financing its war economy despite Moscow’s hopes[6][7]. Key leaders even skipped the meeting (e.g. Brazil’s president and Saudi Arabia’s crown prince chose an EU meeting instead)[8]. Such facts caution against overestimating BRICS as a monolithic alliance. Nonetheless, Western policymakers are increasingly realizing that they cannot dismiss the BRICS challenge out of hand. Even if BRICS is not a tight strategic alliance, it provides a platform for non-Western powers to coordinate alternatives. The mere fact that world leaders like India’s Narendra Modi and even NATO-member Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chose to attend BRICS forums hosted by Vladimir Putin – signaling Putin is “not the global pariah the West would like to believe” – points to an erosion of U.S. diplomatic clout[9]. In sum, Western hegemony now faces a credible (if slow-moving) challenge from an emerging multipolar order; initial Western flippancy toward BRICS has given way to a more sober recognition of this reality.
Weaponized Tariffs and the Backfire Effect
Under President Trump, the United States aggressively wielded tariffs and economic sanctions in an attempt to shore up its dominance – a strategy critics describe as “weaponizing” trade. Trump’s trade war with China, initiated in 2018 and escalated in his second term (2025), was meant to force concessions from the world’s second-largest economy. Instead, it appears to have galvanized China and others to resist U.S. pressure, ultimately undermining U.S. influence. In April 2025, Reuters reported that Beijing had adopted an all-of-government “wartime” footing to counter Trump’s tariffs: Chinese officials were ordered to cancel vacations and work around the clock, while propaganda channels blasted defiant messages (even invoking Mao Zedong’s vow to “never yield” to foreign coercion)[10][11]. China also launched a diplomatic charm offensive to rally other nations – including U.S. allies in Europe and Asia – against Washington’s trade measures[11]. Far from isolating China, Trump’s tariffs arguably pushed China to build alternative trade links and exploit divisions between the U.S. and its partners.
Trump did not stop at China. On January 30, 2025, he stunned many by threatening 100% tariffs on all BRICS countries unless they abandoned plans for a common BRICS currency or any move to replace the U.S. dollar in international trade[12][13]. “We will require a commitment … that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other currency to replace the mighty U.S. Dollar or they will face 100% tariffs,” Trump announced, vowing to make BRICS nations “say goodbye to selling into the wonderful U.S. economy” if they challenged dollar primacy[12][14]. This hardline stance was intended to protect the cornerstone of U.S. hegemony – the dollar’s global reserve status. Yet experts warned it could backfire disastrously. Imposing punitive tariffs on such a large swath of the world could “hasten the expansion of currency multipolarity”, effectively accelerating the decline of dollar dominance rather than preventing it[13][15]. As one analyst noted, BRICS nations make up well over 40% of global GDP and more than half the world’s population; forcing them to decouple from U.S. trade would inevitably spur them to trade more with each other in local currencies, thereby diminishing reliance on the U.S. dollar[15].
Indeed, objective data show the United States is not the indispensable trading partner it once was. The U.S. share of global trade has fallen to about 15% today (down from ~20% in 2018)[16]. For most BRICS members (aside from China), the U.S. market is important but not irreplaceable, and their exports could be redirected elsewhere over time[17][18]. In other words, the leverage of U.S. market access is declining. Washington’s threats thus carry less weight than before – and in some cases provoke defiance. Russia bluntly responded that any American attempt to coerce countries into using the dollar “would backfire”[19]. We have seen concrete examples of U.S. economic coercion pushing targeted states closer to U.S. rivals: for instance, after Western sanctions in 2022, Russia deepened energy ties with China and India; likewise, U.S. tariffs on China have encouraged Beijing to bolster trade with fellow BRICS and Belt & Road countries.
Not only have Trump’s tariff wars failed to achieve their strategic aims, they have also inflicted economic pain at home, undermining the very “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) promises Trump made. Higher import costs fueled by tariffs raised inflation on consumer goods and industrial inputs, disproportionately hurting American low-income households. Analysts projected that all-out tariffs on BRICS could boost core U.S. inflation by several percentage points, “with the poorest in the U.S. community… hardest hit”[20]. Rising prices for essentials (from healthcare to utilities) would hit retirees and fixed-income families especially hard[20]. In sum, as one study drily concluded, “those promised that the American Dream will be restored are likely to be disappointed, again.”[20] The MAGA pledge to revive American prosperity is belied by the fact that tariff brinkmanship has worsened inequality and burdened consumers, while manufacturing revival (the ostensible goal) remains elusive.
