There is a recurring pattern at the beginning of modern wars. Governments describe their objectives confidently, military superiority appears measurable, analysts calculate force ratios, and predictions emerge that the decisive phase will take weeks or months. Then the enemy adapts.

That has happened spectacularly in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion, launched on 24 February 2022, is now approaching four and a half years of continuous warfare. Moscow failed to capture Kyiv or destroy the Ukrainian state in the opening campaign. Yet Ukraine also failed to expel Russia, and Russian forces still occupy approximately 20% of internationally recognised Ukrainian territory. Peace negotiations exist intermittently, but on 21 August Moscow was still insisting that any settlement recognise the “realities on the ground”, while Washington acknowledged that a rapid resolution was unlikely. (Reuters)

Something remarkably similar has happened in the newer Middle Eastern war. The United States and Israel launched large-scale coordinated attacks on Iran on 28 February 2026. The operation killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior Iranian commanders and struck military and nuclear-related facilities. President Donald Trump subsequently suggested that the central objectives of the campaign could be completed within weeks. Almost six months later, the Islamic Republic remains in power, Iran retains substantial missile and regional capabilities, the nuclear question is unresolved, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted, and an attempted ceasefire has largely collapsed. (Reuters)

So who is winning?

The answer depends on what “winning” means. If it means destroying more targets, controlling more territory or possessing greater conventional military power, there are relatively straightforward answers. If it means achieving the political objectives for which the war was started, the picture becomes very different.

Ukraine: Russia has the land, but not the victory it expected

Russia remains the stronger power in conventional terms. It has a much larger population, a substantial defence-industrial base, large missile and drone inventories and the ability to sustain enormous casualties. Most importantly, it possesses territory. Roughly one-fifth of Ukraine remains under Russian occupation, including Crimea and large portions of the east and south. (Reuters)

Territory matters. A war cannot be judged entirely by percentages on a map, but possession creates bargaining power. If hostilities were frozen tomorrow along the existing line, Russia would physically retain a substantial part of Ukraine and the land corridor to Crimea.

That represents an undeniable Russian advantage.

Yet the battlefield situation is considerably less favourable to Moscow than the simple territorial figure suggests.

Russian advances since the major territorial changes of 2022 have generally been extraordinarily slow. A July 2026 CSIS assessment estimated Russian advances around some major axes at only tens of metres per day and concluded that Russian territorial control actually contracted during April and May 2026. CSIS estimated Russian battlefield casualties at around 1.4 million since February 2022, although wartime casualty statistics from all sides must be treated cautiously. (CSIS)

Ukraine has also demonstrated that Russia’s gains are not irreversible. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in August that Ukrainian forces had regained approximately 745 square kilometres during 2026. Russia, meanwhile, claimed the capture of 19 settlements during its summer campaign. Neither set of battlefield claims should be treated as perfectly precise, but together they describe something important: this is no longer a battlefield on which one army is simply advancing and the other retreating. Territory is changing hands locally while the strategic front moves very slowly. (Reuters)

Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated drone war has become central to this change. Ukrainian forces are striking logistics centres, ammunition stores, military facilities and energy infrastructure deep inside Russia and Russian-occupied territory. ISW reported in August that Ukrainian operations against Russian logistics and the expansion of Ukrainian drone-controlled “kill zones” were reducing Russia’s operational tempo. (Institute for the Study of War)

This matters because Ukraine cannot realistically compete with Russia shell-for-shell, missile-for-missile or soldier-for-soldier indefinitely. Its answer has increasingly been engineering rather than mass: drones, automation, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, distributed manufacturing and relatively inexpensive weapons attacking expensive targets.

Russia has adapted in turn.

Its most important present advantage may therefore not be territorial movement but its growing capacity to punish Ukraine from the air. Russia has expanded long-range drone infrastructure and intensified missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Civilian casualties rose sharply during the summer. On 19 August a major attack on Kyiv killed 17 people, while Ukrainian authorities said shortages of Patriot interceptors were limiting their ability to stop ballistic missiles. Ukraine says allied deliveries of missile interceptors in 2026 have fallen to roughly one-third of their 2025 level. (Reuters)

The Middle Eastern war is actually contributing to this problem. Western and particularly American air-defence resources have competing demands elsewhere.

Ukraine also continues to face a problem Russia does not face to the same degree: dependence on outsiders. NATO and European states remain heavily committed, and mechanisms such as the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List continue financing critical American systems. Allies announced another $1 billion package in June, while European governments are again meeting to discuss increased support. (Reuters)

But dependency creates uncertainty. Moscow can reasonably calculate that political priorities in Washington, Berlin, Paris or London may eventually change. Ukraine cannot make the same calculation about Russian war production disappearing.

Russia, however, has its own clock ticking.

The wartime economic boom produced by enormous state expenditure is fading. Moscow reduced its 2026 growth forecast to only 0.4%, while high interest rates, sanctions, taxation and the diversion of resources towards military production are placing growing pressure on civilian industry. Even prominent Russian businessmen have publicly complained about economic conditions. (Reuters)

Ukraine’s strategy therefore increasingly appears to be an attempt to make time work against Russia: prevent a decisive breakthrough, destroy logistics and energy assets, keep Russian casualty rates high, maintain Western support and gradually increase the economic cost of continuing the war.

Russia’s strategy is almost the mirror image: remain militarily and politically durable for longer than Ukraine and its supporters, continue applying pressure to Ukrainian society, exploit manpower and missile advantages, and eventually force negotiations from a position in which Russian territorial possession becomes permanent.

So who is winning in Ukraine?

At present, Russia has the stronger negotiating position because it holds approximately 20% of Ukraine and can still impose enormous destruction. On that narrow measure, Russia is ahead.

But Russia is not achieving anything resembling the decisive victory envisaged in February 2022. Ukraine remains independent, heavily armed, increasingly integrated with Europe and capable of striking targets hundreds of kilometres inside Russia. Russian forces have paid an extraordinary price for relatively small additional territorial gains.

Equally, Ukraine cannot credibly claim victory while one-fifth of the country remains occupied and its cities remain vulnerable to sustained Russian bombardment.

The best description in August 2026 is therefore a strategic stalemate with a Russian territorial advantage but an increasingly contested battlefield initiative.

Russia is ahead on the map. Neither side is close to winning the war.

The US–Israel–Iran war: overwhelming firepower meets strategic survival

The Iran conflict is even more revealing because the conventional imbalance is enormous.

There is little doubt which side would win a traditional contest of air forces, intelligence systems, precision strike capabilities and high-end military technology. The United States possesses capabilities Iran cannot remotely match, while Israel has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to penetrate Iranian airspace and intelligence networks.

The opening campaign illustrated this brutally. The February attacks killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior military commanders and severely damaged Iranian infrastructure. Iran’s political leadership was decapitated to a degree that would have paralysed many states. (Reuters)

Yet Iran did not collapse.

The Islamic Republic’s deliberately layered political and military structure survived. Mojtaba Khamenei formally succeeded his father, while the Revolutionary Guards became even more important within the wartime state. Reuters subsequently reported that real power had increasingly migrated towards the IRGC and national-security apparatus. (Reuters)

That survival itself changed the definition of victory.

American and Israeli objectives have at various times included eliminating or severely restricting Iran’s nuclear programme, degrading its ballistic missiles, weakening Hezbollah and other Iranian-aligned forces, limiting Tehran’s regional power and, at the most ambitious end, encouraging regime change.

After six months, none has been decisively achieved.

Most strikingly, the nuclear question remains unresolved. The IAEA’s first post-war assessment reported little observable change in the underlying nuclear issue and said inspectors still lacked reliable knowledge of the location and condition of important enriched-uranium stocks. Destroying facilities is not the same thing as destroying technical knowledge, nuclear material or the political decision to pursue a programme. (Reuters)

Iran therefore provides a textbook example of the difference between military destruction and strategic defeat.

The US and Israel can destroy Iranian installations. Iran cannot prevent every strike. But Tehran does not need to defeat the United States Air Force to deny Washington victory. It needs to survive, retain the ability to retaliate and impose costs greater than Washington is politically willing to continue paying.

The Strait of Hormuz has become its most powerful instrument.

Before the war, roughly one-fifth of global crude oil and LNG flows passed through the strait. By August, traffic had collapsed. Reuters reported periods in which only single-digit numbers of commodity vessels crossed each day; on 21 August just seven were recorded. Oil flows through the strait have fallen dramatically from pre-war levels, although exact quantities vary and some vessels operate without normal tracking. (Reuters)

This transforms Iran’s geography into a strategic weapon.

Iran cannot economically survive indefinitely with its own exports blockaded. But neither can the wider world treat Hormuz as irrelevant. By threatening shipping, attacking vessels and creating sufficient uncertainty to deter commercial traffic, Tehran can export part of the cost of the war to countries that are not participants in it.

Oil prices have consequently remained elevated, with Brent closing above $94 a barrel on 21 August. Higher energy costs feed inflation throughout Europe, Asia and the United States. (Reuters)

That is asymmetric warfare on a global scale.

Iran is nevertheless paying an immense price.

Its economy is in severe distress. Reuters reported inflation of approximately 66% in July and food prices up dramatically year-on-year. Infrastructure has been damaged, the currency has weakened, unemployment has risen and the US naval blockade has restricted Iran’s ability to export oil and import goods. Washington is now preparing an even tougher sanctions regime. (Reuters)

If the war becomes principally a contest of economic endurance, Iran begins from a far weaker position.

But America is not fighting without costs either. The Pentagon put the direct cost of the campaign at $37.5 billion by July, with additional funding required. American personnel have been killed and hundreds injured, while the conflict is consuming expensive precision weapons and air-defence interceptors. (Reuters)

There is also a political price. A Reuters/Ipsos poll in August placed President Trump’s approval at 33%, while 80% of Americans surveyed believed the Iran war would be prolonged. High petrol prices have made a distant conflict directly visible to American voters. (Reuters)

Iran’s regional network compounds the problem. Tehran’s partners are not a single centrally controlled military alliance, and the term “Iranian proxies” can obscure significant independence among them. Nevertheless, Hezbollah, the Houthis and armed groups in Iraq give Iran multiple theatres through which pressure can be exerted.

Houthi activity around the Bab el-Mandeb creates a second threat to maritime trade. Iranian-aligned Iraqi forces create risks for American and Gulf facilities. Lebanon has intermittently become part of the confrontation. Gulf states themselves have been drawn closer to the conflict despite attempting to avoid becoming direct combatants. (Reuters)

This makes the war extraordinarily difficult to terminate because there is no single battlefield on which victory can be declared.

So who is winning the Iran war?

If one measures military dominance, the answer is unquestionably the United States and Israel. They can penetrate Iranian territory, destroy infrastructure and impose damage at a level Iran cannot reciprocate conventionally.

If one measures economic damage, Iran is also clearly losing. Its economy is being squeezed far harder than America’s or Israel’s.

But if the original objectives included eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme, neutralising its missile capability, collapsing the Islamic Republic or removing Iran as a major regional security problem, the US–Israeli campaign has not delivered victory.

Iran has survived. Its government remains functional. Its security apparatus has consolidated power. Its nuclear programme has not been verifiably eliminated. It retains the ability to threaten US bases, neighbouring states and global shipping.

A Reuters assessment following the June ceasefire described Iran as battered but intact and noted that the United States had failed to achieve its most ambitious objectives. (Reuters)

The current judgement is therefore almost the reverse of Ukraine:

The United States and Israel are winning the conventional military contest, while Iran is so far winning the more limited strategic contest of avoiding defeat.

Neither amounts to overall victory.

Why are both wars proving so difficult to end?

The two conflicts look radically different, but they share a fundamental characteristic: the stronger military power is trying to convert material superiority into political submission, while the weaker side is trying simply to remain viable long enough to make that submission too expensive.

Russia discovered this in Ukraine. Its military superiority did not make Ukrainians accept Russian political control.

The United States and Israel are discovering something similar with Iran. Destroying air-defence systems, command centres and nuclear facilities does not necessarily compel a large state of more than 90 million people to accept another country’s political terms.

Modern technology also favours survival in unexpected ways. Cheap drones threaten expensive equipment. Missiles can circumvent conventional front lines. Commercial satellites make surprise harder. Distributed production replaces destroyed factories. Electronic warfare changes tactics within weeks. A state that survives the first attack can learn remarkably quickly.

The economics of war have changed as well. Ukraine attacks Russian refineries and logistics. Russia attacks Ukrainian infrastructure. Iran attacks maritime commerce. The United States blockades Iranian exports. Wars are increasingly contests between interconnected industrial, financial, energy and information systems rather than simply armies occupying terrain.

Most importantly, neither losing side yet believes that accepting the opponent’s terms would be preferable to continuing the war.

That is the real reason there is no obvious end date.

Conclusion: who is winning?

In Ukraine, Russia is presently ahead in the most visible metric: territory. It controls approximately one-fifth of Ukraine and retains formidable missile, manpower and industrial advantages. But its original objective of subjugating Ukraine has failed, its territorial advances are extraordinarily slow, casualties and economic costs are immense, and Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to regain ground and conduct increasingly effective deep strikes.

Verdict: slight Russian advantage, but strategic stalemate.

In the US–Israel–Iran war, the United States and Israel possess overwhelming conventional superiority and have inflicted immense physical and economic damage. But Iran has accomplished the minimum requirement for an asymmetric strategic victory: it has not been defeated. Its regime survived the killing of its supreme leader, its nuclear question remains unresolved, its missiles and regional networks remain relevant, and its ability to disrupt Hormuz has imposed costs on the entire world.

Verdict: US–Israeli tactical and military superiority, but no strategic victory; Iran remains battered but undefeated.

The uncomfortable possibility is that both wars could continue for considerably longer.

Russia believes time may eventually fracture Western support for Ukraine. Ukraine believes technological adaptation and the accumulating economic cost of war can make Russia’s present strategy unsustainable. Washington believes military and economic pressure can eventually force Tehran into concessions. Tehran believes endurance, regional escalation and disruption of global energy markets can make continued American involvement politically unacceptable.

Each side therefore possesses a theory explaining why tomorrow may be more favourable than today.

And as long as every major belligerent believes that, compromise remains more frightening than another month of war.

That is why neither conflict presently looks close to ending—and why asking simply who is winning may ultimately be less important than asking which side will first decide that continuing to fight offers less than negotiating from the position it already has.

The key distinction I would retain from the paper is: Russia is currently somewhat ahead in Ukraine because territory is the ultimate bargaining asset, whereas the US and Israel are militarily dominant against Iran but have so far failed to turn that dominance into the political outcome they sought. In neither war would I describe the present leader as being close to victory.

Given how quickly both fronts are moving, I can also monitor them and produce an updated “who is winning?” assessment when the strategic balance materially changes.

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The picture remains fluid, and several claims are disputed. What is clear is that the attacks were among the most serious challenges to Mali’s ruling junta since it turned decisively away from France and Western security partnerships and toward Moscow. The violence hit not only remote northern areas, where insurgent and separatist forces have long operated, but also sensitive sites near Bamako itself, including the garrison town of Kati and areas close to the capital’s international airport. (AP News)

A coordinated strike across the state

The attacks began on 25 April 2026 and involved multiple theatres at once. Reports describe assaults in or around Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Sévaré, Gao and other strategic locations. The attackers reportedly included fighters linked to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, known as JNIM, an al-Qaeda-linked coalition (CIA), alongside Tuareg separatist elements associated with the Azawad Liberation Front. (AP News)

This was not a routine insurgent raid. It appears to have been designed to stretch the Malian military across several fronts, test the government’s command structure, and create the impression that the state could no longer secure its core institutions. Bamako and Kati matter because they are political and military nerve centres. Kidal matters because it has long been a symbol of northern autonomy, rebellion and the limits of central authority.

The Malian authorities and Russia framed the offensive as a failed coup attempt rather than merely a battlefield escalation. Moscow’s Defence Ministry claimed that Africa Corps units, fighting alongside Malian forces, helped prevent the fall of strategic locations and stopped an operation intended to destabilise the government. Russian sources also claimed the attackers numbered in the thousands, although such figures have not been independently verified. (Reuters)

Goïta reappears and signals continuity

For a period after the attacks began, uncertainty surrounded the status of Mali’s military leader, Assimi Goïta. His absence from public view encouraged speculation about the stability of the junta and whether the attacks had caused deeper disruption inside the state. On 28 April, Goïta reappeared publicly, met Russia’s ambassador in Bamako, and stated that the situation was under control. (AP News)

That appearance was politically important. It allowed the government to signal three things at once: that the leadership had survived, that the army remained functional, and that the Russian partnership remained intact. In a crisis built as much around perception as territory, Goïta’s reappearance was intended to close the door on rumours of collapse.

Yet the government’s claim of control does not mean the crisis is over. Several reports indicate that Kidal either fell to separatist forces or was vacated by Malian and Russian personnel under pressure. Reuters reported that Goïta acknowledged ongoing military operations, while other reporting indicates that armed groups had made gains in the north and centre of the country. (Reuters)

The Africa Corps factor

The Russian Africa Corps is central to the political meaning of this episode. After France’s drawdown and the end of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, Russia became Bamako’s most important external security partner. That relationship is not merely military. It is part of a wider geopolitical shift across the Sahel, where juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sought to break with the old French-led security architecture and build new relationships with Moscow.

For Bamako, Russian support offers immediate battlefield value, political protection and a message of sovereignty: Mali will choose its own partners and will not be dictated to by Paris, Brussels or Washington. For Moscow, Mali is a strategic foothold in West Africa, a demonstration that Russia can still project influence outside Europe, and a symbol of the post-French Sahel.

In this crisis, Russia’s Africa Corps claimed a decisive role in preventing the government’s overthrow. Mali’s allies in the transitional authorities also credited the Russian force with helping secure the state. But the battlefield record is more complicated. Reports from several outlets suggest Russian and Malian forces withdrew from Kidal and that Russia may now be forced to concentrate more heavily on defending the capital and key southern corridors rather than projecting control across the north. (The Guardian)

That is the contradiction at the centre of the story. Russia may have helped prevent a political collapse in Bamako, while still suffering a strategic setback in northern Mali.

A blow to the junta’s security promise

Since taking power, Mali’s military leadership has built much of its legitimacy on the promise of restoring sovereignty and security. It expelled or sidelined Western military partners, embraced Russia, and argued that a harder, more sovereign security doctrine would succeed where years of French-led intervention had failed.

The weekend attacks challenge that promise. Even if the government survived, the scale and coordination of the assault show that armed groups retain the ability to strike simultaneously across distant parts of the country. The reported killing of Defence Minister Sadio Camara, a key figure in Mali’s pro-Russian military establishment, adds to the political weight of the event. (Reuters)

The message from the attackers was simple: the state may control Bamako, but it does not control the full country. The message from the government was equally clear: the state still stands, its leadership remains in place, and its Russian-backed security line will continue.