Beyond China and the major BRICS economies, the U.S. has also brandished economic weapons against smaller states aligning with the BRICS/non-Western camp. A telling case is South Africa. In mid-2023, as South Africa (a BRICS member) maintained a neutral stance on the Ukraine war and hosted joint naval exercises with Russia and China, bipartisan U.S. lawmakers openly demanded retaliation. A June 2023 letter from senior members of Congress urged the Biden administration to punish South Africa for its perceived support of Russia – even suggesting South Africa be deemed ineligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a vital trade preference that gave it duty-free access to the U.S. market[21][22]. The lawmakers insisted that hosting the AGOA summit in South Africa would “serve as an endorsement” of Pretoria’s pro-Russia tilt and cited a requirement that AGOA beneficiaries not undermine U.S. foreign policy[23]. In effect, Washington signaled it would use tariffs or trade sanctions to keep partners in line and discourage them from getting too close to the BRICS/Russia-China camp. South African officials bristled at these threats, and such U.S. pressure arguably pushed Pretoria even closer to its BRICS allies out of resentment. This example underscores the broader pattern: the West has tried to check BRICS’ evolution through punitive economic measures, but these measures often backfire by breeding mistrust and resolve among the targeted countries. Instead of isolating BRICS, the tariff and sanctions campaigns are accelerating the formation of alternative blocs and financial systems outside Western control[13][15].
Multipolar Reality and the Risk of Multi-Front Conflict
Underlying these economic rifts is a dawning multipolar reality in geopolitics. The United States today faces simultaneous challenges in three distinct theaters – Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East – a strategic bind unseen since World War II. If Washington refuses to accommodate a more multipolar order, it risks overextension by confronting major powers on multiple fronts. Political commentators critical of U.S. policy warn that the era of unipolar American primacy is ending, and an insistence on clinging to hegemonic dominance could lead the U.S. into “three serious war fronts” at once – against Russia, China, and Iran – with potentially ruinous consequences.
Firstly, in Europe, the Russia-Ukraine war has become a grinding test of Western resolve. The U.S. and NATO have invested heavily in Ukraine’s defense since Russia’s 2022 invasion, seeing it as a frontline struggle against Russian revisionism. Yet as of August 2025, the conflict has settled into a bloody stalemate that arguably favors Russia. After over three-and-a-half years of combat, Ukraine has been “losing ground to Russian forces” in key sectors[24]. Russia occupies large swathes of eastern and southern Ukraine, and Ukrainian counteroffensives (while valiant) have not decisively reversed those gains. European officials privately fear that if Russia can absorb parts of Ukraine and weather Western sanctions, it may grow more aggressive toward other neighbors[25]. Indeed, Moscow’s resilience is bolstered by the fact that it is not isolated globally – China, India, and others continue to buy its exports and diplomatically engage with Putin’s government[9]. Western sanctions have not crippled Russia as intended, partly because many non-Western countries refused to enforce them strictly. This diminished effectiveness of the Western “economic weapon” has exposed “the limitations of the Western sanctions toolkit” and the lack of universal support for U.S. policy goals[9]. The Ukraine war thus exemplifies a new reality: U.S. and allied power, while still immense, cannot unilaterally dictate outcomes against a major adversary when much of the Global South opts to hedge or stay neutral.
At the same time, in East Asia, tensions with China are near an all-time high. China’s rise as an economic and military peer-competitor has led the U.S. to refocus its strategy (as outlined in recent U.S. National Security Strategy documents) on countering Beijing. Flashpoints abound – most dangerously, the possibility of a war over Taiwan. The Pentagon is quietly grappling with how to deter China from attempting to reunify Taiwan by force, even as China rapidly modernizes its military. Trump’s renewed trade war in 2025, including the tariff salvos and tech export bans, has only hardened Beijing’s resolve to decouple key industries and assert its own sphere of influence. In response to U.S. pressure, Chinese leaders have adopted a defiant tone, making clear that China stands ready to “push back against hegemony” in defense of its interests[26]. Beijing’s coordination with Moscow has also tightened – the two declared a “no-limits” partnership, and their militaries conduct joint drills. American analysts openly worry that Washington may soon confront a two-front crisis: a simultaneous war with Russia in Eastern Europe and with China in the Western Pacific[27]. The U.S. military, while powerful, would be hard-pressed to fight full-scale wars in Europe and Asia at once, especially as both adversaries possess advanced arsenals (including nuclear weapons). A recent Atlantic Council assessment bluntly stated that the U.S. and its allies “are not currently well-situated to fight a two-front war” against Russia and China, nor even a limited nuclear conflict in two theaters[27]. This capacity gap is fueling urgent debates in Washington about increasing defense budgets and industrial production. The prospect of adding Iran as a third adversary in a concurrent conflict is even more daunting – effectively beyond the bounds of the longstanding U.S. “two-war” force planning construct[28]. In sum, U.S. strategists recognize that a maximalist attempt to confront all revisionist powers simultaneously could overstretch American capabilities and invite disaster.
The third front, the Middle East, saw a dramatic escalation in mid-2025 that underscores the risks of the unrestrained hegemonic approach. In June, Israel and Iran fought a short but intense 12-day war that directly drew in the United States – a conflict many observers would have thought unthinkable a few years prior. The war ignited when Israel, alarmed by advances in Iran’s nuclear program, launched preemptive airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 13, 2025[29][30]. Days later, the U.S. itself joined the hostilities at Israel’s behest: U.S. forces struck Iran’s fortified enrichment sites at Fordow and Natanz with heavy missiles, “completely obliterating” some targets (according to President Trump’s boast)[29][30]. This marked a massive U.S. escalation – the first direct American military attack on Iranian soil in the modern era. Iran retaliated by firing ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest U.S. base in the region, injuring U.S. personnel and dramatically raising the stakes[31]. For a tense period, many feared the Middle East was sliding into a full-scale regional war.
Ultimately, President Trump rushed to broker a ceasefire to halt the spiraling conflict. Within days of the U.S. strikes, Trump announced that Iran and Israel had agreed to a “Complete and Total CEASEFIRE” – what he termed “the 12 Day War … that could have gone on for years and destroyed the Middle East”[32][33]. A fragile truce took hold by late June 2025, though not without hiccups – at one point Israel violated the ceasefire with a further strike (claiming Iranian missiles had been launched post-truce), drawing an angry rebuke from Trump[34][35]. The ceasefire was re-imposed, and active hostilities ceased by the end of June. Each side claimed victory, but the outcome was murky, and the episode’s geopolitical fallout has been significant.
For Israel, this confrontation was a double-edged sword. On one hand, Israel demonstrated it could hit Tehran’s nuclear program even deep underground, and it secured unprecedented U.S. military participation in doing so[30][36]. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu touted the operation as proof of Israel’s determination and thanked Trump for “standing alongside us” in direct action[37]. On the other hand, Israel failed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capacity outright – much of Iran’s know-how and stockpile may survive. There is “no independent confirmation” yet of the extent of damage to Iran’s underground facilities; even the IAEA cannot verify how badly Fordow was hit without on-site inspections[38][39]. Iranian officials have projected confidence, with Iran’s nuclear chief asserting that “preparations for recovery had already been anticipated” and vowing an uninterrupted program despite the strikes[40]. In essence, Iran absorbed the blows and remained unbowed, if bruised. This resiliency – coupled with Iran’s immediate retaliatory capability – has led some commentators to argue that Israel gained little of strategic value from the war. A post-war analysis by New Lines Magazine noted that while Netanyahu claimed success, any victory is questionable: Israel’s campaign imposed only temporary setbacks on Iran, at the cost of inflaming regional tensions and exposing Israeli cities to potential missile strikes in return[41]. Even some Israeli and American experts privately concede that Iran’s nuclear know-how cannot be bombed away, and that the war did not definitively remove the threat that so concerns Israel[42][43]. In fact, the conflict might have hardened Iran’s resolve – Iran’s parliament responded by advancing a bill to suspend cooperation with the IAEA entirely[44] – and weakened the prospect of future diplomatic compromise. Meanwhile, Israel’s resort to large-scale force (and the humanitarian toll of such strikes, even if brief) elicited international criticism, casting Israel once again as an aggressor in the eyes of many.