The northern question returns

Kidal has always been more than a town. It is a symbol of the unresolved northern question in Mali: the relationship between Bamako and the Tuareg-majority north, the legacy of rebellion, and the failure of successive governments to build a durable political settlement.

If Kidal is now outside effective government control, even temporarily, this represents a serious reversal. It does not necessarily mean the junta is falling. But it does mean Mali’s war is again splitting along familiar lines: a southern state core around Bamako, a contested centre, and a north where separatist, jihadist and local armed networks compete for influence.

This is why the term “coup attempt” is politically useful but analytically incomplete. The attacks may indeed have been designed to threaten the government. But they were also part of a wider insurgent and separatist campaign to fracture state authority, disrupt supply lines, and prove that Bamako’s Russian-backed military model cannot impose national control.

Russia’s Sahel test

The events in Mali now become a test of Russia’s credibility in Africa. Moscow presents itself as a reliable partner that does not lecture African governments on internal politics and is willing to provide hard security assistance. That message has appeal in parts of the Sahel, especially where populations are frustrated with years of French and Western intervention that failed to end insecurity.

But Russia is discovering the same hard geography and political complexity that frustrated France. Mali’s problem is not only a shortage of soldiers or aircraft. It is a deep state legitimacy crisis, a fragmented national territory, porous borders, ethnic grievances, militant networks, economic strain and unresolved local conflicts.

Africa Corps can help hold strategic positions. It can strengthen the junta’s hand in Bamako. It can provide political theatre and battlefield support. But it cannot, by itself, solve the political architecture of the Malian state.

The wider Sahel balance

This crisis also matters beyond Mali. Burkina Faso and Niger are watching closely. So are Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, France, Russia, Turkey, China and the United States. Mali sits at the centre of a Sahelian belt where state authority is under pressure and where external powers increasingly compete through security partnerships, mining interests, diplomatic influence and information networks.

The fact that Mali reportedly received new military equipment from China around the same time underscores the diversification of Bamako’s external partnerships. Mali is no longer operating inside a single Western security orbit. It is trying to assemble a multipolar support system: Russia for hard security, China for equipment and infrastructure, and regional alliances through the new Sahel bloc. (defenceWeb)

That may give Bamako more options. It does not automatically give it victory.

What happens next?

The immediate outcome is that the Malian government has survived. Goïta has reappeared. Bamako remains under government control. Russia has reaffirmed its support. The Africa Corps has presented itself as the force that helped prevent a “Syrian scenario” in West Africa.

But the deeper outcome is less comfortable for the junta. The attacks exposed vulnerability, coordination among armed groups, and possible overextension by Malian and Russian forces. If Bamako cannot reassert control in the north, the government may be forced into a more defensive posture: protect the capital, secure key transport corridors, hold major towns, and accept that parts of the north remain contested.

The most likely short-term scenario is not the immediate fall of the government, but a harder, more militarised Mali. Expect more operations, more Russian involvement around strategic zones, stronger rhetoric about foreign interference, and tighter internal security. At the same time, insurgent and separatist forces will likely try to exploit the psychological impact of the weekend attacks.

Mali has not collapsed. But the weekend proved that the war is far from contained. The government and its Russian partners may have stopped an attempted political decapitation, but they have not yet solved the larger strategic problem: a state fighting to prove that it still commands the territory it claims to govern.

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The war is now best understood as a contest of exhaustion. Russia is still attacking. Ukraine is still defending, adapting and striking deeper into Russian territory. Neither side has achieved its declared political objectives. Russia has not conquered Ukraine or broken its state. Ukraine has not expelled Russia from all occupied territory. The result is not peace, but a brutal equilibrium.

On the battlefield, Russia continues to hold the larger army, greater manpower depth, a bigger industrial base and the ability to absorb losses at a scale Ukraine cannot match. Its method remains attritional. CSIS describes Russia’s approach as one that accepts very high casualties in the hope of wearing down Ukraine’s army and society, using infantry assaults, drones, artillery, glide bombs and stand-off weapons to grind forward. (CSIS)

But Russia’s superiority has not translated into decisive victory. Its advances remain slow, costly and tactically limited. Ukraine’s defensive system — trenches, mines, drones, artillery, mobile reserves and increasingly sophisticated battlefield surveillance — has made every Russian gain expensive. The war now favours the defender, especially in heavily fortified eastern areas where movement near the front is dangerous for vehicles and troops alike. (CSIS)

This creates the central paradox of the war: Russia may be advancing in places, but it is not clearly “winning” in the strategic sense. It has captured territory, but at enormous cost. It has damaged Ukraine, but not destroyed it. It has survived sanctions, but remains locked into a long war economy. It has shown endurance, but not dominance.

Ukraine, meanwhile, is not winning in the classic sense either. It remains dependent on Western military, financial and intelligence support. It faces manpower constraints, air-defence shortages and the constant pressure of Russian missile and drone attacks on cities and infrastructure. Reuters reported recent Russian drone strikes on Odesa and missile and drone attacks on Dnipro, showing that Ukraine’s rear areas remain vulnerable. (Reuters)

Yet Ukraine has also changed the war. Its drone campaign has widened the battlefield into Russia itself. Recent Ukrainian attacks have targeted Russian oil, refinery and industrial infrastructure, including Tuapse and other sites. Moscow calls these attacks strikes on civilian infrastructure; Kyiv sees them as pressure on Russia’s war economy. (Reuters)

This is one reason the war has become harder to categorise. Ukraine cannot easily defeat Russia in a conventional land campaign. Russia cannot easily force Ukraine to capitulate. Both sides are therefore seeking leverage beyond the trench line: energy, diplomacy, sanctions, air defence, long-range strikes, prisoner exchanges, European funding and American political pressure.

The diplomatic picture is equally frozen. Moscow says President Vladimir Putin would meet President Volodymyr Zelenskiy only to finalise an already prepared agreement, not to negotiate from scratch. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said such a meeting would require “political will” from Kyiv and careful preparation. Ukraine, for its part, has asked Turkey to help host a leader-level meeting. (Reuters)

The United States remains involved, but not decisively enough to force an outcome. President Donald Trump said on 26 April that he continues to have “good conversations” with both Putin and Zelenskiy and hopes to settle the war, but Reuters noted that more than a year into his second term the conflict continues. (Reuters)

This matters because the war’s ending is likely to be determined less by a sudden battlefield collapse than by political arithmetic. The question is not simply who controls which village this month. It is whether Moscow, Kyiv, Washington and Europe can accept a settlement that each side can survive politically.

For Russia, the minimum objective is to secure recognition, formal or informal, of its control over occupied territory and prevent Ukraine from becoming a fully integrated Western military platform. Moscow will want neutrality guarantees, sanctions relief, limits on Ukrainian rearmament and acceptance that Crimea and parts of eastern and southern Ukraine are no longer under Kyiv’s control.

For Ukraine, those terms are extremely difficult. Any agreement that openly concedes territory risks looking like surrender. Kyiv needs security guarantees strong enough to prevent Russia from using a ceasefire as a pause before another war. It also needs a path toward Europe, reconstruction funding and continued access to weapons.

For Europe, the problem is strategic credibility. If Russia is seen to gain territory through war and keep it, the lesson for the continent is dangerous. But if Europe insists on total Ukrainian territorial restoration without the means to achieve it, the war may drag on indefinitely. That is why recent European language has begun to sound more pragmatic. Reuters reported that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested Ukraine may have to accept that some territory could remain outside Kyiv’s control in a future peace deal, linking this to Ukraine’s European prospects. (Reuters)

The most likely ending is therefore not a clean peace treaty. It is a ceasefire or armistice: a frozen or semi-frozen conflict with a militarised line of contact, continued non-recognition of Russian annexations by Ukraine and many Western states, gradual reconstruction in Ukrainian-held areas, and a long struggle over sanctions and security guarantees.

This would resemble neither victory nor defeat in simple terms. Russia would claim it had secured territory and blocked NATO expansion. Ukraine would claim it had preserved its state, army, capital, sovereignty and European future. The West would claim Russia failed to conquer Ukraine. Everyone would claim victory because none could admit the full cost of compromise.

Could Ukraine still regain the initiative? Possibly, but only if several factors align: stronger European arms production, sustained American support, improved air defence, successful deep strikes against Russian logistics, and continued Russian overextension. Some analysts argue Ukraine has built momentum through drone warfare and defensive adaptation, but this has not yet produced a decisive strategic reversal. (mickryan.substack.com)

Could Russia still break Ukraine? Also possible, but less likely than Moscow once hoped. Russia can keep grinding, but grinding is not the same as winning. The deeper danger for Ukraine is not a single dramatic breakthrough, but cumulative exhaustion: fewer soldiers, weaker air defence, political fatigue in the West and economic strain at home.

The war has fallen under the media radar because West Asia has produced faster, more spectacular headlines. But in strategic terms, Ukraine remains the hinge of the European order. Its ending will not be a cinematic moment. It will probably be a negotiated exhaustion, dressed up as principle, necessity and victory.

For now, the balance of power is this: Russia has the advantage in mass, endurance and escalation tolerance. Ukraine has the advantage in legitimacy, defensive innovation, Western alignment and national survival. Neither has a decisive path to total victory. That is why the war may be approaching an ending — not because peace has arrived, but because the battlefield is slowly forcing politics to catch up.

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The meeting has been seized upon by commentators as evidence of a major geopolitical shift: Iran, having survived the US-Israeli military campaign and retained leverage over one of the world’s most important energy corridors, is now seeking to convert battlefield resilience into diplomatic advantage. The central claim circulating on social media is that Tehran is no longer negotiating merely as a besieged state, but as a regional power setting terms with Russian backing.

Some of that framing remains political interpretation rather than confirmed fact. But the hard diplomatic signals are significant. Putin publicly praised Iran’s resistance to US and Israeli pressure and said Russia would do what it could to help Tehran. Araqchi, for his part, underlined the strategic nature of the Russia-Iran relationship, saying Moscow had consistently supported Iran. Putin also confirmed that he had received a message from Iran’s leadership shortly before the meeting. (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty)

The talks came after Araqchi’s regional diplomacy through Pakistan and Oman, two states that have become important channels in efforts to manage the crisis. According to reports, the Iranian foreign minister blamed “excessive” US demands for the continuing deadlock, while also indicating that Tehran was reviewing new American proposals. That sequence suggests Iran is widening the negotiating table, ensuring that any settlement is no longer handled solely through Washington and its allies. (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty)

At the heart of the standoff is the Strait of Hormuz. Before the war, between 125 and 140 ships normally moved in and out of the strait each day. That traffic has collapsed dramatically. Reuters reported that only seven vessels transited in a recent 24-hour period, with none carrying oil bound for the global market. The same report said the strait usually handles around 20% of the world’s daily oil and LNG supply, making its disruption a direct threat to global energy markets. (Reuters)

Iran has imposed restrictions on shipping through the strait, while the United States announced a blockade of Iran-related shipping on April 13. US forces have reportedly turned back dozens of vessels since then. This creates a dangerous dual-control situation: Iran can complicate maritime passage, while the United States can obstruct Iran-linked traffic. The result is not peace, but a tense, controlled paralysis in which both sides are using shipping as leverage. (Reuters)

The maritime problem is not simply political. It is also technical and commercial. Al Jazeera reported that Pentagon officials told US lawmakers it could take months to fully clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines, and maritime insurers warned that even a ceasefire may not be enough to restore normal traffic if the risk cannot be priced with confidence. In other words, even if diplomats announce an agreement, the strait may remain only partially usable until shipowners, underwriters and naval authorities believe the route is reliably safe. (Al Jazeera)

This gives Iran lasting leverage. A formal ceasefire may end open hostilities, but the practical reopening of Hormuz depends on guarantees, inspection, naval coordination and insurance confidence. For Tehran, that means the strait becomes not only a military pressure point, but a bargaining instrument in any wider settlement.

Russia’s role is therefore important. Moscow is not merely expressing sympathy. It is positioning itself as a necessary interlocutor. Putin has raised the possibility of Russia helping to mediate, including around the nuclear dispute, which remains a major obstacle in US-Iran talks. Analysts cited by RFE/RL suggest Russia may try to use its access to Tehran to secure nuclear concessions acceptable to Washington, while also preserving Iran as a strategic partner. (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty)

At the same time, defence diplomacy is moving in parallel. Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov held talks in Kyrgyzstan with Iran’s Deputy Defence Minister Reza Talaei-Nik, according to Reuters. Belousov repeated Moscow’s position that the Iran conflict should be resolved through diplomacy and said he expected Moscow and Tehran to continue supporting one another. Talaei-Nik also travelled to Belarus for talks on the Middle East situation. (Reuters)

The Kyrgyzstan setting matters because it sits within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation framework, where Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and India are all present. China’s defence minister Dong Jun also attended the SCO defence meeting and called for deeper defence and security cooperation among member states. Reuters reported that Dong held sideline talks with officials from Iran, Russia, Pakistan and Belarus. (Reuters)

This points to the wider strategic picture. Iran is not only relying on missiles, ports or the Strait of Hormuz. It is embedding itself in Eurasian structures: the SCO, Russian-backed security channels, trade corridors through Pakistan and Central Asia, and the wider North-South and East-West transport logic linking Russia, Iran, India and China. The more these routes develop, the less decisive Western maritime pressure becomes.

The social-media claim that “Iran won the war” is a political judgement, not a settled historical fact. What can be said with more confidence is that Iran has not been isolated in the way Washington may have intended. Instead, the crisis has accelerated the visibility of a Russia-Iran alignment and brought Eurasian powers more directly into the Persian Gulf equation.

The emerging settlement, if one is reached, will therefore not be a simple US-Iran bargain. It will likely involve maritime guarantees, nuclear sequencing, sanctions questions, Russian mediation, Gulf security arrangements and the practical reopening of Hormuz. That is the real chessboard now taking shape: not a single battlefield victory, but a contested diplomatic order in which Iran is trying to convert survival into strategic influence, with Russia standing visibly beside it.

The post Russia Moves Into the Gulf Endgame as Iran Shapes the Post-War Settlement appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

After nearly two years of grueling conflict, 2025 saw the scales tip decisively in Russia’s favor in Ukraine. Moscow’s forces not only held their ground but expanded control over eastern and southern territories, forcing a bitter reckoning in Kyiv. By late 2025, the Ukrainian government – starved of munitions and facing economic ruin – agreed to abandon its long-held NATO ambitions and accept a U.S.-brokered peace framework that ceded territory to Russiapresstv.irpresstv.ir. This marked a humiliating end to NATO’s campaign: Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership was “a bitter acknowledgment of the strategic dead end” after a prolonged war of attritionpresstv.ir. Western officials quietly conceded that no viable alternative remained but to strike a peace deal on Russia’s termspresstv.ir.

The implications of Russia’s assured victory reverberated globally. Russia’s former president Dmitry Medvedev, in a triumphalist speech, declared that “Moscow’s victory in the Ukraine conflict will lay the groundwork for a more just world” and even suggested a new Russian national holiday would commemorate the victorygroups.google.comgroups.google.com. Medvedev stressed that Russia’s goal was to destroy the “Kiev neo-Nazi regime” – not the Ukrainian people – and vowed no hostile Western-backed regime would ever again be allowed on Russia’s bordersgroups.google.comgroups.google.com. Such rhetoric underscored the Kremlin’s confidence that it had weathered NATO’s challenge. Indeed, by year’s end, Western unity on Ukraine had fractured. European allies, exhausted by economic strain and increasingly skeptical of an unwinnable war, threw support behind the U.S. peace plan that effectively ratified Russia’s annexations as the “lesser evil” compared to endless warpresstv.irpresstv.ir. NATO’s credibility suffered a stark blow – its promises to Kyiv were broken, and its vaunted deterrence power tarnished by Russia’s resilience.

For Ukraine, the collapse was catastrophic. President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government, once adamant about reclaiming all territory, was compelled to accept a ceasefire that freezes the conflict largely on Russia’s termspresstv.irpresstv.ir. In exchange for a pause in the fighting, Ukraine must demilitarize its army and codify neutrality – a de facto abandonment of the Western integration it had pursued since 2014presstv.irpresstv.ir. This turn of events – a “strategic vacuum” as Press TV described itpresstv.ir – laid bare the harsh reality: NATO would not – and perhaps could not – rescue Ukraine from Russia’s grinding offensive. European diplomats privately acknowledged that without U.S. military weight, Ukraine “cannot withstand Russia”presstv.ir. Yet Washington under President Donald Trump had explicitly refused to commit troops, counseling Europe to handle its own neighborhoodpresstv.irpresstv.ir. The result is a Ukraine shattered and partitioned, its economy in ruins and tens of thousands of civilians deadpresstv.ir, while Moscow tightens its grip on the Donbas and Crimea.

The assured Russian victory also accelerated a global geopolitical shift. Most of the Global South refused to isolate Moscow; major developing powers treated the outcome as a lesson in Western overreach. As Medvedev put it, Russia’s success marked “the first step toward…a multipolar world order”, one based on “mutual respect and real international law” rather than Washington’s dominancegroups.google.com. In this narrative – echoed by media like RT – NATO’s defeat in Ukraine symbolized the waning of Western unilateral power and the rise of a fairer balance. While Western officials might contest that framing, few could deny that by the end of 2025, U.S.-led attempts to weaken Moscow had failed. Ukraine’s collapse became “an epic Western strategic failure”, as even some Western observers admitted, on par with past debacles like Iraqtheguardian.com. With Russia’s security goals largely met, and NATO’s eastern expansion halted, 2025 closed with Moscow ascendant in Eastern Europe – and the post-Cold War era of unchecked NATO enlargement effectively over.

Gaza Under Siege: Israeli Genocidal Campaign and Iran’s Resistance Axis

In parallel with the showdown in Eastern Europe, the year 2025 bore witness to a devastating conflict in the Middle East that many around the world labeled a genocide. Israel’s ongoing military operations in the Palestinian territories – especially the Gaza Strip – reached unprecedented levels of destruction and civilian suffering. Israeli forces pounded densely populated Gaza cities with relentless air and artillery strikes, ostensibly targeting Hamas fighters but in practice killing thousands of men, women, and children. By autumn 2025, Palestinian casualties in Gaza since the war’s onset in October 2023 had surpassed a staggering 63,000 killed (including over 20,000 children according to one Save the Children report) and 160,000 woundedpresstv.irpresstv.ir. Entire neighborhoods lay in ruins, and Gaza’s infrastructure – from hospitals and schools to water and power systems – was pulverized. International rights groups, including within Israel, concluded that Israel’s conduct met the legal definition of genocidepresstv.irpresstv.ir.