For the United States, the Iran-Israel war was a stark illustration of lost credibility and complications of fighting on multiple fronts. Washington’s open siding with Israel – including joining in offensive strikes – severely damaged U.S. standing in the Arab and Muslim world. Public opinion polls across the Middle East in late 2023 (during the Gaza war) were already registering record-low approval of the U.S., and those sentiments intensified by 2025. According to Gallup-affiliated polling, a mere 7% of respondents in six key Arab countries viewed America’s role in the Israel-Gaza/Iran conflicts positively, while nearly half saw Russia positively and around 40% even saw Iran as having a positive impact[45][46]. In contrast, the perception of the U.S. was overwhelmingly negative – a direct result of U.S. support for what many viewed as Israeli aggression[47]. This collapse in goodwill (“losing Arab hearts and minds” as one analysis put it[47]) has real strategic ramifications: it bolsters America’s geopolitical competitors (who are seen as counterbalancing Israel) and risks fueling radicalization. The episode also highlighted diverging interests between the U.S. and its great power rivals: notably, Russia and China, despite their strategic ties to Iran, chose not to intervene directly. Their responses were limited to rhetoric and diplomatic moves (e.g. jointly drafting a UN ceasefire resolution)[48][49]. Privately, Iranian officials were “frustrated” that Moscow and Beijing did not offer more tangible support during the crisis[49][50]. This suggests that while Russia and China oppose U.S. actions and gave Iran political cover, they avoided being dragged into a direct war with the U.S. over Iran – a sign of caution in the nascent multipolar coalition[51]. In effect, the United States was able to act with a degree of impunity militarily, but at the cost of its moral authority and influence. The war also tied down U.S. military resources and attention in yet another theater, even as the Ukraine war and Indo-Pacific tensions continued. Critics argue that this is precisely the scenario a hegemonic U.S. must avoid: spreading itself thin in conflicts against multiple regional powers simultaneously.
Finally, it is worth noting how these multi-front pressures have fractured domestic U.S. politics and narratives. President Trump’s hardline stance on China and Iran, and his embrace of ultra-hawkish pro-Israel positions, have alienated some of his original “America First” base. Trump rose to power on promises of avoiding endless foreign wars and prioritizing domestic renewal. Yet by 2025, he had presided over deepening involvement in foreign conflicts – from Europe to the Middle East – and seemed, in the eyes of critics, to be doing the bidding of neoconservative “globalists” and pro-Israel hardliners rather than sticking to his non-interventionist instincts. Notably, a segment of right-wing populists and conservative Christians in the U.S. began voicing dissent over unqualified U.S. support for Israel as Gaza and southern Lebanon suffered devastation. Even some who “consider themselves pro-Israel” expressed concern about America being “entangled in yet another Middle Eastern war,” and questioned the “ironclad” alliance with Israel as the Gaza conflict turned into a humanitarian catastrophe[52][53]. More fervently, a wing of Trump’s evangelical base – self-described “America First” Christians – grew “seething” in their criticism of Israel and started turning on Trump for siding with what they see as a morally indefensible campaign in Gaza[54][55]. This unprecedented MAGA infighting underscores that the old neoconservative agenda of unconditional support for Israeli military action is no longer universally accepted even among American conservatives. Trump’s alignment with Israel’s most hardline policies (cheered by the pro-Israel lobby) thus splintered his coalition, with some supporters accusing him of being “owned” by those very globalist and Zionist interests he once railed against. In an ironic twist, Trump – who in 2016 lambasted foreign influence and promised to put “America First” – found himself in 2025 justifying U.S. participation in a distant war at Israel’s behest. This has, as commentators note, tarnished the MAGA brand and undercut U.S. claims to moral high ground, since America is now seen by many as complicit in the humanitarian crises resulting from its allies’ actions[47][45]. The net effect is that the United States has not only lost credibility abroad but, in some respects, the respect of the world, as even friendly populations question U.S. motives and competence in managing global stability.
Ukraine and the Alaska Summit: East Holds the Cards?
One of the clearest manifestations of BRICS-oriented power challenging the West is playing out in the resolution (or lack thereof) of the Ukraine war. As mentioned, Russia has withstood Western pressure in part thanks to the implicit support of fellow BRICS giants like China (which ramped up purchases of Russian energy) and India (which maintained neutrality and trade). With Ukraine’s counteroffensives making only modest progress and Russian forces entrenching, there is a palpable sense that Ukraine may not be able to win militarily given current dynamics. By August 2025, even U.S. officials tacitly acknowledged Ukraine’s struggles – the conflict is at best a costly stalemate, and at worst, trending in Russia’s favor[56][24].