A United Nations inquiry and the world’s leading genocide scholars delivered a damning verdict: Israel was “engaged in systematic and widespread crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide” in Gazapresstv.ir. In a nearly unanimous vote, the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) passed a resolution declaring that Israel’s actions – from the deliberate leveling of homes and destruction of food and medical infrastructure to the enforced starvation siege – fulfill the 1948 Genocide Convention criteriapresstv.irpresstv.ir. As evidence, they cited Israel’s explicit tactics: “deliberate destruction of agricultural fields, food warehouses, and bakeries” combined with choking off humanitarian aid, inflicting “unlivable conditions resulting in starvation” of the civilian populationpresstv.irpresstv.ir. By late 2025, Gaza’s malnutrition crisis had turned into a famine, with hundreds of children perishing from hunger and preventable disease under the total blockadepresstv.irpresstv.ir. The international consensus in the Global South – and among a growing chorus of Western human rights voices – was that Israel’s campaign was not mere counterinsurgency but an attempt to annihilate Gaza’s societypresstv.irpresstv.ir. The International Criminal Court moved forward on investigations, and arrest warrants were reportedly issued for top Israeli officials on charges of war crimespresstv.ir.

Such was the backdrop against which resistance forces and their backers mobilized. Far from isolating and weakening the Palestinian cause, Israel’s onslaught — widely seen as “genocidal” — galvanized a region-wide “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran. The Islamic Republic, long a patron of Palestinian and Lebanese militant groups, seized the moment to ramp up support for those fighting Israel. Tehran’s leaders framed the Gaza war as a defining battle against oppression, casting Israel as a “terror ringleader” whose aggression threatened the entire regionpresstv.irpresstv.ir. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps funneled weapons and technology to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, even as those groups waged fierce urban warfare against Israeli ground incursions. To Israel’s north, Hezbollah in Lebanon engaged in the most serious border clashes since 2006, tying down substantial Israeli forces. And in an unprecedented show of transregional solidarity, Yemen’s Houthi movement (Ansarullah) opened a new front: throughout 2025, the Houthis launched near-daily long-range drone and missile strikes against Israeli targets, from Red Sea shipping to infrastructure in Eilatpresstv.ir. In response, Israel even conducted airstrikes on Yemen’s capital Sanaa, assassinating senior Yemeni officials – a move Iran’s top commander decried as a sign of Tel Aviv’s “deep fear of the expansion of the Resistance Axis”presstv.irpresstv.ir.

Meanwhile, Iran’s regional clout hit new highs amid the chaos. As Arab publics and many Muslim-majority nations rallied to the Palestinian cause, governments traditionally aligned with Washington felt pressured to distance themselves from Israel’s actions. Iran skillfully used forums like the Islamic Cooperation Council and its diplomatic channels to call out what it termed Western hypocrisy and to demand protection for Palestinians. Tehran’s message – that Israel’s impunity is enabled by the U.S. and must be resisted collectively – resonated widelypresstv.irpresstv.ir. Even some leaders of U.S.-allied Arab states issued unusually sharp condemnations of Israel. In Syria, events underscored Iran’s growing role as a regional power-broker. Late 2024 had seen the sudden toppling of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad – an Iranian ally – after a Turkey- and Western-backed rebel offensive reached Damascus, aided by intense Israeli airstrikespresstv.ir. A hardline Sunni coalition led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took power in Damascus with covert Western approval, fundamentally altering the balance in the Levantpresstv.irpresstv.ir. Yet Iran did not accept this fait accompli. Throughout 2025, Tehran lent quiet support to a broad Syrian resistance front against the new HTS-led regime. In Syria’s coastal and central heartland, Alawite, Shia, and other minority communities rose up in mass protests condemning the “increasing violence” of the Islamist government and its foreign patronspresstv.irpresstv.ir. A former Syrian Army officer announced the creation of a “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria,” explicitly vowing to “topple the current regime” installed in Damascus and “liberate all Syrian land from occupying terrorist forces”presstv.irpresstv.ir. This guerrilla resistance – implicitly backed by Iran and Russia – has bogged down the HTS-led authorities and their Western supporters in yet another protracted struggle.

Iran’s multifaceted support for regional resistance has enhanced its prestige among anti-colonial and anti-Zionist movements. By positioning itself as the champion of Palestinian survival and Syrian sovereignty, Tehran strengthened the Axis of Resistance as a counterweight to U.S.-Israeli hegemony. Iranian officials noted that even non-Arab countries like Turkey openly challenged Israel’s actions in Gaza, reflecting a shifting norm: Muslim-majority nations are less afraid of breaking with the West on core issues of Israel/Palestine. In Tehran’s view, the year ended with Israel more isolated and the Resistance axis more unified. “Tel Aviv’s bloodshed only deepens its strategic nightmare,” argued Iran’s military Chief of Staff, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, pointing to the “growing unity among regional nations in defending the Palestinian cause”presstv.irpresstv.ir. If 2025 was a dark year for Gaza’s people, it was also a year that solidified a historic realignment: an empowered Iran-led bloc intent on checking Western allies’ dominance in West Asia, from the rivers of Palestine to the mountains of southern Lebanon and beyond.

China and India Reshape Global Power through BRICS and Diplomacy

While wars and turmoil rattled the West and Middle East, Asia’s two emerging superpowers – China and India – spent 2025 steadily expanding their global influence. Both nations harnessed their economic might and leadership of multilateral forums to push for a more multipolar, South-centered world order. Together with other rising powers, Beijing and New Delhi positioned themselves as champions of the “Global South,” emphasizing development, sovereignty, and non-interference – in stark contrast to what they describe as decades of Western hegemony. The BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) became the primary vehicle of this agenda. In 2025, BRICS completed a historic expansion, admitting six new members – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia – and by doing so, transformed into a true heavyweight coalition encompassing over half the world’s population and a large share of its economic outputen.chinadiplomacy.org.cnen.chinadiplomacy.org.cn. By one measure (purchasing-power parity GDP), the enlarged BRICS now accounts for roughly 44% of global economic output and 50% of humanityen.chinadiplomacy.org.cnen.chinadiplomacy.org.cn, a striking symbol of the shift in economic gravity away from the G7 West.

The geopolitical and economic rise of China and India was evident on multiple fronts. China, already the world’s second-largest economy, solidified itself as the engine of South-South cooperation. Beijing doubled down on its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure program, which by this year connected some 150+ countries via railways, ports, and fiber-optic networksen.chinadiplomacy.org.cn. At the third Belt and Road Forum, President Xi Jinping welcomed dozens of Global South leaders and signed tens of billions in new trade and investment deals, from green energy projects in Africa to high-speed rail in Southeast Asia. China’s model of state-led development continued to attract developing nations’ admiration: the country’s success in lifting hundreds of millions from poverty and becoming a world leader in industries like clean technology was held up as “an inspiration for the Global South”, showing that alternatives to the Western neoliberal model existglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Indeed, in 2025 China led the world in green innovation, filing over 100,000 low-carbon patents – more than the next several countries combineden.chinadiplomacy.org.cn. This underscored how China is leveraging its technological prowess to shape future markets (electric vehicles, solar and battery supply chains, etc.) and help fellow developing countries leapfrog ahead.

India, for its part, emerged increasingly confident on the world stage as well. Now the world’s most populous nation and fifth-largest economy, India positioned itself as the voice of the Global South in international forums. During 2025, Indian diplomacy bridged East and West: for instance, New Delhi maintained cordial ties with Washington but also refused to join Western sanctions on Russia, insisting on strategic autonomy. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India took on leadership roles in forums like the G20 (where the African Union’s admission this year, strongly backed by India and China, symbolized a more inclusive order) and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Indian officials frequently echoed calls for multipolarity, arguing that “as major developing countries, both China and India hope to achieve world multipolarity” and must strengthen cooperation to reform global governanceglobaltimes.cn. Notably, India played host to a Global South Summit in early 2025 that brought together over 120 developing nations to coordinate positions ahead of U.N. and G20 meetings – a clear effort to present a united southern front on issues from debt relief to climate finance.

Crucially, China and India worked together within BRICS to challenge Western dominance of finance and trade architecture. A landmark achievement of the 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro was agreement on mechanisms to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar in international tradeglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. BRICS finance ministers announced the formation of a technical committee to study a potential joint currency or unit of account for the blocglobaltimes.cn. While a full “BRICS currency” remains a distant goal, the member states made concrete progress on de-dollarization: by 2025, China and Russia were conducting over 80% of their bilateral trade in yuan and rubles rather than dollarsglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn, and Brazil had sealed a pact with China to use yuan-real for all trade, bypassing the dollar entirelyglobaltimes.cn. Even India – traditionally cautious about challenging the dollar – began allowing its biggest refiner to purchase Russian crude oil in Chinese yuanglobaltimes.cn. These steps, coupled with the New Development Bank (BRICS’ own multilateral lender) raising the share of loans it issues in local currencies, show an accelerating “weaving of a non-dollar web” in global commerceglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn.

Strategically, both Asian giants also expanded their regional leadership. China took a lead role in mediating conflicts and fostering new security alignments in Asia. It notably helped de-escalate border tensions between longtime rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia (having brokered their diplomatic rapprochement in 2023) and supported peace talks in civil strife-torn Myanmar. India, meanwhile, projected influence across the Indian Ocean and into Africa – for example, investing in East African port projects and security cooperation with Indian Ocean island states. In South Asia, India’s economic weight made it a de facto guarantor for smaller neighbors’ stability (such as Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring). Both countries also found common cause in calling out Western hypocrisy on climate and trade. At U.N. climate negotiations, China and India led the G77 in demanding that the U.S. and EU deliver on climate finance pledges, arguing it was unjust for the West to expect developing nations to curb growth without adequate support.

It was not all smooth sailing: China and India still have a thorny bilateral relationship, marked by an unresolved Himalayan border dispute and competition for influence. Yet, pragmatism largely prevailed in 2025. As a Global Times editorial observed, “strengthening interaction [between China and India] is a rational choice in a multipolar world”globaltimes.cn. And indeed, at BRICS and other forums, New Delhi and Beijing found alignment on broad objectives: defending national sovereignty norms, pushing U.N. reform to give the Global South a greater voice, and developing alternative economic institutions not dominated by Washington. The rise of China and India thus went hand in hand with the rise of BRICS as a geopolitical force. With BRICS nations now spanning Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia, the group’s clout in agenda-setting grew. Collectively, BRICS pressed for “true multilateralism” as opposed to Western-led “clubs,” emphasizing that international rules should not be dictated by a single bloc’s interestsglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. By year’s end, analysts noted that the “Global South is now leading” in shaping key global debatesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn – from reforming the World Bank/IMF (where BRICS countries demanded fairer representation) to establishing technology standards and supply chains outside Western control.

The ascent of these Asian powers – working in concert at times – has undeniably shifted perceptions. Western commentators fretted that Washington’s post-Cold War dominance is steadily eroding as Beijing and New Delhi gain prominence. But from the viewpoint of much of the world, 2025’s trends were encouraging: power is becoming more diffused, and voices outside the Euro-Atlantic are finally being heard. As one Global South scholar wrote, this is “the embodiment of humanity’s collective hope for a world order that respects dignity, diversity and the planet”globaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. In other words, the rise of China, India, and their BRICS partners is seen as fostering a more inclusive multipolar world, one not only about great-power rivalry but about elevating the development priorities of billions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Whether this nascent multipolar order delivers on its promise of justice and stability remains to be seen. But 2025 made one thing clear: the era of uncontested Western dominance is ending, and new centers of power are ready to assume a leading role in global affairs.

Trump’s Second Term Turmoil: US Credibility Crumbles

The January 2025 inauguration of President Donald Trump for a second term ushered in a tumultuous year for American governance – one marked by policy whiplash, infighting, and a precipitous decline in U.S. global credibility. Campaigning on an “America First” platform redux, Trump wasted no time reversing many of his predecessor’s policies and asserting a more unilateralist, even isolationist, U.S. stance abroad. The result, as seen from allies and adversaries alike, was incoherent governance in Washington – a mix of bellicose threats, abrupt U-turns, and ad-hoc dealmaking that left other nations unsure where America stood. By year’s end, the consensus among foreign policy observers (including some in the U.S.) was that America’s international standing had deteriorated markedly under Trump’s erratic leadershippewresearch.orgre-russia.net.

One stark illustration came with the release of Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS), which startled even America’s closest allies in Europe. The NSS – unveiled in November – espoused a throwback neo-isolationism, focusing U.S. attention on the Western Hemisphere and framing traditional European partners as nearly an afterthought. It warned bluntly that Europe faced “civilizational decline” and lambasted EU nations for “failing to end the war in Ukraine” and not controlling their internal problemsglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. In an extraordinary public rebuke of allies, President Trump gave an interview accusing Europe of “decaying” and free-riding on U.S. security commitmentsglobaltimes.cn. Such rhetoric ruptured the veneer of transatlantic unity. European leaders bristled: Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, blasted parts of the U.S. strategy as “unacceptable” and cautioned that Europe “must prepare to manage on its own”globaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Indeed, Trump’s withering criticism “cast a shadow over the continent,” exposing “unprecedented cracks in transatlantic relations,” according to observers in Brusselsglobaltimes.cn. Long-standing U.S. allies in NATO found themselves questioning Washington’s reliability. Was this the same America that once championed the alliance’s unity? In 2025, it seemed not.

Beyond Europe, Trump’s unorthodox approach sowed confusion and distrust. On the one hand, he talked of ending “forever wars” and pushed Ukraine into a ceasefire (as detailed earlier), positioning himself as a dealmaker for peace. On the other hand, his administration opened new fronts of aggression (for instance, against Venezuela) and ratcheted up confrontation with perceived adversaries like Iran and China in unpredictable ways. Foreign diplomats privately complained that U.S. policy could zigzag from one extreme to another on a whim – often via the President’s late-night social media pronouncements. The State Department and Pentagon frequently appeared out of sync, reflecting rival factions in Trump’s team (populist isolationists versus hawkish hardliners). This policy incoherence eroded America’s aura of leadership. Even allies in Asia-Pacific, while welcoming U.S. security presence, quietly started hedging bets – engaging China more – because they feared Washington might abruptly pull back or push them into conflict.

Quantitatively, global opinion of the U.S. under Trump II plummeted. A Pew Research Center survey across 24 countries mid-2025 found that in 19 of those countries, a majority of the public has little or no confidence in Trump’s leadership in world affairspewresearch.orgpewresearch.org. Words like “arrogant” and “dangerous” were most commonly associated with him, and majorities in most nations doubted his competence on issues from climate change to handling international conflictspewresearch.orgpewresearch.org. Strikingly, U.S. favorability ratings fell significantly in 15 countries compared to just a year prior, including a 20+ point drop in close allies like Canada and Swedenpewresearch.org. In Western Europe, confidence in Trump was only somewhat higher than during his first term (2017–2020), and still far lower than the ratings Europeans gave President Bidenpewresearch.org. A global median of just one-third of people trusted Trump to do the right thing internationallyglobaltimes.cnpewresearch.org. As the Global Times, a Chinese outlet, noted pointedly: “The US’ increasingly unilateral behavior… has led to a sharp decline in its prestige and credibility”globaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Even many Americans acknowledge this reputational hit. Far from “Making America Great Again” in the eyes of the world, Trump’s governance style appeared to be isolating the United States and diminishing its soft power.

All this translated into concrete strategic consequences. In Europe, Trump’s berating of NATO partners and refusal to fully back Ukraine pushed EU nations to explore greater strategic autonomy – essentially planning for a future where the U.S. might not be a dependable allypresstv.irglobaltimes.cn. In the Middle East, U.S. credibility as a mediator was nil; Washington was seen as green-lighting Israeli excesses in Gaza and had zero role in ceasefire negotiations, which instead fell to actors like Qatar and Egypt. In the Asia-Pacific, countries nervously watched U.S. dealings with China: Trump imposed new rounds of tariffs on Chinese goods (resurrecting the trade war) and sent mixed signals on Taiwan, at times provoking Beijing and at others claiming he’d struck “the greatest deal” with Xi (though no evidence of any grand bargain materialized, to allies’ bafflement). Such unpredictability made regional states question U.S. steadiness in a crisis. Japan and South Korea, while still allied with Washington, quietly opened back-channel talks with Beijing to insure against an American stumble. Across Latin America, Trump’s aggressive stance on leftist governments (from Cuba to Venezuela) revived memories of Yanqui meddling; Mexico, Argentina, and others distanced themselves from U.S. initiatives.

Meanwhile, at home, governance was chaotic. The Trump White House cycled through key officials at a dizzying rate (by September, Trump was on his third National Security Advisor of the year). Partisan battles led to a brief federal government shutdown in October, further tarnishing the image of U.S. stabilitypresstv.ir. Domestic turmoil – including ongoing congressional investigations into Trump’s personal legal issues – consumed bandwidth that might have been used for international leadership. The overall picture was an America absorbed in its own divisions and led by a mercurial president who often shunned multilateral cooperation. This did not go unnoticed abroad. European public opinion polls in late 2025 showed majorities in countries like France and Germany viewing the U.S. as unreliable or even a destabilizing force internationallyglobaltimes.cnpewresearch.org. Confidence in U.S. global leadership reached near post-WWII lows.

By year’s end, many analysts concluded that Trump’s second term had accelerated an ongoing trend: the decline of U.S. hegemony. Allies were openly speaking of life “after Pax Americana”, hedging their bets between East and West. Rivals were more brazen – Russia and China certainly capitalized on the leadership vacuum. And non-aligned powers in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America felt emboldened to assert independent policies without fearing U.S. retribution as before. The world’s policeman appeared not only reluctant but also inconsistent and internally conflicted. In sum, 2025 under Trump confirmed what one Asia Times commentator dubbed the “Price of Unpredictability”: America’s friends and foes alike saw the superpower as less credible, less cohesive, and less commanding than at any point in recent memoryforeignaffairs.comglobaltimes.cn. While the U.S. remains a formidable military and economic power, its ability to lead by example or by consensus was dramatically undermined – a development that has accelerated the tilt toward a multipolar world.

Washington’s Warpath in Venezuela: Blockades and “Narco-Terror” Strikes

In a year when U.S. foreign policy often appeared disengaged or erratic elsewhere, one region felt a very direct – and violent – focus of the Trump administration’s attention: Venezuela. The oil-rich South American nation, long at odds with Washington, became the target of a dramatic U.S. military campaign in late 2025 that critics likened to a low-intensity war. Under the banner of combating drug cartels and “narco-terrorism,” the United States launched a series of lethal strikes at sea, imposed a naval blockade, and even seized vessels in international waters – all actions that inflicted civilian casualties and infrastructure damage in Venezuela and its environs.

The campaign intensified through the latter half of the year. In early September, President Trump gave the green light to Joint Task Force “Southern Spear” to use force against suspected narcotics shipments allegedly linked to Venezuela. What followed was unprecedented: U.S. drones, helicopters, and patrol aircraft began tracking and destroying small boats and ships in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean, often without warning. The U.S. Defense Secretary, former Navy SEAL Pete Hegseth, touted these as “lethal kinetic strikes on vessels operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations”presstv.irpresstv.ir. In practice, many of the targets were go-fast boats and fishing vessels the U.S. claimed were moving cocaine – but the strikes frequently resulted in all aboard being killed, with no due process or opportunity to surrender. By mid-December, the Pentagon acknowledged at least two dozen such strikes since September, with a death toll of at least 99 people – most of them killed in international waters off Venezuela’s coastpresstv.irpresstv.ir. Human rights observers raised alarms that innocent fishermen or coerced traffickers were being summarily executed from the air. One particularly egregious incident saw a U.S. aircraft, after disabling a boat, fire on survivors clinging to floating debris, killing two injured men – a act widely condemned as a possible war crimepresstv.irpresstv.ir.

Image: U.S. Southern Command released footage of a so called “narco-terror” boat being targeted by American forces in the Eastern Pacific, December 2025. The Trump administration’s campaign has reportedly killed nearly 100 people in maritime strikes since Septemberpresstv.ir.

President Trump defended the offensive unabashedly. In mid-December, he stood before cameras and declared the U.S. was engaged in an “armed conflict with the drug cartels,” likening them to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. He accused Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro of turning his country into a narco-state and vowed to “smash” any networks threatening the U.S. with illicit drugs. On December 17, Trump took the extraordinary step of declaring a naval blockade on Venezuela – announcing that all sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers would be prevented from entering or leaving the country’s portspresstv.irpresstv.ir. This blockade, enforced by U.S. Navy warships and coast guard cutters, sharply escalated the economic warfare on Caracas, essentially cutting off Venezuela’s primary source of revenue (oil exports) by force. Under the blockade, at least one Venezuela-flagged tanker was boarded and seized by U.S. forces, prompting outrage from Caracas. President Maduro lambasted the move as proof that Washington’s real aim was “regime change, not drug control,” and that the U.S. sought to “turn Venezuela into its colony”presstv.irpresstv.ir. He noted that the U.S. had simultaneously assembled its largest regional military presence in decades – including carrier strike groups and thousands of troops on exercises in nearby Guyana and the Caribbean – suggesting an invasion was being contemplatedpresstv.ir.

Inside the U.S., a few voices of caution emerged. Some lawmakers in Congress – including libertarian Republicans and progressive Democrats – questioned the legal basis for what essentially looked like an undeclared war in the eastern Pacific. They pointed out that Congress had not authorized any use of force in Venezuela, and that killing foreign nationals on the high seas in peacetime could violate both U.S. and international law. These concerns led the House of Representatives to vote on measures to limit Trump’s Venezuela aggression, but in November those measures were narrowly defeated amid partisan divisionspresstv.ir. Meanwhile, human rights groups demanded transparency. They pressed Secretary Hegseth to release video from the strikes (especially the controversial September 2 incident), but he flatly refused, even as global criticism mountedpresstv.ir. The administration insisted everything was within the bounds of “lawful warfare” – a claim many legal experts contested given the lack of a clear armed-conflict legal framework for attacking civilian boats.

The impacts on Venezuelan civilians were severe. The naval blockade caused petrol and diesel shortages inland, crippling transport and agriculture. Repair parts for the electrical grid and water systems – many of which Venezuela imported – were delayed or blocked, worsening an already dire humanitarian situation stemming from years of sanctions. And while Trump’s team touted the strikes as successful (they claimed tons of drugs were intercepted), Venezuelan officials said the U.S. attacks often hit legitimate fishing boats and cost innocent lives. Even some regional neighbors voiced disapproval. Mexico and Argentina at the U.N. raised concerns about the precedent set by attacking vessels without due process. CARICOM (Caribbean community) nations worried the aggressive U.S. actions in their waters could endanger their own citizens. The Organization of American States was largely mute (reflecting U.S. influence), but CARICOM and the ALBA bloc of leftist Latin countries called emergency meetings to discuss the crisis.

Geopolitically, Trump’s Venezuela offensive further isolated Washington in Latin America. The timing was noted: it coincided with political shifts in the region. By 2025, left-leaning governments held power in a majority of Latin America’s largest countries – Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile – many of whom expressed sympathy for Venezuela’s sovereignty even if they had differences with Maduro. These countries refused to join any U.S. “coalition” against Venezuela. In the U.N. General Assembly, a resolution condemning unilateral force and blockades (clearly aimed at the U.S. campaign) was introduced by the Group of 77 and China – it garnered over 120 votes in favor, though the U.S. vetoed binding action in the Security Council. The Net effect was a further loss of U.S. moral authority. As one Latin American diplomat put it, the U.S. seemed to be re-running the 1989 Panama playbook (when Bush invaded Panama) in slow motion – “but Latin America of 2025 is not the Latin America of the 1980s”, he said, noting that many countries now openly resist U.S. dictates.

Notably, Trump’s own Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, in an off-message moment, admitted to Vanity Fair that the maritime strikes were indeed part of a broader plan to weaken and oust Maduro’s governmentpresstv.irpresstv.ir. This corroborated what Maduro and others alleged: that the war on “narco-terror” was a pretext to achieve through force what the U.S. had failed to accomplish via economic sanctions and failed coup attempts in previous years. By year’s end, Venezuela remained defiant. Maduro, bolstered by continued support from allies like Cuba, Iran, and to an extent Russia (which sent a few shipments of fuel and food despite the blockade), declared that the U.S. “will simply never” succeed in recolonizing Venezuelapresstv.ir. However, the humanitarian toll on the Venezuelan people was undeniable, raising tough questions about international law and the limits of American power. As the Press TV network bluntly concluded, “Washington’s real objective is regime change”, and in pursuit of that, the U.S. exhibited a “warmongering and colonialist pretense” that global opinion strongly criticizedpresstv.irpresstv.ir.

Europe’s Decline: Ukraine Policy Blowback and Internal Fractures

For the European Union, 2025 was a sobering year of political and economic decline that called into question Europe’s global relevance in the emerging multipolar order. Having tied its fortunes closely to the U.S.-led strategy on Ukraine, the EU found itself bruised by the outcome of the conflict and riven with internal divisions. The prolonged Ukraine war – which Europe helped finance and fuel with arms – exacted a heavy price on EU economies while yielding none of the intended results. Instead of a humbled Russia and a secure Eastern Europe, the EU got a frozen conflict on its border, a resurgent Moscow, and “a costly lesson in realpolitik” about the limits of its influenceglobaltimes.cn. Meanwhile, the sanctions blowback and energy crunch from the war pummeled Europe’s industrial base and drove inflation to record levels, just as social cohesion frayed under waves of political fragmentation.

By abandoning its initial hard-line stance and acquiescing to a negotiated peace that favored Russia, Europe implicitly acknowledged a strategic failure. As Press TV reported, by late 2025 European leaders accepted a U.S. peace framework that required recognizing Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories as fait accompli, because they saw no other choice in an “endless and devastating war with the Russian bear”presstv.ir. This capitulation undermined the EU’s credibility enormously – especially in Eastern European member states like Poland and the Baltics, which had trusted Brussels’ resolve. NATO’s inability to deliver a victory (or even a stalemate on favorable terms) for Ukraine also shattered transatlantic unity. The once-solid front between Washington and European capitals developed visible cracks: Western European powers like France and Germany became anxious to end the war to relieve economic strain, even if it meant pressuring Kyiv into painful concessionspresstv.irpresstv.ir. Eastern members felt betrayed by that pragmatism. The result was an EU more internally strained than at any time since the 2015 migrant crisis or even the Brexit saga.

Economically, the EU entered a period of stagnation. The loss of cheap Russian natural gas – pillar of German and Central European industry – had driven energy costs sky-high in 2023-2024. By 2025, the promised alternatives (LNG from the U.S., renewables, etc.) still could not fully cushion the blow. Europe’s growth flatlined; Germany narrowly avoided recession thanks only to government subsidies, while countries like Italy and Hungary saw their economies contract. “Europe is enduring a prolonged period of low growth,” observed China’s Global Times, noting that external crises (like Ukraine) and internal flaws combined to sap Europe’s economic vitalityglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Inflation in the eurozone spiked to levels not seen in decades, fueled by energy and defense spending. Meanwhile, the massive costs of supporting Ukraine – tens of billions in aid and the expense of replenishing depleted military stockpiles – strained national budgets. Despite the fanfare of EU unity for Ukraine, by late 2025 several governments were openly balking at new funding for Kyiv. A Brussels summit in December to arrange €50+ billion in long-term aid nearly collapsed, with arguments that Europe’s own reconstruction (post-COVID, post-energy shock) should take priority. As Press TV put it, Europe faced “a shortage of funds” for both supporting Ukraine and rearming itself; its finances were “already straining” under the weight of crisesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. The fundamental post-Cold War assumption – that Europe could afford both butter and guns in limitless quantity – was shattered.

Politically, 2025 saw social fragmentation intensify across Europe, feeding the rise of anti-establishment forces. The cost-of-living crisis – energy bills, food prices – ignited frequent street protests from Prague to Paris. Voters vented their anger at mainstream parties seen as out-of-touch or too subservient to Washington’s policies. In multiple EU states, far-right populist parties (some sympathetic to Russia or hostile to continued Ukraine aid) surged in polls. For instance, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany hit record popularity, while Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France capitalized on discontent with President Macron’s international priorities. “European citizens no longer buy into the ‘values wars’ touted by mainstream politicians,” wrote one analysis, noting people “bear the brunt of the energy crisis, soaring inflation and declining living standards” while elites lecture about abstract principlesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. This “democratic deficit” – a yawning gap between EU policy and public sentiment – widened dangerouslyglobaltimes.cn. Trust in national governments eroded, and identification with the EU project diminished. Eastern Europe, too, saw democratic backsliding and defiance of Brussels: Poland and Hungary, already at odds with the EU on rule-of-law issues, dug in further, emboldened by what they viewed as an EU leadership vacuum and hypocrisy (e.g. Brussels preaching rule of law but cozying up to regimes like HTS-ruled Syria for geopolitics).

Europe’s strategic impotence was most embarrassingly displayed in the Middle East. As Gaza burned under Israeli bombardment, European states were deeply divided on how to respond. Some smaller nations (Ireland, Belgium, etc.) condemned Israeli actions and called for ceasefire; but heavyweights like Germany felt constrained by guilt and U.S. pressure to support Israel publicly. The EU as a bloc could say very little of substance – a paralysis that diminished its moral standing globally. Meanwhile, Europe’s pretensions to being a diplomatic power-broker – for example in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program or mediating in African conflicts – were largely sidelined by more assertive actors (Russia, China, regional powers).

Within the EU, the structure of decision-making itself showed strain. The requirement for unanimous agreement on major issues (sanctions, budgetary moves, enlargement, etc.) led to paralysis or lowest-common-denominator outcomesglobaltimes.cn. For example, Hungary single-handedly held up an EU aid tranche to Ukraine for months, demanding unrelated concessions. On admitting new members (like Ukraine’s own EU candidacy), unity was lacking. This institutional inertia, combined with divergent national interests, led a Chinese professor to quip that Europe “finds itself in a predicament where pulling on one thread unravels the entire tapestry”globaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn – meaning every major decision risked exposing internal contradictions.

Perhaps most worrying for Brussels is the loss of global influence. Once a trendsetter in trade and regulatory policy, the EU in 2025 found itself largely reacting to agendas set by others. “Europe’s hard power and influence… are diminishing,” concluded the Global Times, citing how the EU struggled to respond to simultaneous internal and external challengesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. The United States, under Trump, sidelined Europe on key issues (making deals with Russia over Europe’s head, as seen in the Ukraine settlement negotiations run via Washington and Berlinpresstv.ir). In the Global South, Europe’s stock hit a nadir – its alignment with U.S. sanctions and its perceived neocolonial attitude (especially France’s troubles in Africa) alienated many developing countries. A telling metric: when the U.N. voted on resolutions critical of Western positions (like over Palestine or Russia’s sanctions), more countries than ever before either abstained or supported the non-West line, ignoring European exhortations. The EU’s soft power – its claim to moral high ground, democratic values, economic allure – has taken a beating in an era of rising authoritarian capitalism (exemplified by China) and Western missteps.

Yet, amid the gloomy assessments, some Europeans began charting a path forward. The events of 2025 gave momentum to voices calling for “strategic autonomy” – the idea that Europe must be able to act independently of the U.S. “Pressured by fragile defense frailties, political fractures and a stalling economy, [Europe] has embarked on profound self-examination,” one commentator observedglobaltimes.cn. President Macron of France (fresh off facing domestic unrest) and Chancellor Merz of Germany convened an extraordinary EU council on defense union. There, proposals were floated for joint EU military units and even a European Nuclear Deterrent (via French forces) to reduce reliance on the U.S. NATO remained, but Europeans signaled interest in a parallel security structure under EU control. Furthermore, Europe started rethinking its posture toward emerging powers. Recognizing it could not afford a new Cold War with China, the EU began cautiously rebuilding ties with Beijing. “Europe must carefully consider its relationship with China,” urged Global Times, advising Europe to balance its U.S. ties with a more pragmatic, “complementary cooperation” with Chinaglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Indeed, late in the year the EU sent its first delegation to Beijing to discuss investment and technology cooperation since relations soured – a tentative step toward strategic rebalancing.

Still, the road ahead is fraught. As former British PM Tony Blair bluntly warned in December, if the EU does not reform drastically, it risks global irrelevance in the new orderreuters.com. The collapse of its Ukraine strategy and the centrifugal forces pulling at its unity make that warning salient. In 2025, the European Union – long seen as a pillar of the liberal international order – appeared more as a cautionary tale of a bloc caught in transition: overstretched externally, undercoordinated internally. Whether it can renewal through integration and autonomy, or whether it declines into second-tier status on the world stage, remains one of the pressing questions as the multipolar era dawns.

Africa’s Anti-Colonial Turn: Ousting France and Embracing Sovereignty

Across Africa, 2025 was a year of empowerment and pushback – a continent-wide assertion of sovereignty that saw the expulsion of French influence from several former colonies and a bold drive toward Pan-African solidarity. This trend, building for years, reached a crescendo as one African nation after another severed military ties with Paris, ending decades (in some cases over a century) of neo-colonial dominance. In West and Central Africa especially, the message was unmistakable: the era of “Françafrique” – France’s post-colonial sphere of influence – is over.

The shift was dramatic. By 2025, six West African countries – Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and notably this year, Chad and Ivory Coast – had cut defense cooperation with France and demanded French troops departaljazeera.comaljazeera.com. In quick succession, long-standing French military bases were shut down. In February, France officially withdrew from its last base in Ivory Coast, a country once considered a cornerstone of French West Africapresstv.irpresstv.ir. A ceremonial handover in Abidjan saw the Ivorian flag raised over the base as French forces left, ending a continuous presence that dated back to Ivory Coast’s independence in 1960presstv.irpresstv.ir. French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu, presiding over the exit, admitted “the world is changing… our military relationship should change”presstv.ir. But in truth, the change was imposed on Paris by a wave of African “frexit” – a regional rejection of foreign garrisons. Chad, France’s staunchest ally in the Sahel, delivered an even bigger shock when its government announced on its Independence Day that it was ending all French military cooperationvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu. French troops that had been stationed in Chad for over 6 decades were told to pack up. And in Senegal, a new president – swept to power on a wave of youth discontent – declared it “obvious” that French soldiers would no longer be welcome on Senegalese soil eithervocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu.

By year’s end, French soldiers had been expelled or asked to leave from over 70% of their bases in Africapresstv.irpresstv.ir. From the large Sahelian outposts of Mali and Niger to coastal Senegal and Ivory Coast, the footprint of France’s once-formidable Operation Barkhane and related missions was nearly erased. Only two significant French deployments remained: about 1,500 troops in Djibouti (in the Horn of Africa) and a small force in Gabon, Central Africapresstv.ir. Those too faced uncertain futures as local sentiment grew impatient with any vestiges of foreign militarism. As a senior analyst Mucahid Durmaz observed, “Chad’s decision marks the final nail in the coffin of France’s post-colonial military dominance in the entire Sahel region”, reflecting a “wider structural transformation” in Africa’s engagement with Francevocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu. In plainer terms, France’s influence – political, military, economic – in its former African colonies has never been weaker than it is now.

What drove this sweeping change? Fundamentally, African populations and new leaders demanded sovereignty and dignity. Years of frustration had built up: French military interventions had not quelled the Islamist insurgencies plaguing the Sahel, economies remained tied to old colonial-era currencies (like the CFA franc), and political elites propped up by France were seen as corrupt and repressive. A younger generation of Africans, connected via social media, helped ignite mass protests with chants like “France dégage!” (“France get out!”). In 2025, these sentiments were translated into policy by governments – especially military juntas that took power in Mali (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023). These juntas rode populist anger to justify ejecting ambassadors and troops of the former colonial power. Even in more democratic states like Senegal and Ivory Coast, incumbent leaders pivoted to anti-French positions to maintain legitimacy in the face of public pressure and opposition gainsaljazeera.comaljazeera.com. Ivory Coast’s President Alassane Ouattara, long regarded as Paris-friendly, surprised many by announcing that French forces must withdraw because the Ivorian army is “now effective” and can handle security itselfaljazeera.comaljazeera.com. Analysts noted Ouattara likely also acted to steal the thunder of anti-French rivals ahead of elections, but whatever the motive, the outcome was clear – France was out.

The eviction of France also had an economic and symbolic dimension. Several countries moved to reclaim control over natural resources that had been dominated by French companies. Mali, for instance, revoked a French multinational’s gold mining license and invited firms from Russia and China instead. Niger, a major uranium producer, renegotiated terms with France’s Orano company amid accusations that France’s decades of mining amounted to “mass crimes” against the Nigerien peoplepresstv.irpresstv.ir. Such steps are part of a broader push to finally “decolonize” African economies – whether through establishing new currencies, diversifying trade partners, or asserting better terms for resource extraction.