This context set the stage for the extraordinary Trump-Putin summit in Anchorage, Alaska, scheduled for mid-August 2025 – the first such meeting of Trump’s second term. The very optics of this summit illustrate how much the geopolitical tables have turned since the early 2000s. Rather than a triumphant U.S. dictating terms, we see an American president flying to a remote location to personally negotiate with an isolated (but unyielding) Kremlin leader in hopes of ending a war that is draining Western unity and resources. Commentators note the irony that Putin now comes to the table holding considerable leverage, while the U.S. side is constrained in its options. Trump’s own advisors are publicly lowering expectations, calling the meeting a “listening exercise”[57][58]. There is open debate in Washington about which Trump will show up: will it be the tougher-sounding Trump who recently complained about Russia’s missile strikes, or the Trump who historically flattered Putin and might be “bamboozled” into a deal favoring Moscow[59]? European allies, for their part, are alarmed at the prospect of a separate peace that sacrifices Ukrainian territory. A former U.S. diplomat warned it’s a “reasonable concern” that Trump might be outplayed and “cut a terrible deal at Ukraine’s expense.”[59] The fact that such warnings are issued underscores that U.S. credibility and leverage have waned – it is Russia, through battlefield realities, that holds many of the cards.
Trump’s approach since regaining office hints at concessions to Russian interests. Earlier in 2025, his administration eased pressure on Russia and even echoed some of Moscow’s narratives: for example, a special envoy in March implied Russia had a legitimate claim to parts of Ukraine because those regions are Russian-speaking[60][61]. Such statements delighted the Kremlin and dismayed Kyiv. Moreover, when Trump floated a possible second summit including Ukraine’s President Zelensky, it was framed as conditional on Putin’s goodwill and the success of the initial talks[62] – again suggesting that Moscow’s cooperation is the linchpin. All of this reflects a power inversion: a U.S. president is effectively pleading with a Russian president to negotiate, in order to extricate the U.S. from a costly proxy war. As one Reuters analysis put it, Trump’s history of placating Putin has raised concerns, but even if he tries a harsher line now, the U.S. has limited tools left beyond persuading Russia with inducements[59][63]. Simply put, Washington cannot dictate terms to Moscow as it might have in the unipolar moment – instead, it must engage in realpolitik bargaining. The Alaska summit symbolizes how Eastern powers “hold the cards” in ways they haven’t for decades: Putin comes to talks not as a defeated pariah, but as the leader of a nation that has survived everything the West threw at it, buoyed by trade with China and diplomatic support from much of the non-Western world[9].
It would be an exaggeration to say the U.S. holds “none, zero” of the cards – the West still has significant economic and military might, and Ukraine’s brave resistance has not collapsed. But there is no doubt that the multipolar dynamic (with Russia and China in particular aligning) has circumscribed U.S. power. American threats are less fearsome when adversaries have alternative markets and allies; American offers carry less allure when many countries are exploring financial systems beyond U.S. control. The Ukraine conflict’s trajectory – ending not in a clear Western victory, but in fraught negotiations – may be the first major post-Cold War crisis where the U.S. cannot unilaterally shape the outcome. BRICS’ influence is indirect but crucial here: Russia’s ability to wage war this long is partly because BRICS economies softened the blow of sanctions[9], and international fatigue with U.S. sanctions has grown. For the future, the outcome in Ukraine will set a precedent for U.S. credibility. If Trump is seen as “holding none of the cards” and essentially ceding to a Russian fait accompli, it will validate the view that American hegemony has decisively eroded. If, conversely, the U.S. manages to secure a just peace (one that preserves Ukraine’s core sovereignty) through deft diplomacy, it might salvage some leadership prestige – but even that would require acknowledging Russia’s security concerns to a degree unthinkable a few years ago. Either way, the era of total Western primacy in setting global security terms is being supplanted by genuine multipolar bargaining. The Alaska summit is a microcosm of that new reality.
Middle East Aftershocks: Israel’s Position and Global Perceptions
The fallout of the Iran-Israel 12-day war is still unfolding, but it offers a vivid case study in the changing global order. Historically, Israel – backed by the U.S. – could count on quick military dominance over any regional foe, as seen in past conflicts. This time, while Israel dealt serious blows to Iran’s nuclear facilities, it did not emerge as an unambiguous victor. Iran’s ability to retaliate (striking a U.S. base in the Gulf) and to force a ceasefire after less than two weeks showed that even a regional middle power like Iran can withstand a confrontation with the U.S.-Israel duo, at least to a draw[64][32]. From Iran’s perspective, simply emerging from the war with its regime and core capabilities intact was a strategic success: Tehran proved that an attack on its soil would be met with fire (deterring future strikes), and it likely bolstered nationalist support at home for its nuclear stance. In the wider Muslim world, Iran’s stock rose for having stood up to Israel. Surveys indicate that across Arab countries, many people viewed Iran’s role in the war positively, in contrast to Israel and the U.S.[45][46]. This is a remarkable turnaround from a decade ago, when Iran was often seen with suspicion by Sunni Arab publics; U.S. and Israeli actions have effectively driven much of Arab public opinion to see Iran as a heroic resistor against Western aggression. Such public perception shifts highlight a loss of U.S./Israeli soft power. When only 2% of Jordanians, for example, think the U.S. had a positive role in the war, but a third praise China and nearly half praise Russia[45][46], it underscores how the narrative of who is “on the right side” has flipped in many eyes. The West no longer automatically commands the moral high ground.
For Israel itself, the war exposed some strategic vulnerabilities. Israel remains militarily powerful, but its limitations were laid bare: it needed U.S. help to carry out the most critical strikes (particularly the bunker-busting of Fordow), indicating that Israel alone might lack the capability or confidence to strike Iran’s hardened sites[30][36]. Moreover, once Iran retaliated directly against U.S. forces, the conflict’s escalation had to be contained by Washington – Israel could not simply continue pounding Iran without risking a wider conflagration that even the U.S. did not want. In essence, Israel’s freedom of action was circumscribed by the risk of Iranian escalation. The quick ceasefire, enforced by Trump’s pressure on Netanyahu (Trump went so far as to publicly order “ALL planes” to stand down and “head home” after Israel violated the truce[35]), signaled that Israel could not dictate the course of the war once other great powers (the U.S., and potentially Russia/China diplomatically) became involved. This was a humbling moment: Israel, often seen as the Middle East’s preeminent military, had to abide by terms set in part by others.
Unsurprisingly, some analysts have dusted off the old epithet of “paper tiger” to describe Israel’s predicament. Years ago, a U.S. military analyst warned that if Israel got into a full-scale war (say with Hezbollah in Lebanon, or with Iran), it could be exposed as “nothing more than a ‘paper tiger’ … all bluster and threat with no ability to back them up,” likely to “lose catastrophically” in a drawn-out fight[65][66]. While “catastrophic loss” is an overstatement in the recent war (Israel was not defeated on the battlefield), the spirit of that warning resonates – Israel’s deterrence has taken a hit. Its enemies saw that Israel hesitated to launch a ground invasion or prolonged strikes on Iran, likely out of fear of missile barrages on Israeli cities or a regional missile war involving Hezbollah. In Gaza (2023) and Lebanon (with Hezbollah skirmishes in 2024), Israel also encountered protracted resistance that made quick victory elusive. All this contributes to a new image: Israel can inflict tremendous damage, but it struggles to decisively crush well-prepared adversaries, especially without incurring unacceptable costs. For a state whose survival strategy hinges on appearing invulnerable, this perceptual shift is dangerous. It encourages Iran and militant groups to be bolder, and it even stokes debate within Israel about the wisdom of perpetual conflict. A senior Iranian official gloated after the ceasefire that Israel failed to destroy Iran’s program and had been “taught a lesson”; conversely, Israel’s hardliners insist they must rearm and be ready to hit Iran again, lest Tehran rebuild its nuclear capability. This cycle sets the stage for future showdowns – but next time, Israel may find even less international tolerance for its preventative strikes, and an even more emboldened set of adversaries.