The Pan-African sovereignty movement also manifested in greater cooperation among African nations themselves. Notably, the three Sahel countries under military rule – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – formed a defensive alliance (the Liptako-Gourma Charter) pledging mutual support against external aggression or internal destabilization. When ECOWAS (the West African regional bloc) – prodded by France and the U.S. – threatened military intervention to reverse Niger’s July 2023 coup, not only did Mali and Burkina warn they’d fight in Niger’s defense, but Nigeria’s public strongly opposed their own government’s participation. ECOWAS ultimately backed down from intervention, illustrating how Western influence via African proxies has waned. Meanwhile, the African Union showed new assertiveness on the global stage. In 2025, the African Union gained a seat at the G20 table (as a permanent member), a development championed by India and China to ensure Africa’s voice is heard in major economic decisions. African leaders used that platform to press for reforms in global finance and climate funding, often in concert with BRICS partners.

Indeed, Africa gravitated toward the multipolar ethos. Many African states deepened ties with China, Russia, Turkey, and others as alternatives to Western patrons. China is now the largest trading partner and investor for most of Africa, financing infrastructure without the political strings Western aid often carried. Russia has expanded security ties – the Wagner Group, though mired in controversy, provided training and support that some regimes found valuable after kicking out French forces. As one West African analyst put it, “They want to explore options with Russia, China, Turkey and other powers” because ties with France “have not benefited the population”vocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu. Even Middle Eastern players like the UAE stepped in – for example, reportedly offering Chad security aid after it expelled the French, showing that Africans are actively diversifying partnershipsvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu.

A palpable sense of Pan-Africanism also re-emerged. Across borders, Africans cheered each other’s moves to reclaim sovereignty. When Niger expelled the French ambassador and troops in 2023, supportive rallies were held in Mali and Burkina Faso. In 2025, as Ivory Coast joined the “French troops go home” club, many across Francophone Africa hailed it as a collective victory. Social media buzzed with slogans of African unity, and cultural exchanges (through music, film, and academic forums) stressed shared identity over colonial languages or divisions. The refrain “African solutions to African problems” gained substance: from mediating regional conflicts to joint military exercises like the “African Shield 2025” that brought together forces from 10 countries (with no Western advisers involved) for disaster response and counterterror drills.

Of course, challenges remain. The security vacuum left by departing foreign forces has in some places been filled by instability. The Sahel’s jihadist insurgencies did not disappear with France’s exit; in fact, extremist attacks rose in Mali and Burkina in 2025, testing the capacity of local armiesvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu. Some critics argue that Russia or China could become new hegemons if Africa is not careful, swapping one dependency for another. But for many Africans, the immediate focus is on breaking the cycle of foreign domination. The symbolism of raising national flags over former foreign bases – as seen in Abidjan and N’Djamena – is powerful. It feeds a sense of pride and possibility: that African nations, by uniting and asserting themselves, can chart an independent course.

In summary, 2025 will be remembered as the year Africa’s post-colonial second independence truly accelerated. The strengthening of Pan-African sovereignty is evident in the way African states stood up to former metropoles, coordinated in multilateral forums, and amplified their collective voice for fairness in the international system. As Press TV noted, “the French withdrawal… reflects a broader shift in West Africa’s ties with Paris amid rising anti-French sentiment”, part of a continental trend of reclaiming agencypresstv.irpresstv.ir. In the larger multipolar narrative, Africa’s rise is essential: with 1.3 billion people and vast resources, the continent’s liberation from neo-colonial influence means a more balanced world. African nations are no longer content to be pawns in others’ games; they seek to be players in their own right. If this momentum holds, Africa’s renaissance will be a cornerstone of the emerging multipolar order – fulfilling the dreams of early pan-Africanists that a free, united Africa can stand equal among the world’s powers.

Conclusion: The New World Taking Shape

From the steppes of Ukraine to the streets of West Africa, the events of 2025 together paint a tableau of a world in transition. The unipolar moment of U.S. and Western primacy is fading, giving way to a multipolar order defined by a diverse set of powerful actors and regional blocs. This year, a resurgent Russia bluntly demonstrated that NATO’s will can be thwarted. An emboldened Iran and its allies showed that even a U.S.-backed regional hegemon like Israel could be held to account for its actions, at least in the court of global opinion. China and India underscored that economic and diplomatic leadership no longer emanates only from the West – the Global South is increasingly setting its own agenda. And across developing nations, from Latin America’s defiance of Washington’s interventions to Africa’s expulsion of European troops, there is a clear demand for sovereign equality and respect, not paternalism.

None of this is to romanticize the multipolar world as automatically peaceful or just. Indeed, 2025 also witnessed horrific bloodshed and new dangers. The collapse of old arrangements can breed instability, as seen in Syria’s turmoil after regime change or the security gaps in the Sahel after French withdrawals. Multipolarity is not a panacea; it means more centers of decision-making, which can complicate efforts to address global challenges like climate change or pandemics. But what is evident is that hegemony is being challenged on all fronts. Western powers, especially the United States and European Union, face a stark reckoning with their own shortcomings and overextensions. As even European leaders admitted, the West must adapt to a world where it “faces the risk of civilizational decline” if it fails to renew itselfglobaltimes.cn. The alternative – embracing true multilateral cooperation on the basis of mutual respect – is ironically what Western nations had long preached but not always practiced. Now, they are being held to those ideals by rising counterparts.

For the first time in generations, multiple civilizational poles – Eurasian, South Asian, Middle Eastern, African, Latin American – are asserting their interests in a way that constrains unilateral power. This “multipolar moment,” born through the trials and tragedies of 2025, could lead to a more balanced international system if managed wisely. It could force reforms in institutions like the UN Security Council and Bretton Woods financial system to be more inclusive. It could temper the impulse of any one nation to act as the world’s policeman, knowing that others can and will push back. Certainly, the Global South’s leadership, as seen in BRICS and other forums, is pushing for an order where development needs and historical justice take center stageglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn.

The key moving forward will be whether major powers avoid turning multipolar competition into a zero-sum contest. The spirit of 2025’s resistance – whether Ukraine’s survival instinct, Gaza’s steadfastness, or Africa’s unity – was ultimately about dignity and equality. If that lesson is heeded, a multipolar world could be more equitable and stable than the unipolar or bipolar eras of the past. As of the end of 2025, at least, the world has unmistakably entered a new chapter: one in which Western hegemony is no longer taken for granted, and multiple voices now write the narrative of international relations. The birth of this multipolar order has been painful, but in the eyes of many nations long marginalized, it is the overdue “rebalancing…of the world based on mutual respect” that figures like Medvedev proclaimedgroups.google.comgroups.google.com. The task ahead will be turning that proclamation into a lived reality – forging a just peace in Ukraine, real freedom for Palestine, genuine partnership with Africa, and shared prosperity rather than new great-power rivalries. The story of 2025 shows both the promise and the peril on that path, and the world will be watching how these developments unfold in the years to come.

Sources: The analysis draws on diverse independent media reports and expert commentary, including Press TV (Iran) for on-the-ground perspectives in West Asia and Latin Americapresstv.irpresstv.ir, RT (Russia) for viewpoints on the Ukraine conflict and EU politicsgroups.google.comgroups.google.com, Global Times (China) for insights on multipolar trends and European challengesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn, as well as regional outlets like Al Mayadeen and Prensa Latina for Africa’s post-colonial developmentsvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cupresstv.ir. These non-Western sources corroborate the major events and help illuminate the growing consensus in much of the world that 2025 marked a decisive break from Western-centric narratives toward a more multipolar reality.

The post 2025: The Birth of a Multipolar World Order appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

This report examines the likelihood of a world war erupting soon (particularly in the next year), explores multiple viewpoints (Western and BRICS alike), draws historical analogies to past pre-war periods, and considers whether the world has passed the point of peace or if de-escalation is still achievable. The aim is to provide a comprehensive, balanced analysis of how close we truly are to World War III and what its outcomes might entail.

Escalating Conflicts: Flashpoints for a Global War

Multiple regional flashpoints today carry global significance. Any of these conflicts – or a combination of them – could spiral into a broader war involving the major powers. As one analysis bluntly put it, “any major war will almost certainly result from the tensions between five major players: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and the United States”[1]. Below we examine the key theaters and how they interconnect:

The Ukraine–Russia War: Europe’s Powder Keg

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered decades of relative peace in Europe and raised the specter of direct NATO-Russia confrontation. Thus far, NATO countries have limited their involvement to arming and supporting Ukraine, but the risk of escalation is ever-present. Russian forces have periodically tested NATO’s resolve with incidents like drone incursions into Polish and Romanian territory and fighter jets violating Baltic airspace[2][3]. Each incident carries the danger of miscalculation – a Russian strike that accidentally hits a NATO member could trigger the Alliance’s mutual defense clause and spark direct conflict. Indeed, officials in frontline NATO states have warned that they are at their “closest to open conflict since the Second World War,” as Poland’s prime minister said after a series of airspace violations[4]. Western intelligence also believes Moscow is preparing for a wider war. In late 2024, the head of Germany’s BND intelligence service cautioned that “Russia is preparing for a war with the West”[5], indicating that NATO is laying contingency plans for scenarios ranging from an all-out shooting war to shadowy hybrid attacks. For many in Eastern Europe, Russian expansionism is not a distant hypothetical but a real, immediate threat[6].

Should Russia directly attack any NATO territory, it would force the alliance into all-out war, with Russia likely calling on its partners to join a global fight[7]. This is the nightmare scenario: NATO’s vast military (including the U.S.) clashing head-on with a nuclear-armed Russia. Analysts have voiced concern that the world could “sleepwalk its way into an engulfing conflict” if Kremlin aggression goes unchecked[8]. However, some experts believe Moscow might not launch a blatant invasion of NATO territory; instead, Russia could pursue ambiguous gray-zone actions intended to divide and weaken the Alliance[9]. Even so, with Russia ramping up production of long-range hypersonic missiles capable of reaching across Europe and the Western Hemisphere[10], the European theater remains extremely volatile. Eastern European nations are fortifying defenses and bracing for the worst, as evidenced by several Baltic states withdrawing from a landmine-ban treaty to remilitarize their borders[11]. In summary, the Ukraine war has already drawn in NATO indirectly, and any further escalation – deliberate or accidental – could light the fuse of a wider war.

Middle East Tinderbox: Israel, Iran and Regional Turmoil

The Middle East is another potential ignition point for global conflict. The region’s stability dramatically worsened after the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023, which saw Hamas’s surprise attack and a major Israeli military response in Gaza. That war’s reverberations have been felt across the region: skirmishes with Hezbollah in Lebanon, unrest in the West Bank, and heightened tensions involving Iran. For a tense period in mid-2024, it appeared a direct Israel–Iran war was about to erupt – a conflict that could easily drag in the world’s great powers. As one account described, “for a few days over the summer it looked as though the war between Israel and Iran would explode into an all-out regional conflict, dragging in the US and Western allies on one side, and potentially Russia and China on the other.”[12] Both Washington and Tehran seemingly came to the brink: reports indicate the United States even launched limited airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities amid that crisis, before all sides backed down within about 24 hours[13]. This close call underscores how rapidly a regional showdown — in this case between Israel and Iran — could escalate into a superpower standoff.

Several factors continue to fuel Middle Eastern volatility. Iran’s nuclear program remains a flashpoint: Tehran’s efforts to enrich uranium have brought it closer to a nuclear weapons capability, something Israel has vowed to prevent at all costs. After the 2023 Hamas–Israel war and the weakening of Iran’s proxy forces like Hezbollah (reportedly even the Assad regime in Syria fell amid the chaos, according to some analyses)[14], hardliners in Tehran have even more incentive to seek a nuclear deterrent. Iran still holds an estimated 440 kg of highly-enriched uranium, and despite covert attacks and sanctions aimed at slowing its progress, the program is seen as a growing threat[15][16]. As one researcher observed, “it all adds up to quite a dangerous situation… their capacity has been marginally degraded, but the incentives for Iran to go nuclear have gone through the roof.”[15] If Iran were to weaponize its nuclear program or if Israel were to strike preemptively, a wider war could ensue. In such a scenario, the U.S. would likely back Israel while Russia (which has ties to Iran and Syria) and China (which opposes Western interventionism) could support Iran diplomatically or even militarily, aligning along geopolitical fault lines[12].

At the same time, Israel’s own policies are a source of tension. Its government’s expansion of settlements and talk of annexing parts of the occupied West Bank have angered not just Palestinians but also sparked international backlash. In fact, numerous countries – including some Western allies like France, the UK, Canada, and Australia – have moved toward formally recognizing Palestinian statehood, especially in the aftermath of the Gaza war[17]. Israel has reacted with alarm to these recognitions, and there are fears it might retaliate by unilaterally annexing more West Bank territory[17]. Such a move would inflame the Arab world and could provoke another violent uprising or even intervention by countries like Iran. The U.S. finds itself in a delicate position: while it staunchly defends Israel’s security, it also wants to prevent a broader regional war that could draw in American forces. For now, cooler heads have prevailed – for instance, Israel, Iran and the U.S. all ultimately pulled back from the brink during that scare in 2024[13]. But the Middle East remains on a knife’s edge. Any spark – a Hezbollah missile barrage, an Iranian nuclear breakout, or an Israeli annexation attempt – could set off a chain reaction involving outside powers.

Indo-Pacific Tensions: U.S.–China Rivalry and East Asian Flashpoints

Perhaps the most significant potential trigger of a world war lies in East Asia, where a rising superpower (China) is increasingly at odds with the established one (the United States). Many analysts have long assumed that if World War III were to occur, it might begin in the Indo-Pacific region[18]. The core issue is Taiwan – the self-governing island that Beijing claims as part of Chinese territory, but which enjoys de facto independence with U.S. support. China’s President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central goal, and he has not renounced the use of force to achieve it. In recent years, China’s stance toward Taiwan has grown markedly more aggressive: the Chinese military (PLA) routinely conducts large-scale air and naval drills around the island as rehearsals for a potential invasion or blockade[19]. In one instance, live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait were explicitly described as a “dress rehearsal for a possible real blockade… in the future”[20]. Beijing has also tested new amphibious assault ships and even unveiled technology like deep-sea cable cutters (to sever internet links) in preparation for possible conflict[21]. These actions signal that China is actively preparing for war over Taiwan, as Taiwan’s own defense officials have warned[22][23]. In a September 2025 speech in Washington, a senior Taiwanese minister stated plainly: “China is preparing for war to take Taiwan… Beijing has been actively preparing for war,” pointing to stepped-up Chinese military activity near the island[22][23]. He cautioned that if Taiwan fell to a Chinese invasion, it would trigger a “domino effect” undermining regional security and directly threatening the U.S. [22][24]. American leaders have likewise identified a potential Chinese move on Taiwan as one of the gravest looming threats, with some intelligence estimates suggesting Beijing wants the capability to seize Taiwan by 2027 – the 100th anniversary of the PLA[25].

The United States has signaled it would not abandon Taiwan. Washington has been increasing military aid and coordination with Taipei, and U.S. officials frequently reiterate that any Chinese attack would be met with a response. This mutual posturing creates a real risk of direct superpower war. A Chinese attempt to forcibly reunify Taiwan would almost certainly draw in the U.S. and possibly U.S. allies like Japan, Australia, and others in Asia-Pacific – an event that would “shake the foundations of the world as we know it and could well trigger a Third World War”[26]. Chinese leaders are aware of this risk: invading Taiwan means “direct war with the US,” as even Chinese strategists acknowledge[27]. This acts as a deterrent, but also motivates Beijing to rapidly build up its military (including expanding its nuclear arsenal) to tilt the balance. Analysts note that China is on track to field 600+ nuclear warheads in coming years and, together with Russia, could potentially amass more nukes than the United States – a development that complicates deterrence calculations for Washington[28]. Meanwhile, China portrays U.S. involvement as the provocative factor. Chinese officials regularly warn Washington “not to play with fire” by arming or encouraging Taiwan’s independence[29]. From Beijing’s perspective, America’s network of alliances in Asia (and frequent naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait) amount to encirclement, and BRICS partners like Russia often echo the view that U.S. “hegemony” is the source of instability[30].

Beyond Taiwan, East Asia has other flashpoints that could compound a conflict. North Korea, a close partner of China (and Russia), continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Pyongyang’s dictator Kim Jong Un has modernized his arsenal and declared an end to hopes of peaceful reunification with South Korea[31]. In 2023–2024, North Korea repeatedly tested missiles (including potentially nuclear-capable ones) and even sent small contingents of troops to assist Russia in Ukraine[32][33]. The Korean Peninsula is thus a tinderbox: a North Korean attack on South Korea or Japan (both U.S.-allied) could instantly broaden any war. Western experts speculate that in a U.S.-China showdown, Beijing might encourage North Korea to open a second front. As one scenario suggests, China could prod Pyongyang into attacking southward “in order to expel U.S. troops [from the Korean Peninsula]. That would open a new front against the US so that China could more easily take Taiwan.”[34] In other words, a coordinated move by China and North Korea could stretch U.S. forces across two Asian wars simultaneously. This ominously mirrors the “axis” coordination seen in Europe during World War II, and indeed U.S. officials now openly talk about an emergent de facto alliance of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea acting in concert[35][36]. All four have been cooperating in today’s conflicts – e.g. North Korean artillery and Iranian drones aid Russia in Ukraine, while China’s trade with Russia undermines Western sanctions[37][36]. In a future war, these states could form one camp, with NATO and Indo-Pacific U.S. allies forming the opposing camp. The stage would be set for a true world war, spanning multiple theaters from Eastern Europe to the Middle East to the Pacific.

How Likely Is World War III in the Near Future?

With so many hotspots and dire warnings, is a global war actually likely to erupt in the next year? While the risk is real and growing, most analysts still consider a full-scale World War III (involving direct great-power clashes) to be improbable in the very immediate term, though not impossible. The consensus is that we are in a period of heightened danger, even if world war is not yet inevitable. A recent survey of hundreds of global strategists found that 40% expect a world war (a multifront great-power conflict) to occur by 2035[38]. Notably, historian Philip Zelikow estimated a “20 to 30 percent” probability of “worldwide warfare” breaking out “within the next one to three years”, warning that the world is entering a “period of maximum danger”[39]. These are sobering odds – effectively a coin flip over the next decade, and a non-trivial chance in the next few years. Even some prominent investors and thinkers outside the security field have sounded alarms: Billionaire Ray Dalio recently wrote that the odds of the current “contained” conflicts escalating into a “hot world war” involving major powers have risen to ~50%, up from 35% two years earlier[40]. In his words, it’s now “a coin toss” whether we transition from isolated wars (Ukraine, Israel-Hamas, etc.) into a broader global war that draws in the U.S. and China[41]. He argued in late 2023 that the Israel-Gaza war and Russia-Ukraine war are likely to be “brutal until the end” and “more likely to spread than subside”, potentially leading to “a much more horrific hot world war” if other major countries become involved[42].