Netanyahu’s government, dominated by ultranationalists, continues to talk of expanding Israeli settlements and power – the so-called “Greater Israel” vision. If Israel interprets the 12-day war as merely a pause before the next confrontation (rather than a signal to seek a diplomatic modus vivendi), it could launch further military operations (for instance, a renewed campaign in Gaza or a strike on Hezbollah). However, any such moves would now carry higher risk. The Gaza war of 2023 already severely tarnished Israel’s global standing, with numerous countries (including in Europe) condemning the scale of Palestinian civilian casualties. Another round could trigger even harsher international blowback, possibly sanctions or arms embargoes that Israel has long avoided. Furthermore, Israel’s reliance on U.S. backing has come under scrutiny. Trump’s unequivocal support gave Israel leeway in 2023–25, but U.S. politics are volatile – and as noted, even Trump’s own base showed signs of war-weariness and discontent with blank-check support to Israel[53][67]. A future U.S. administration (especially if leadership changes in 2028 or if Congress shifts) might not be so obliging. Thus, if Netanyahu continues on a maximalist path – rejecting compromises and pursuing dominance over Palestinians and neighbors – he might be courting “deadly” outcomes for Israel itself, as some commentators warn. In a worst-case scenario, an overstretched Israel could trigger a multi-front war (Iran, Hezbollah, perhaps others) that it cannot win without devastating losses. Such warnings echo inside Israel too: many security professionals have cautioned that the country’s current trajectory (escalating conflicts, eroding democratic norms internally) is unsustainable and endangers Israel’s long-term viability.
In balanced perspective, Israel is not about to disappear – it remains a regional superpower with nuclear weapons and advanced technology. But the myth of invincibility that surrounded the “Western hegemon’s sheriff” in the Middle East has been punctured. The recent war showed that even with U.S. support, Israel had to halt at the brink of a wider abyss. And critically, the rest of the world did not uniformly rally behind Israel. Instead, major powers like China positioned themselves as neutral peace-brokers (Beijing quickly called for ceasefire and offered to mediate)[48], enhancing their image as responsible stakeholders. Russia condemned U.S.-Israeli strikes as “irresponsible…unprovoked aggression” (with some irony, given Russia’s own behavior in Ukraine)[68], but then pointedly kept negotiating with the U.S. on other issues, signaling it would not let Iran derail its broader agenda[69]. Europe was split – some NATO countries quietly supported the idea of curbing Iran, but the EU as a whole tried (unsuccessfully) to dissuade Trump and Netanyahu from military action, preferring a return to the Iran nuclear deal framework[43][70]. Thus, the West was not monolithic either.
The bigger picture is that the Middle East is no longer an exclusive Western sphere where the U.S. and its ally Israel can operate unchecked. Other actors – Russia, China, Iran, Turkey – now exert significant influence, and global public opinion heavily factors in. The war illustrated that if the West overplays its hand (e.g. by supporting actions that look like aggression or neo-colonial intervention), rivals will pounce on the PR opportunity and much of the “Global South” will side with those rivals or at least not side with the West. This is a fundamental change from the early 1990s unipolar moment. It means any future attempts by the U.S. to project force (be it to contain China, confront Russia, or support allies like Israel) will be viewed with far more skepticism internationally, and may spur counter-coalitions. In essence, Western hegemonic actions now incur higher reputational and strategic costs, accelerating the multipolar dynamic further.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the current state of global politics is one of transition and profound tension between old power structures and new realities. The points raised by various political commentators – that Western hegemony is faltering, that Trump’s unilateralist tactics backfired, that the world is moving inexorably toward multipolarity – are grounded in observable trends, though they sometimes overstate the immediacy of U.S. “insignificance.” The West, led by the United States, still possesses vast economic and military strength and retains close alliances (e.g. NATO, G7) that collectively outmatch any rival bloc in many metrics. The U.S. dollar remains, for now, the primary global reserve currency and has even seen its dominance reinforced in some aspects by recent turmoil[71]. However, it is equally true that Western dominance is no longer unchallenged or unchallengeable. Efforts to prevent the rise of alternative centers of power – whether via tariffs, sanctions, or military intervention – have yielded diminishing returns and often unintended consequences. Trump’s attempt to bully BRICS into submission with tariff threats arguably strengthened BRICS resolve and hastened moves away from the dollar[13][15]. Western sanctions and ostracism drove Russia deeper into partnership with China and spurred a wave of de-dollarization talks. Military overreach in the Middle East eroded Western moral authority and made space for Russia and China to present themselves as responsible mediators. Meanwhile, countries like South Africa, India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have asserted their strategic autonomy, refusing to simply “choose sides” as the West often demands.