That said, a world war is not a foregone conclusion and there are significant constraints on its outbreak in the near term. For one, all the major powers know that a direct war carries incalculable risks, foremost among them nuclear annihilation. The principle of nuclear deterrence has, since 1945, prevented the superpowers from fighting each other outright. Even as tensions run high, leaders in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing have strong incentives to avoid crossing the threshold into open conflict that could escalate to strategic nuclear exchange. This “balance of terror” continues to act as a moderating force. For example, Western nations have carefully calibrated their support to Ukraine – providing weapons to Kyiv but stopping short of deploying NATO troops – precisely to avoid a direct NATO-Russia shooting war. Similarly, China and the U.S. have kept channels of communication open and recently resumed high-level military dialogues to reduce the chance of accidents in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait sparking combat. Restraint and diplomacy still have a role: despite heated rhetoric, Beijing has not moved to attack Taiwan yet, and U.S. and Chinese officials periodically meet to manage the rivalry. In the Middle East, backdoor negotiations (often via third parties) have so far prevented an Israel-Iran missile exchange. And in Europe, Russia has limited its war to Ukraine, likely aware that attacking NATO would be suicidal. All these factors suggest that while war could erupt (especially via miscalculation or unintended escalation), there remains a plausible path in which the next year sees continued brinkmanship and proxy conflicts without an overt World War.

It’s also important to note that some observers believe World War III may have effectively “already begun,” but in a form distinct from past world wars. They argue that we are in a state of hybrid global conflict that hasn’t yet gone nuclear or fully mobilized. In this view, the Russia-Ukraine war, China’s military posturing, cyber warfare, economic sanctions, and clashes in places like Africa are all part of a brewing world war that is unfolding “by a thousand cuts”. National security expert Mark Toth and former intelligence officer Jonathan Sweet, for instance, contend that the third world war is already underway – not with mushroom clouds and massed armies, but with subtler means[43]. “This third global conflagration doesn’t look or feel like what Hollywood envisioned… no mushroom clouds or apocalyptic wastelands. Rather, it is war by a thousand cuts, conducted across multi-regional and multi-domain battlefields,” they told the Daily Mail[43]. In their analysis, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked the “early stages” of this conflict[44]. Since then, the war has expanded into cyberspace (with massive hacking and disinformation campaigns), outer space (ASAT weapons tests), and proxy battles in developing countries[45]. Under this paradigm, the world may already be fighting World War III in incremental ways, and the question is whether it erupts into the traditional full-scale war that people recognize. While not everyone agrees with this interpretation, it underscores the reality that the international order is at its most unstable point in decades. Even if a formal world war is not “declared” in the next year, the conflicts and rivalries at play are global in scope and could at any moment intensify.

In summary, the next 12 months will likely see continued instability and localized wars rather than an immediate leap to World War III – but the margin for error is thin. The probability of world war in any given year is difficult to quantify (some put it in the single digits percentage-wise), yet it is clearly higher now than it was a decade ago, and it continues to rise. We are essentially in a race between escalation and diplomacy: either the conflicts will be managed (or frozen) to buy time for longer-term solutions, or one of these flashpoints will escalate beyond control. The consensus among cautious experts is that outright world war is not inevitable in the very near term – but if current trends continue unchecked, the risk in the medium term (next 2–5 years and beyond) is uncomfortably high[39].

Western vs. BRICS Perspectives: Who’s to Blame, and What’s at Stake?

Interpretations of these mounting war risks vary dramatically between the Western world and the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and its sympathizers. To present a balanced view, it’s crucial to understand each side’s narrative:

• Western Perspective: From the viewpoint of the United States and its NATO/allied partners, the threat of a world war stems largely from the aggressive actions of authoritarian powers – namely Russia’s expansionism in Europe and China’s militarism in Asia. Western leaders argue that the post-World War II “rules-based international order” is under assault by nations who seek to redraw borders by force or undermine sovereign nations’ rights. For example, the U.S. and European governments see Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an unprovoked act of aggression violating international law. In their eyes, Moscow is solely responsible for the war, and Western military aid to Ukraine is a justified effort to stop Russian imperial ambitions. Analogies are often drawn to the 1930s: some Western officials compare Putin’s territorial grabs to Hitler’s annexations, warning against “appeasement” and insisting that failing to stop Russia in Ukraine will only embolden it to threaten other countries. This is why NATO’s eastern members are so on edge – a sentiment encapsulated by those Baltic and Polish warnings of being closer to war than at any time since 1945[4]. Western intelligence also frequently highlights hostile intent from the Russian side; recall the German intelligence chief’s stark warning that Russia appears to be gearing up for possible war against the West[5]. Similarly, China is viewed warily by the West. American and European officials often cite Chinese belligerence – whether it’s military build-ups near Taiwan, island-building in the South China Sea, or combative “wolf warrior” diplomacy – as evidence that Beijing is trying to subvert the status quo. The Western narrative frames the U.S.-China rivalry as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism, with Taiwan’s freedom and the security of the Pacific at stake. U.S. military leaders have openly said they must be ready to defend Taiwan if China attacks, and NATO’s latest strategy documents even mention managing the “systemic challenge” posed by China. In short, the West tends to blame the would-be aggressors (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea) for pushing the world toward war. The preferred Western solution is strength and deterrence: bolster alliances, arm the threatened democracies (Ukraine, Taiwan, Israel), and make clear that any attack on allies will be met with overwhelming force. The hope is that robust deterrence will prevent World War III by persuading adversaries they cannot win one. Western powers also emphasize international law and often seek diplomatic off-ramps, but not at the expense of what they consider core principles (like a country’s right to self-determination or freedom of navigation). From this angle, appeasement equals risk, whereas collective security and resolve offer the best chance to keep the peace.
• BRICS (Russia/China & partners) Perspective: Leading voices in Moscow, Beijing, and other BRICS capitals tell a very different story – one where the West is the instigator of global instability. Russian and Chinese leaders accuse the U.S. and NATO of hegemonic, expansionist behavior that has cornered them into reacting. For instance, President Putin portrays the Ukraine war not as an invasion but as a defensive response to NATO’s eastward expansion and Western meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere. He frequently asserts a deep historical unity between Russians and Ukrainians (infamously claiming “we are one people”), implying Moscow is reclaiming what it views as its own[46]. From the Kremlin’s perspective, NATO’s arming of Ukraine proves that Russia is really fighting “the whole Western alliance” in Ukraine. Indeed, Russian officials often refer to the conflict as “Russia’s war against the West”. Putin also couches his worldview in terms of a changing global order: he criticizes Western dominance and points to the rising economic and political clout of BRICS as “inevitable” trends reshaping power balances[30]. In a June 2025 forum, Putin warned that if regional conflicts (like Ukraine and Middle East tensions) remain unresolved, it may lead to a global war, and he insisted those conflicts “need serious attention and peaceful solutions”[47]. However, he squarely blamed the West for many of those conflicts and touted Russia and China as champions of a “more balanced” world order replacing Western unilateralism[30][48]. This rhetoric resonates with many in the Global South and within BRICS nations, who feel Western countries have long dictated terms in international affairs.

China, for its part, views U.S. actions in Asia as provocative. Beijing sees American military alliances in its neighborhood (Japan, South Korea, Australia, plus unofficial ties with Taiwan) as an attempt to contain China’s rise – analogous, Chinese officials sometimes say, to how encirclement strategies preceded past great-power wars. The Chinese government insists that Taiwan is an internal matter and that it seeks peaceful reunification, but it also vows to “take all necessary measures” to prevent Taiwan’s permanent separation or foreign interference[29]. When U.S. warships sail through the Taiwan Strait or sell arms to Taipei, China frames it as dangerous meddling that could trigger war. In Beijing’s narrative, the U.S. is “playing with fire” and creating the crisis, whereas China is simply responding to defend its sovereignty. Similar logic applies to the South China Sea, where China’s claims and militarization are, in their view, justified by history – and it’s the U.S. Navy patrols asserting freedom of navigation that raise war risks. Broadly, BRICS countries emphasize multipolarity: they argue that the era of undisputed Western (American) dominance is ending, and a new order where multiple powers (including China, India, Russia, etc.) have a say must emerge. They often cite the growing share of global GDP accounted for by BRICS and the expanding membership of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as evidence that the West can no longer call all the shots[30][48]. From this view, conflicts like Ukraine and the Israel-Palestine issue are symptoms of Western refusal to accommodate other powers’ interests. Russian and Chinese officials routinely accuse the West of hypocrisy – for example, intervening militarily around the world when it suits them (Iraq, Libya, Kosovo) but condemning Russia’s intervention; or upholding Israel’s security while ignoring Palestinian rights. Such grievances feed a narrative that a “more balanced” global order is needed to secure peace[30]. Interestingly, leaders like Putin and Xi often stop short of advocating a world war – rather, they cast themselves as trying to prevent one by correcting Western misbehavior. In practice, however, their calls for a new order sometimes serve to justify aligning together against the West. Moscow and Beijing have drawn closer in diplomatic and military cooperation, presenting a united front against Western sanctions and pressures. They insist they are not forming a hostile bloc, but Western analysts do see an “axis” of sorts emerging[35]. Other BRICS members like India and Brazil take more nuanced stances – they generally don’t want a world war and prefer diplomacy, but they also voice frustration at Western dominance and have been reluctant to sever ties with Russia or China. India, for example, continues to buy Russian oil and weapons and has not joined Western sanctions on Russia, emphasizing a neutral approach and urging dialogue in Ukraine. Yet India also has border conflicts with China and is part of the Quad with the U.S., so its loyalties in a world war scenario might be split (analysts predict India would try to stay non-committal in a WW3 situation)[49]. This underscores that “West vs BRICS” is not black-and-white – there are shades of gray. Still, for the purpose of gauging war sentiment: Western opinion sees authoritarian aggression as the chief danger, whereas the BRICS side sees Western hegemonism as the root cause of potential world war.

In a sense, both perspectives agree on one thing: the current trajectory is perilous. But they disagree on how we got here and how to avoid disaster. The West calls for upholding international norms and deterring aggressors; the BRICS call for respecting new power realities and addressing what they view as Western-caused grievances. A balanced assessment must acknowledge that each side fears the other. NATO countries fear an emboldened Russia or China will upend the peace by force; Russia/China fear the U.S.-led bloc is trying to thwart their security and rise, possibly by force. This mutual distrust is itself reminiscent of past pre-war rivalries and makes resolving crises much harder.

Historical Analogies and Lessons

History does not repeat exactly, but it rhymes. Many observers draw analogies between today’s geopolitical tensions and those in eras that preceded major wars. Such analogies can be illuminating – or cautionary – as we seek to understand if World War III is looming. Here are a few pertinent historical parallels:

• “Sleepwalking” into World War I (1914): The situation in 1914 is often invoked when discussing how a world war can start almost inadvertently. Prior to WWI, Europe was a multipolar powder keg of rising and declining empires entangled in alliances. A localized event – the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in the Balkans – triggered a chain reaction of mobilizations due to treaty obligations and strategic miscalculations. Leaders on all sides believed war could be controlled or avoided even as they took aggressive postures, but ultimately they “sleepwalked” into a catastrophic global conflict. Similarly, today we see a multipolar world with several great powers (U.S., China, Russia, etc.) and a web of alliances (NATO, security pacts in Asia) that could draw many nations into war if a single spark is not contained. It’s no coincidence that analysts warn we may “sleepwalk… into an engulfing conflict” again[8]. Like 1914, none of the major powers openly desires a world war, yet each is ramping up militarily and might feel compelled to respond to a provocation against an ally or proxy. The lesson from 1914 is the danger of overconfidence and rigid alliance commitments – something policymakers today are keenly aware of when managing, for instance, the NATO commitment to defend the Baltics if attacked. Avoiding a repeat may require flexibility, communication, and willingness to de-escalate crises before they spiral. The WWI analogy is a stark reminder that world wars can start even when no one initially intends them, due to miscalculation and the momentum of events.
• Appeasement and World War II (1930s): On the other hand, the lead-up to World War II offers lessons about the cost of failing to confront expansionism early. In the 1930s, aggressive powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan) repeatedly violated treaties and annexed territory. The Western democracies often responded weakly or tried to appease these regimes (e.g. Munich Agreement of 1938, yielding the Sudetenland to Hitler) in hopes of preserving peace. The result was that the aggressors became emboldened, seeing appeasement as a green light, and ultimately launched full-scale war that became global. Many in the West apply this analogy to today’s situations: for example, some compare Putin’s annexation of Crimea (2014) and invasion of Ukraine (2022) to Hitler’s land grabs, arguing that yielding territory or making concessions will only encourage more aggression. This viewpoint bolsters the case for firm resistance now – supplying Ukraine, drawing red lines around Taiwan, etc., to show that free nations will fight and thus deter a larger war. Critics, however, note a key difference: unlike the 1930s, today’s potential aggressors wield nuclear weapons, making direct confrontation far more dangerous. Still, the WWII analogy influences decision-makers: the fear of being seen as Chamberlain (who appeased Hitler) weighs on leaders like those in Washington or London when considering how strongly to respond to Russia or other threats. Conversely, Russia sometimes flips this analogy on its head – Putin’s propaganda absurdly labels Ukraine’s government as “Nazis” and casts Russia’s war as a righteous fight akin to WWII. While that narrative is widely rejected outside Russia, it underscores how historical memory (the Great Patriotic War in Russia’s case) is used to justify current policies. The true lesson of WWII might be that unchecked expansionism leads to bigger wars, but also that once total war starts, it is unimaginably destructive – especially now that nukes exist.
• Cold War and the Avoidance of World War III (1947–1991): The decades-long Cold War between the U.S.-led bloc and the Soviet-led bloc was in essence a world war that did not happen – or that was fought indirectly. Both superpowers had diametrically opposed ideologies and engaged in intense arms races and proxy wars, yet they scrupulously avoided direct clashes. This was largely due to the nuclear deterrent (Mutual Assured Destruction) and carefully managed diplomacy (hotlines, arms control treaties like SALT, INF, etc.). Some see today’s climate as a Second Cold War, with the U.S. and its allies on one side and a loose China-Russia partnership on the other. If so, history suggests two paths: a prolonged cold standoff with occasional proxy conflicts but no world war (the better outcome), or a failure of deterrence leading to a hot war (the worst outcome). The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) is a favorite analogy for the brinksmanship over Taiwan or Ukraine – a reminder of how close we came to WWIII and how effective communication and compromise (Kennedy and Khrushchev’s secret deal) pulled us back. Today, ensuring robust communication channels – e.g. between U.S. and Chinese militaries, or the U.S. and Russia – is likewise critical to defuse potentially catastrophic incidents (like an air collision or naval incident in disputed waters). The Cold War also teaches the value of proxy conflicts as both a risk and a safety valve: wars like Korea and Vietnam were devastating but world war was avoided because the superpowers limited their direct involvement. Ukraine resembles a proxy war in that NATO is assisting one side while Russia avoids attacking NATO directly. This might contain the conflict – but as history warns, proxy wars can also escalate or expand if mismanaged. Ultimately, the Cold War ended peacefully through negotiation and the internal collapse of one side; it shows that patient containment and vigilance can succeed without global Armageddon, albeit after many tense decades. Policymakers hoping to avoid World War III may well be trying to emulate the cold peace model rather than the hot war model.
• Thucydides Trap (Ancient Greece): A frequently cited historical concept (though not without critics) is the Thucydides Trap, referring to the ancient rivalry between Sparta (the established power) and Athens (the rising power) that led to the Peloponnesian War. Historian Thucydides wrote that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” By analogy, some fear that China’s rise and the fear it creates in the U.S. could similarly make a U.S.-China war “inevitable”. While inevitability is debated, we do see a classical security dilemma: each side’s defensive moves look offensive to the other (e.g., U.S. alliances vs. Chinese military expansion), leading to escalation. Avoiding this trap will require deliberate efforts by both Washington and Beijing to find a modus vivendi – much as Britain and the U.S. peacefully accommodated their power transition in the early 20th century, breaking the usual pattern of great-power war. The historical analogies of rising vs. ruling powers (like Germany vs. Britain pre-WWI as well) loom large in strategists’ minds and underline the importance of managing great-power competition so that it doesn’t erupt in conflict.

In applying historical lessons, one must be careful – no analogy is perfect. However, they collectively teach us that wars often seem unlikely until they suddenly happen, that balancing deterrence with diplomacy is vital, and that recognizing the perspectives and fears of all sides can sometimes avert fatal misunderstandings. History is replete with missed chances at peace and also a few extraordinary successes (as in 1962). The world today stands at a similar crossroads, and the awareness of history could be what helps current leaders navigate away from a repeat of 1914 or 1939.

At the Crossroads: Is Peace Still Possible or Have We Passed the Point of No Return?

With tensions so high, a critical question arises: Have we passed the point of “Peace,” or can escalation be halted? Some commentators grimly suggest that the world has already slid too far toward conflict – that the relative peace of the post-Cold War era is over, and an era of inevitable confrontation is upon us. Indeed, by many measures the world is less peaceful today than at any time since the Cold War: a major land war is raging in Europe, great-power military spending is surging, and international arms control regimes (like nuclear treaties) have frayed. However, acknowledging that peace is under severe strain is not the same as declaring it lost for good. De-escalation remains possible – and extremely necessary – to avoid crossing the threshold into world war.

On one hand, pessimists argue that key actors are no longer interested in compromise, making war only a matter of time. They point to rhetoric like that of Ray Dalio, who noted current conflicts seem more likely to widen than to resolve peacefully[42]. They also observe that diplomatic efforts have so far failed to resolve any of the major crises: negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have stalled or collapsed, Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects look dimmer than ever, and U.S.-China talks have yet to produce any agreement on Taiwan or the South China Sea. In this gloomy view, humanity may have crossed a Rubicon where each side is doubling down on military readiness, and “peace” as we knew it – the absence of great-power war – might be a thing of the past. The world could be likened to the late 1930s or the early Cold War 1950s, when confrontation became the new normal. If that is the case, the best we might hope for is a controlled standoff (a cold war) rather than a hot war, but even that standoff would be precarious and punctuated by proxy fights. Already, as noted, some see a form of World War III unfolding in slow motion via hybrid warfare[50][43]. Under this paradigm, true peace (where major powers genuinely trust each other and disarm) is out of reach for the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, there is a more optimistic (or at least pragmatic) camp which believes that de-escalation and diplomacy can still prevent doom. History offers examples of seemingly irreversible paths to war being turned around at the 11th hour. Even in our current conflicts, there have been moments of restraint that show war is not inevitable. For instance, despite extreme rhetoric, neither Russia nor NATO has deliberately expanded the Ukraine war beyond Ukraine’s borders – an indicator that both sides, for now, prefer to contain the fighting. The grain export deals in the Black Sea (when they were in effect) and periodic prisoner exchanges between Russia and the West showed that dialogue is possible even amid war. In the Middle East, as furious as Israel and Iran are at each other, both have avoided direct warfare for decades, often thanks to behind-the-scenes mediation (Oman, for example, has brokered messages between Tehran and Washington). As recently as 2015, major powers including the U.S. and Russia collectively negotiated the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) – proof that diplomatic solutions can be found for thorny issues when there is political will. Regarding the U.S.-China rivalry, there have been efforts to establish “guardrails,” such as the Biden-Xi summits and agreements to maintain communication hotlines. Those initiatives are aimed exactly at preventing accidental war. It’s worth remembering that domestic pressures in many countries also favor avoiding war: for example, American public opinion, scarred by long wars in Iraq/Afghanistan, is wary of new entanglements; Chinese economic ambitions are undermined by war disruptions, incentivizing Beijing to keep stability; European economies likewise desperately want to avert a wider war. These moderating forces suggest that rational self-interest could yet pull us back from the brink.