The war between the “West” and the emergent BRICS-led coalition is not a traditional war – it is a complex mix of economic competition, proxy conflicts, information battles, and diplomatic realignments. Washington’s attempt to maintain its post-Cold War primacy by force or coercion has indeed pushed some countries closer to the Sino-Russian camp. If the U.S. continues down a path of trying to “keep BRICS from evolving” primarily through threats and punitive measures, it may accelerate the very outcomes it fears: fragmentation of the global financial system, formation of parallel institutions, and the loss of U.S. influence over large portions of the globe[13][19]. A more sustainable strategy, many suggest, would be to adapt to multipolarity – accepting a reality of multiple power centers and seeking new arrangements of coexistence. That could mean negotiating arms control and spheres of influence (however politically unpalatable that sounds in the West), revitalizing international institutions with greater input from non-Western powers, and focusing on multilateral diplomacy rather than ultimatums.
In the specific arenas discussed: the resolution of the Ukraine war will likely require acknowledging some Russian security concerns (short of fully validating aggression) in exchange for peace – a purely “winner-takes-all” approach is unrealistic now. In trade and finance, the U.S. might need to find a modus vivendi with China and BRICS on currency and trade rules, rather than attempting to sanction away every alternative (which is impractical in the long run). In the Middle East, addressing root causes – such as rethinking the stalled Israel-Palestine peace process and Iran’s legitimate security interests – could reduce the frequency of wars that tarnish everyone’s reputation. Western hegemony, in essence, must evolve into Western leadership within a multipolar partnership, rather than hegemony maintained by force. If not, the cycle of conflict and counter-coalition will continue, potentially to the detriment of global stability and with the West finding itself increasingly isolated.
The critical tone of the commentators’ points is understandable – recent U.S. missteps have been costly. However, a nuanced academic perspective recognizes that we are in a fluid moment: the unipolar era is ending, but a new equilibrium is still forming. The U.S.-led “West” and the BRICS/”East” are not strictly binary enemies; there is overlap and room for negotiation. Europe, for one, remains caught in the middle – a traditional Western pillar that also seeks engagement with BRICS giants for economic reasons. Countries like Saudi Arabia or Turkey float between camps. This flux means outright “war” between West and BRICS can likely be avoided if cooler heads prevail, but it also means both sides will test each other’s resolve. In 2025, the tests have been fierce: tariff wars, proxy shooting wars, and diplomatic snubs. Going forward, the measure of global leadership will be who can steer these tests toward peaceful settlements and mutual respect. The West, if it wants to retain global respect, will have to demonstrate humility and a willingness to share power – accepting a multipolar world as the reality that it is, rather than fighting against the tide. Otherwise, as the events discussed demonstrate, attempts to impose unipolar dominance will only hasten its demise, with potentially dangerous consequences for all sides.
Sources:
- Associated Press – Trump’s BRICS gaffe and tariff threats[1][2]
- Carnegie Endowment – U.S. views on BRICS and its expansion[3][9]
- China-US Focus – Analysis of Trump’s 100% tariff threat and multipolar currency impacts[13][15]
- Reuters (Aug 14, 2025) – Preview of Trump-Putin Alaska meeting, Ukraine war status[24][59]
- Reuters (Jan 31, 2025) – Trump warning BRICS against dollar replacement, Russian response[14][19]
- Reuters (Apr 14, 2025) – China’s hardline response to Trump’s tariffs (“wartime” footing)[10][11]
- CBS News – U.S. lawmakers threaten South Africa’s trade benefits over Russia ties[21][22]
- Atlantic Council (Fikra Forum) – Polling of Arab public opinion on U.S. vs. China/Russia/Iran during Gaza war[45][46]
- CNA (Analysis, July 2025) – Russia and China’s limited support to Iran during 12-day war, Iranian frustration[49][50]
- Al Jazeera – Explainer on the 12-day Israel-Iran war and its aftermath (ceasefire, claims)[32][40]
- New Lines Magazine – U.S. Christian conservative base turning critical of Trump’s pro-Israel stance amid Gaza war[53][67]
- Tasnim News Agency – “Israel a ‘paper tiger’” comments by U.S. analyst (context for military limitations)[65][72]
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[27] Toplines: The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a …
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[41] What Did Israel Achieve With Its 12-Day War Against Iran?
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[62] Live updates: Trump raises possibility of Zelensky joining him and Putin in Alaska – The Washington Post
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