One potential path forward is renewed arms control and risk-reduction talks. Even during the Cold War’s darkest days, Washington and Moscow worked out agreements to limit nuclear weapons and manage incidents (e.g. the 1972 Incidents at Sea agreement to avoid naval collisions). In today’s context, something similar between the U.S. and China – perhaps an understanding on certain red lines around Taiwan or a mechanism to de-conflict military operations in the Western Pacific – could reduce the chance of a spark. In Europe, while formal treaties with Russia have faltered (Russia suspended the New START nuclear treaty, for instance), there are calls to eventually negotiate a settlement in Ukraine that could include security guarantees to both Ukraine and Russia. Such an outcome may seem distant now, but wars do end at the negotiating table eventually, and planning for a post-war security architecture could prevent the next war. Another hopeful sign is the involvement of third-party mediators. Countries like Turkey, India, Brazil, and South Africa (the latter three are in BRICS but also maintain ties to the West) have at various times offered to mediate the Ukraine conflict or dialogues between the U.S. and its rivals. While none of these initiatives have borne fruit yet, they could gain traction if stalemates on the battlefield make the combatants more receptive to talks. The recent Saudi-Iran rapprochement (brokered by China) shows that even long-time foes can strike a deal under the right circumstances – a reminder that surprises can happen in international diplomacy.

In weighing whether we’ve passed the point of peace, one must define “peace.” If we mean a return to the relatively harmonious international relations of the 1990s, then yes, that era appears over – the world has undeniably entered a more adversarial phase. But if “peace” means simply avoiding another world war, then it has not yet slipped out of our grasp. The coming year and beyond will be critical. As one expert panel found, about 60% of global strategists still believed the world in ten years could be as good as or better than today, while 40% feared it would be worse[51]. That indicates a substantial belief that disaster is not preordained. Ultimately, the fate of peace may rest on choices not yet made: whether leaders choose to dial down the rhetoric, engage in serious negotiations, and address the legitimate security concerns of all sides – or whether they continue on the collision course, banking on the hope that the other side blinks first.

Conclusion – A Fragile Balance: We stand at a fateful juncture. The likelihood of World War III in the next year remains low in absolute terms, but it is higher now than at any point in recent memory and rising with each uncontrolled crisis. A blend of flashpoints – in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia – have created a global tinderbox. Should these conflicts entwine or erupt simultaneously, a third world war could indeed materialize, with devastating outcomes: tens of millions of lives at risk, economies shattered, and even nuclear Armageddon if escalation runs away. Both Western and BRICS viewpoints highlight valid fears and grievances, yet if each side pursues absolute victory or dominance, all may lose. Historical analogies to 1914 and 1939 sound alarms about miscalculation and appeasement, while the Cold War offers lessons in crisis management that are urgently needed now. We have not necessarily passed the final point of no return – but we are uncomfortably close to it. De-escalation is possible through determined diplomacy, mutual compromise, and building new security arrangements that acknowledge the interests of all major powers. The coming months will test whether leaders can step back from the brink. In essence, the world is teetering between two futures: one in which it sleepwalks into an abyss of world war, and another in which it awakens to the peril and pulls back. For the sake of humanity, the latter path must prevail.

Sources:

• The Week UK – “How close are we to World War Three?” (Sept 2025)[7][8][12][18][26][34]
• Atlantic Council – Welcome to 2035: Global Foresight Survey (Feb 2025)[39][38]
• The Economic Times (India) – Putin’s SPIEF Forum remarks (June 2025)[47][30][48]
• Reuters – Taiwan Affairs Minister Chiu Chui-cheng speech (Sept 2025)[22][23]
• Newsweek – “What Would World War III Look Like?” (Dec 2024)[1][35][36]
• The Economic Times – Mark Toth & Jonathan Sweet on “WW3 already here” (Dec 2024)[43][44]
• Business Insider – Ray Dalio “50% chance of world war” comments (Oct 2023)[41][40][42]

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[40] [41] [42] Ray Dalio Sees 50% Chance of World War As Israel-Hamas Conflict Rages – Business Insider

[43] [44] [45] [50] World War 3 news: “World War 3 is already here”: No mushroom clouds, but here’s when it really began – The Economic Times

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Background: Trump’s Greenland Gambit and Its Fallout

In August 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump stunned the world by proposing that the United States purchase Greenland from Denmark – a proposal Denmark’s government flatly rejected as “absurd.” This unprecedented gambit injected sudden tension into U.S.-Denmark relations and thrust Greenland into the spotlight of Arctic geopolitics. Trump canceled a state visit to Copenhagen amid the dispute, but the episode had lasting effects. It signaled Washington’s heightened strategic interest in Greenland and spurred Denmark to reassert its sovereignty there. In the years since, Trump has reiterated his interest in acquiring Greenland on national security grounds, arguing that the island’s vast mineral wealth and strategic location make it vital to U.S. interests (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations). These public comments have rippled through diplomatic and security circles, prompting debates about Arctic sovereignty, military posture, and great-power competition in the far north.

Greenland’s leaders and people were caught in the middle of this exchange. The island’s government firmly stated “Greenland is not for sale,” even as Trump’s overtures drew attention to Greenland’s importance and, ironically, energized its independence movement. U.S. officials shifted tactics by engaging Greenland directly – reopening a consulate in Nuuk and even offering economic aid. In 2020, the U.S. announced a $12.1 million aid package for Greenland aimed at fostering ties and expanding a U.S. presence, citing concerns over Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic (U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic | Reuters) (U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic | Reuters). Danish politicians were divided: some decried the U.S. aid as a provocative attempt to drive a wedge between Greenland and Denmark (U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic | Reuters), while others welcomed American investment in Greenland’s development (U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic | Reuters). The immediate diplomatic rift of 2019 gradually gave way to pragmatic cooperation, but Trump’s Greenland saga has undeniably reframed Arctic issues for all parties involved.

Greenland’s Strategic Importance for Arctic Dominance

Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, is the world’s largest island and occupies a critical position in the Arctic Circle. Its strategic value stems from a combination of geography, natural resources, and military utility:

• Geopolitical Location: Greenland sits between North America and Europe, flanking the Arctic Ocean and North Atlantic. It forms part of the vital “GIUK gap” (Greenland-Iceland-UK), a naval choke point for movement between the Arctic and Atlantic. Control of this area is crucial for NATO to monitor Russian naval activity and secure Atlantic sea lanes. As Trump bluntly put it, “We need Greenland for national security” (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations). Full U.S. control over Greenland, he argued, could enhance American air and naval operations in the Arctic and North Atlantic (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations). Even under Danish sovereignty, Greenland hosts Thule Air Base (Pituffik Space Base), America’s northernmost military installation, which provides early-warning radar for missiles and space surveillance (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense). This base underscores Greenland’s role as a forward U.S./NATO defense outpost guarding the approaches to North America and Europe.
• Natural Resources and Economic Potential: Beneath Greenland’s ice lie abundant mineral riches – including rare earth elements, uranium, zinc, iron ore, and potentially oil and gas. These resources are increasingly accessible as ice sheets retreat. Trump and U.S. strategists have eyed Greenland’s “considerable mineral wealth” as an asset for economic and strategic security (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations). Rare earth minerals, in particular, are critical for high-tech and defense industries, and currently dominated by China’s supply chain. Gaining a secure source from Greenland would be a strategic boon for the West. Greenland’s fisheries are another economic lifeline (the island relies heavily on fishing exports), and new opportunities in tourism and infrastructure are emerging. However, exploiting these resources raises environmental and governance questions, especially given Greenland’s delicate Arctic ecosystem.
• New Arctic Sea Routes: Climate change is literally redrawing maps in the high north. Warming temperatures and receding sea ice are opening navigational routes like the Northwest Passage (through Canada’s Arctic) and the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Siberian coast. Greenland sits astride some of these developing corridors. For example, a route over Canada and along Greenland’s coast could significantly shorten voyages between Asia, Europe, and North America. The melting Arctic ice promises new passages for trade, which is “reigniting competition” among powers for influence over these routes (Why does Donald Trump want Greenland so bad? What to know). Greenland’s harbors could someday serve as important waystations or naval bases along a trans-Arctic shipping lane. Both the U.S. and EU worry about freedom of navigation if adversaries try to control these passages. Russia’s dominance of the Northern Sea Route – which it claims as internal waters – could potentially disrupt commercial shipping and military transit, challenging the principle of open seas ( NATO’s Urgent Arctic Defense Strategy | ASP American Security Project ). Thus, Greenland’s location near emerging sea lanes further elevates its strategic significance as the Arctic becomes more accessible.
• Military and Strategic Foothold: Control over Greenland offers a broad strategic footprint in the Arctic. During the Cold War, the U.S. maintained numerous facilities in Greenland (up to 17 installations with 10,000 personnel) to monitor Soviet activity (Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China | Reuters). Today, Greenland remains a key node in Arctic defense. The U.S. Pituffik/Thule base provides critical radar coverage for North America’s missile defense shield (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense), and its airfield can support antisubmarine patrol aircraft guarding the North Atlantic. If tensions in the Arctic escalate, Greenland could host expanded forces or serve as a staging ground for NATO operations. Conversely, in unfriendly hands, Greenland could severely complicate NATO’s strategic calculus. American defense planners view a strong foothold on Greenland as essential to project power and deter rivals in the Arctic region (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations). This helps explain Washington’s extraordinary interest in the island. (Denmark Boosts Defence Spending Amid U.S. Pressure Over Greenland – Nordic Defence Review) A Danish Navy patrol vessel (HDMS Triton, F358) navigates near an iceberg off Greenland’s coast, exemplifying the heightened focus on Arctic defense. Greenland’s vast maritime zones and icy waters require regular patrols to assert sovereignty, conduct search-and-rescue, and monitor foreign activity. Both Denmark and the United States have ramped up military presence around Greenland to address growing geopolitical competition in the Arctic. As ice recedes and traffic increases, such patrols underscore the island’s strategic role in securing the High North. (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense) ( New DOD Strategy Calls for Enhancements, Engagements, Exercises in Arctic > U.S. Department of Defense > Defense Department News )

In sum, Greenland’s unique blend of strategic location, resource potential, and military importance makes it a coveted asset in the Arctic chessboard. U.S. interest in buying Greenland, while unusual, spotlighted these factors. For Denmark, Greenland is a linchpin of its kingdom’s status and a responsibility it must manage amid big-power rivalry. And for other global players like Russia and China, Greenland represents both an opportunity (for influence or resources) and a barrier (to their Arctic ambitions) depending on who controls it. This sets the stage for a wider look at how the U.S., Denmark, Russia, and the EU each approach the Arctic and Greenland in the emerging era of Arctic geopolitics.

Competing Strategic Interests in the Arctic: U.S., Denmark, Russia, and the EU

The scramble for Arctic influence involves multiple stakeholders, each with distinct interests. The table below compares the strategic priorities of the United States, Denmark (via Greenland), Russia, and the European Union in the Arctic region:

Sources: U.S. Department of Defense Arctic Strategy ( New DOD Strategy Calls for Enhancements, Engagements, Exercises in Arctic > U.S. Department of Defense > Defense Department News ) ( New DOD Strategy Calls for Enhancements, Engagements, Exercises in Arctic > U.S. Department of Defense > Defense Department News ); Danish Defense Ministry statements (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense) (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense); Russian Foreign Ministry and strategy documents (Lavrov vows Russia to defend its Arctic interests | Reuters) (Lavrov vows Russia to defend its Arctic interests | Reuters); EU Arctic Policy (2021) and Strategic Compass (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel) (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel).

This comparison highlights that while all players share an interest in the Arctic’s opportunities, they diverge sharply in their security perceptions and methods. The United States and Denmark (as allies) are primarily concerned with checking Russia and China and maintaining the status quo of open access. Russia is focused on solidifying its Arctic dominance and pushing out NATO influence. The European Union seeks to balance security needs with environmental stewardship and the rule of law. These differing strategic interests set the context for how the Greenland issue reverberates through diplomatic and military channels.

Impact on U.S.-Denmark Relations

Trump’s bid for Greenland and the ensuing developments have tested the resilience of the U.S.-Denmark relationship. Traditionally, Denmark is a close NATO ally of the United States, and both countries have cooperated on Arctic security for decades. However, the Greenland episode introduced unprecedented friction:

• Diplomatic Strains: Denmark’s leaders were taken aback by Trump’s public offer and his cancellation of a Denmark visit in 2019. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s dismissal of the idea as “absurd” drew Trump’s ire, straining ties. Although relations normalized under subsequent U.S. leadership, Trump’s renewed Greenland rhetoric (as seen in campaign-style speeches) continues to put Copenhagen in an awkward position. Most recently, in early 2025, Trump (now seeking office again) and his team reignited pressure on Denmark over Greenland’s security. U.S. Vice President JD Vance (during a visit to Nuuk) bluntly accused Denmark of “not doing a good job” protecting Greenland and suggested the U.S. could do better (Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China | Reuters). Such remarks are highly unusual between NATO allies and were met with Danish indignation – Prime Minister Frederiksen called Vance’s comments “unfair” and Greenland’s own government expressed “deep unease” at the implication of a U.S. takeover (Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China | Reuters) (Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China | Reuters).
• Defense Cooperation and Tensions: Paradoxically, the flare-up over Greenland has spurred Denmark to increase its defense commitment in the Arctic, largely in line with U.S. wishes. Feeling the pressure to demonstrate sovereignty, Denmark announced a new Arctic defense agreement in collaboration with Greenland authorities. In January 2025, Copenhagen unveiled a 14.6 billion kroner (~$2.04 billion) plan to bolster Arctic and North Atlantic defense – including new naval patrol vessels, long-range surveillance drones, and enhanced satellite capabilities for Greenland’s surveillance (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense) (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense). The Danish Defense Minister stated that there are “serious security challenges” in the Arctic and vowed to “strengthen our presence in the region” (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense). This investment directly responds to U.S. concerns (and was explicitly linked to Trump’s pressure campaign) in order to “placate the U.S.” and deter any notion that Denmark is neglecting Greenland (Denmark boosts Arctic defence spending by $2.1 billion, responding …) (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense). While this has tightened defense ties – the U.S. is supporting Denmark with arms sales, such as advanced missiles for Danish F-35 jets (Denmark Boosts Defence Spending Amid U.S. Pressure Over Greenland – Nordic Defence Review) (Denmark Boosts Defence Spending Amid U.S. Pressure Over Greenland – Nordic Defence Review) – it also reveals a rift: the U.S. essentially had to shame an ally into action. Danish officials privately resent the implication that they might “lose” Greenland if they don’t militarize more. Nonetheless, going forward, U.S.-Danish cooperation in Greenland is likely to deepen: more joint exercises, US access to Greenlandic ports/airfields, and integration of Danish Arctic units with U.S. North American defense systems are on the horizon.
• Greenland’s Autonomy and the Alliance: A delicate aspect of U.S.-Denmark relations is how Greenland’s own aspirations are handled. Trump’s interest inadvertently boosted Greenlandic nationalism – reminders of being a “pawn” between superpowers fuel desires for greater autonomy (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations). In 2021 and 2023, Greenland’s elections were won by parties advocating eventual independence from Denmark (albeit gradually) (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations). Denmark has pledged it will respect Greenland’s choice should independence come via referendum. For the U.S., this raises a tricky question: Washington wants influence in Greenland, but preferably without rupturing its ties to Denmark and NATO. U.S. officials have thus tried to engage Greenland’s local government directly (opening a consulate, economic aid, high-profile visits) while still officially recognizing Danish sovereignty. The challenge is to avoid undermining Denmark’s position – something that Danish politicians have warned against. For example, Danish lawmakers criticized the U.S. aid package in 2020 as “creating division” between Greenland and Denmark (U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic | Reuters). The balance that Denmark and the U.S. must strike is allowing Greenland enough agency and benefits to feel valued, while keeping it firmly anchored in the Western camp. Any U.S. moves perceived as heavy-handed (like Vance’s speech or Trump’s talk of “taking” Greenland) risk backlash that could weaken Danish domestic support for American involvement. Overall, while the alliance remains strong, the Greenland issue has introduced new sensitivities. Denmark is likely to be more vigilant and assertive about Greenland’s defense, and the U.S. will need to consult closely with Copenhagen (and Nuuk) on any Arctic plans to maintain trust.

Ramifications for U.S.-EU Relations

European leaders largely watched the Trump-Greenland saga with concern and some bemusement. The European Union as an institution has no claim in Greenland (in fact, Greenland exited the EU in 1985), but Denmark’s membership means the EU had a stake in backing its member state. The episode had a few implications for U.S.-EU relations:

• Solidarity with Denmark: European officials and NATO allies informally sided with Denmark’s refusal to sell part of its kingdom. There was a sense that transatlantic norms were being challenged by Trump’s proposal – if a U.S. president could openly contemplate buying (or possibly seizing) territory of an ally, what did that mean for sovereignty? The EU, which prizes rule of law, found the notion contrary to modern international principles. While there was no formal EU rebuke, the situation likely factored into European skepticism about Trump’s unconventional foreign policy. At the same time, Europe recognized the underlying strategic anxieties driving U.S. interest. EU policymakers acknowledged that Arctic security and resource issues were becoming more prominent, and that Europe needed to pay attention as well, if only to ensure Denmark was supported.
• EU Arctic Policy and U.S. Alignment: The Greenland controversy coincided with the EU updating its own Arctic policy. In October 2021, the European Commission released a communication calling for a “peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic,” explicitly mentioning the need for stability and cooperation (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel). The EU shares many of the U.S. concerns about the Arctic: the effects of climate change, new economic opportunities, and geopolitical competition. However, the EU’s emphasis is on multilateral governance and climate action rather than a military buildup. The U.S. and EU found common ground in condemning excessive militarization of the Arctic – for instance, both are wary of Russia’s moves – but there are slight nuances. The EU tends to stress environmental security (highlighting that no new oil/gas extraction should occur in the Arctic as part of fighting climate change), whereas the U.S. under Trump was more inclined to pursue drilling and mining opportunities. This difference did cause some tension. European officials were concerned by suggestions that the U.S. might rush into Greenland for mining or strategic exploitation without regard to environmental consequences. If the U.S. were to push Greenland to allow resource extraction that Denmark or the EU find unsustainable, that could create a rift. So far, that scenario hasn’t materialized, but it’s a point to watch.
• Transatlantic Cooperation vs. Competition in Greenland: On one hand, Greenland’s situation has led to greater U.S.-European (especially Danish) cooperation in Arctic security – which is positive for NATO unity. On the other hand, a subtle competition is at play: the EU has also stepped up outreach to Greenland, partly to ensure it isn’t exclusively oriented toward America. The EU provides development funds and has a partnership with Greenland on education and sustainable development. It wants to secure access to Greenland’s rare earths as well (in line with Europe’s strategy to diversify critical mineral sources). From Brussels’ perspective, it’s important that Greenland’s future isn’t decided over its head by Washington and Copenhagen alone. In 2022, Greenland opened a representation office in Brussels, reflecting the EU’s role in its affairs despite not being an EU member. Overall, the Greenland episode nudged the EU to be more assertive in Arctic affairs, to complement NATO’s military angle with economic and diplomatic tools. U.S.-EU relations have not been fundamentally damaged – indeed, under the Biden administration they improved, and Arctic issues became an area of consultation rather than conflict. But Europe will continue to insist on respect for Danish and Greenlandic autonomy in any U.S. plans, and it will push for environmental considerations that sometimes diverge from U.S. priorities (for example, Europe’s climate-driven stance versus any American inclination to exploit Arctic oil).
• NATO–EU Synergy: It’s worth noting that many EU countries are in NATO, and Finland’s and Sweden’s recent accession to NATO blurs the line between EU and NATO Arctic interests. The Greenland affair underscored that the transatlantic alliance needs a coherent Arctic strategy. EU and NATO members have begun to coordinate more closely on Arctic security (the EU’s 2024 “Strategic Compass” mentions Arctic tensions alongside climate issues (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel)). In summary, while Trump’s Greenland initiative was jarring, it ultimately reinforced to Europeans that U.S. engagement in the Arctic is a reality they must work with. It did not cause a transatlantic split, but rather led the EU to sharpen its own Arctic focus to ensure a balanced approach that includes European values and interests alongside American strategic objectives.

Strategic Consequences for NATO in the Arctic

NATO as an alliance has historically kept a low profile in the Arctic, leaving Arctic affairs mostly to individual member states. But the combination of Russia’s military resurgence in the High North and the political spotlight on Greenland is forcing NATO to pay greater attention to Arctic defense. Several strategic consequences and shifts are underway:

• NATO’s Northern Flank Reinforced: The security concerns raised by the Greenland episode tie into the broader northward shift of NATO’s posture. In the past few years, NATO’s footprint in the Arctic and sub-Arctic has expanded significantly. Finland and Sweden joining NATO (in 2023 and 2024 respectively) means that 7 of the 8 Arctic states are now NATO members, dramatically changing the calculus (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel). The alliance now essentially surrounds Russia in the European Arctic, from the North Atlantic (via the US, UK, Canada, Norway, Denmark) across to the Nordic and Barents region (via Norway, Finland, Sweden). This enlargement was driven by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, but it has clear Arctic implications: NATO airspace and territory now directly abut Russia’s Arctic coast in new ways. NATO is thus more invested than ever in Arctic stability, because any conflict with Russia could quickly extend to the Arctic domain. Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, is covered by NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense guarantee (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations). An attack on Greenland would be an attack on NATO. Hence, any threat of force regarding Greenland (even Trump’s hypothetical suggestion of “taking” it by force, which he floated then downplayed (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense)) is utterly incompatible with NATO’s framework. This was obvious, but it underscored the point that Greenland’s security is indivisible from NATO security.
• Arctic Defense Infrastructure and Exercises: NATO has begun to address its capability gap in the High North. Russia’s military build-up – reopening Soviet bases, deploying air defense systems, modernizing its Northern Fleet – far outpaces NATO’s infrastructure up north (Lavrov vows Russia to defend its Arctic interests | Reuters) ( NATO’s Urgent Arctic Defense Strategy | ASP American Security Project ). Western analysts note that NATO would need at least 10 years to match Russia’s current Arctic infrastructure if it started now ( NATO’s Urgent Arctic Defense Strategy | ASP American Security Project ). This shortfall has prompted new initiatives. NATO member Norway has been upgrading airfields and ports in the Norwegian Arctic; the U.S. is investing in new icebreakers and Arctic-capable ships; and Canada is bolstering its Arctic patrols. The alliance has also ramped up joint exercises in Arctic conditions. For example, large drills like Exercise Trident Juncture 2018 in Norway and Cold Response have practiced the defense of Norway’s far north. The U.S. has conducted freedom-of-navigation voyages near Russia’s Arctic waters and even sailed a carrier into the High North to demonstrate presence. As Lavrov complained, “NATO is intensifying exercises… in the Arctic” and Russia says it is fully prepared to respond (Lavrov vows Russia to defend its Arctic interests | Reuters). Greenland specifically could see more NATO activity: periodic visits of NATO naval vessels to Greenlandic ports, radar integration with NATO systems, and perhaps in the future, space surveillance assets benefiting NATO’s missile defense. In 2020, the U.S. established a new NATO Atlantic Command (JFC Norfolk) with an eye on securing the North Atlantic and Arctic sea lanes. All this amounts to NATO visibly treating the Arctic as an emerging front – a significant strategic shift from a decade ago, when the Arctic was seen as a zone of cooperation.
• Great Power Rivalry & NATO Unity: The developments around Greenland have been a microcosm of great-power rivalry creeping into NATO’s Arctic discourse. On one hand, NATO allies share the threat perception of Russia’s Arctic militarization and, to a lesser extent, China’s ambitions. Russia’s ability to “hold U.S. and allied territories at risk” from the Arctic with advanced missiles and air/naval forces is a serious concern ( New DOD Strategy Calls for Enhancements, Engagements, Exercises in Arctic > U.S. Department of Defense > Defense Department News ). Moscow’s moves – like simulated bomber flights toward Norwegian airspace or jamming GPS in northern Finland – have kept NATO on alert. China, while not an Arctic state, has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and pursued partnerships with Russia and investments in Arctic nations, raising eyebrows in NATO. The alliance has started discussing China’s presence in the Arctic as part of its strategic concept (recognizing China as a challenge). On the other hand, NATO’s unity could be tested if allies’ interests diverge. The Greenland issue, for example, showed a potential schism – the U.S. vs. a smaller ally – but NATO thus far has managed to avoid letting that affect collective defense. Publicly, NATO leaders stick to the line that Greenland is Danish territory and not up for debate. Any internal issues are handled quietly so as not to give Russia propaganda fodder about NATO discord. The silver lining is that the controversy prompted Denmark to invest more in defense, which NATO welcomes. There may also be an understanding now that NATO should have plans in case of unconventional threats to places like Greenland (e.g. hybrid tactics, foreign economic encroachment). In 2022, reports emerged that NATO was considering a more formal Arctic strategy, and by 2023 NATO had set up a Climate and Security Center to study impacts like ice melt on alliance operations ( NATO’s Urgent Arctic Defense Strategy | ASP American Security Project ) ( NATO’s Urgent Arctic Defense Strategy | ASP American Security Project ).
• NATO and the Arctic Council: Another consequence is the sidelining of the Arctic Council’s security taboo. The Arctic Council (which includes all Arctic states but explicitly excludes military security topics) has been the main forum for Arctic governance. However, since Russia’s war in Ukraine, Western members paused Arctic Council cooperation with Russia, effectively stalling the Council. In this vacuum, NATO and ad-hoc groupings have taken a larger role in Arctic matters that touch security. Issues once politely kept out of Arctic Council talks – like militarization, or NATO’s role – are now openly discussed in Brussels and Washington. NATO is careful not to present itself as taking over Arctic governance (so as not to provoke Russia unnecessarily), but it is undeniably more present. This could recalibrate the Arctic Council when (or if) it resumes – NATO-EU coordination might push for addressing security implications of climate change, something Russia traditionally resisted. In summary, NATO has been awakened to the Arctic’s strategic reality. The alliance is gradually enhancing its Arctic defense posture (though still behind Russia’s curve) and integrating the High North into its strategic planning. Greenland, as a part of NATO territory, will benefit from this increased focus – its defense is more assured with allies paying attention – but it also becomes a potential front line in any future conflict, which is a double-edged sword.

Greenland’s Role in Future Arctic Power Projection and Rivalry

Looking ahead, Greenland is poised to play a central role in the unfolding great-power competition in the Arctic. How this role develops will carry diplomatic, military, and economic consequences for the United States and its allies:

• Arctic Power Projection Hub: For the United States, maintaining and expanding capabilities in Greenland will be key to projecting power into the Arctic and even into the North Atlantic. With Russia fortifying its Arctic bases and China increasing its polar presence, the U.S. will lean on assets like Pituffik (Thule) Base and perhaps seek new arrangements in Greenland. We may see upgraded infrastructure – longer runways for strategic airlift, improved port facilities for Navy and Coast Guard vessels, and advanced radar and satellite stations. Already, the U.S. Space Force operates critical sensors from Greenland, and this mission is likely to grow as space and missile threats evolve (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense). If competition intensifies, Greenland could host rotational deployments of U.S. fighters or surveillance aircraft to guard the polar approaches. From Greenland, the U.S. can monitor the North Atlantic and Arctic Ocean with relative ease, making it an unsinkable aircraft carrier of sorts for NATO. This gives the West a geographic advantage to balance Russia’s proximity on the Eurasian side. Greenland’s geography is strategically irreplaceable, and both Washington and Copenhagen know it – hence they will ensure it remains firmly on the Western side of any future standoff.
• Great-Power Interest and Greenlandic Autonomy: Greenland’s own trajectory toward possible independence will factor into great-power rivalry. If Greenland eventually holds an independence referendum (enabled by Danish law whenever Greenlanders decide) (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations), the outcome will have huge implications. An independent Greenland would need to decide on its alignments: Would it join NATO as a sovereign state? Sign a defense treaty with the U.S. or Denmark? Allow foreign bases? These questions make external powers very interested in Greenland’s politics. The U.S. would likely support Greenland’s self-determination but work hard to ensure that an independent Greenland remains a close defense partner (perhaps akin to Iceland’s status – no military but U.S. provides defense by agreement). Russia and China, for their part, would see an opportunity in a newly independent nation: through diplomatic and economic outreach, they might try to pull Greenland into neutrality or their orbit. Indeed, China has courted Greenland with offers to build airports and mining investments in the past. Security concerns about China and Russia “aggressive incursions” – economically or otherwise – are already raised by U.S. officials (Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China | Reuters). Vice President Vance’s 2025 visit explicitly warned that “Russia, China and other nations are taking an extraordinary interest in Arctic passageways, naval routes and minerals” around Greenland (Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China | Reuters). This statement reflects U.S. intent to be Greenland’s partner of choice so that Chinese or Russian influence cannot take root. The competition is not just military; it’s also for Greenland’s political loyalty and economic partnerships. The coming years will likely see Greenland carefully navigating between attracting investment (perhaps even from Chinese companies for mining) and safeguarding its strategic alignment (leaning on the U.S./Europe for security). How well the U.S. and Denmark support Greenland’s development may determine whether Greenland feels the need to look elsewhere.
• Resource Race and Economic Leverage: If Arctic warming continues, by mid-century the region’s resource boom could be in full swing. Greenland’s oil and gas potential, which is currently untapped due to technical, environmental, and political reasons, might become viable. Similarly, rare earth mining projects could commence. In such a scenario, major powers will compete for access to Greenland’s resources. The U.S. will push for American and allied companies to have a stake, aiming to block China (which has shown interest in Greenland’s rare earths). Control of resources can translate to leverage: for example, whoever partners with Greenland on mining could gain long-term supply contracts. Denmark/EU might also vie for these opportunities to ensure Europe’s resource security. This economic dimension adds another layer to Greenland’s strategic weight. A resource-rich Greenland aligned with the West would bolster Western economies and reduce reliance on adversaries. Conversely, if China managed to dominate Greenland’s mining sector, it could gain a stranglehold on critical materials. All parties are aware of this high stakes game. Thus, expect diplomacy and investment in Greenland to intensify. The U.S. may offer more economic aid or trade privileges; the EU will similarly try to be generous (the EU has already exempted Greenland from some tariffs and supports its education sector); China might dangle infrastructure projects. Greenland’s government will have to balance these offers, ideally to its own benefit without compromising security.
• Environmental and Human Security Concerns: Amid the power projection talk, there is also the real issue of Greenland’s environment and people. Great-power rivalry could militarize the region, raising the risk of incidents or degradation (e.g. more nuclear-powered vessels traversing Arctic waters). NATO’s increased presence, while protective, might bring accidents or cultural friction. Greenland’s indigenous Inuit population of 57,000 will have their say on what future they want. They are acutely aware of climate change – their hunting, fishing, and ways of life are already impacted. Any militarization or resource exploitation will be weighed against environmental protection and traditional livelihoods. The U.S. and NATO must be mindful that winning Greenland’s trust means respecting its environment and community, not just viewing it as a strategic outpost. This aspect is where cooperation can still prevail: all Arctic players have a shared interest in search-and-rescue capabilities, oil spill prevention, and scientific research in the region. Greenland could become a venue for confidence-building measures (for instance, demilitarizing certain zones or establishing joint disaster response exercises) if great powers choose to pursue stability. However, given current trends, competitive dynamics are more pronounced.

In conclusion, Greenland stands at the nexus of the Arctic’s diplomatic, military, and economic future. What started as an off-the-cuff idea by President Trump has evolved into concrete policy considerations in Washington, Copenhagen, Brussels, and Moscow. The United States has been reminded of Greenland’s importance and appears determined not to let it slip from Western hands – going as far as high-level visits and floating extreme measures to make that point. Denmark, while irritated by U.S. methods, has been galvanized to shore up defenses and engage more deeply in Arctic strategy. Russia watches all this warily, strengthening its own Arctic bastion and issuing warnings against NATO encroachment. The EU is seeking a larger role to ensure its interests are represented, emphasizing a cooperative approach to what it calls the “high north.” All these threads converge on Greenland.

The next decade will likely see heightened activity around Greenland – diplomatically, militarily, and economically – as the Arctic melts and global interest in the region heats up. If managed well, Greenland could benefit from greater investment and remain a peaceful cornerstone of Arctic security under Western stewardship. If mismanaged, it could become a flashpoint of superpower rivalry, entangling the 56,000 Greenlanders in a contest far beyond their shores. For the U.S. and its allies, the task will be keeping Greenland close through respect and support, rather than compulsion. Trump’s legacy, unintentionally, was to sound an alarm about Arctic geopolitics that few can ignore now. Greenland, once on the periphery of world affairs, is firmly at the center of the Arctic chessboard – and U.S.-Denmark-EU relations, NATO strategy, and broader great-power competition will all continue to be shaped by moves made on this icy but strategic island.

References:

1. Council on Foreign Relations – What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations) (What Would Greenland’s Independence Mean for U.S. Interests? | Council on Foreign Relations)
2. Breaking Defense – Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense) (Denmark strengthens Arctic defense with $2B package for naval vessels, drones – Breaking Defense)
3. Reuters – Lavrov vows Russia to defend its Arctic interests (Lavrov vows Russia to defend its Arctic interests | Reuters) (Lavrov vows Russia to defend its Arctic interests | Reuters)
4. Reuters – Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe (Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China | Reuters) (Vance accuses Denmark of not keeping Greenland safe from Russia, China | Reuters)
5. Reuters – U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland (U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic | Reuters) (U.S. extends economic aid to Greenland to counter China, Russia in Arctic | Reuters)
6. The Arctic Institute – Greenland During Trump 2.0 (analysis of U.S. Arctic strategy) (Greenland During Trump 2.0: Is America Poised for an Historic Arctic Territorial Expansion? | The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies) (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel)
7. American Security Project – NATO’s Urgent Arctic Defense Strategy ( NATO’s Urgent Arctic Defense Strategy | ASP American Security Project ) ( NATO’s Urgent Arctic Defense Strategy | ASP American Security Project )
8. European External Action Service – The EU in the Arctic (The EU in the Arctic | EEAS) (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel)
9. Finabel – EU’s presence in the Arctic (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel) (EU’s presence in the Arctic – Finabel)
10. U.S. Department of Defense – 2024 Arctic Strategy Highlights ( New DOD Strategy Calls for Enhancements, Engagements, Exercises in Arctic > U.S. Department of Defense > Defense Department News )

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Current Military Situation

The past several days have seen significant Russian advances in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, with the Kursk region emerging as a key battleground. Russian forces have effectively encircled Ukrainian troops in the area, enforcing a deadline for surrender that expired at 6 AM today. Despite some Ukrainian surrenders over the past 48 hours, a mass surrender has not occurred, leading to ongoing combat operations that favor Russian advances. Russian commanders, including Chechen-led special forces units, have reported that Ukrainian forces retain control over only three villages in the region. Heavy Ukrainian losses and logistical difficulties have severely weakened their defensive position.

Reports indicate that the Russian military has effectively severed Ukrainian supply lines, preventing retreat and resupply efforts. The Ukrainian command has continued to rush reinforcements into the battle zone, but these efforts appear to be faltering under Russian aerial and artillery dominance. Russian drone warfare has been particularly devastating, with frequent strikes on Ukrainian convoys attempting to retreat towards Sumy. Encircled Ukrainian forces face dwindling resources and heightened casualties.

Tactical and Strategic Developments

Russian sources confirm that their forces have nearly completed the capture of Kursk region and are poised to push into Sumy, establishing a buffer zone along the border. Russian commanders suggest that this move is not only part of a broader military strategy but also a directive from high command to expand territorial control beyond current frontlines. This is happening despite ongoing diplomatic discussions about potential ceasefires.

Elsewhere along the front, Russian offensives have intensified:

• Kupiansk Sector: Russian forces have significantly expanded their bridgehead across the Oskil River, suggesting that a push towards Kupiansk itself is imminent. This would mark a major shift in control over Kharkiv Oblast.
• Toretsk Region: After weeks of uncertainty, it is now clear that Russian forces hold nearly all of Toretsk. Ukrainian counterattacks have been repelled, and Ukrainian troops in some locations are reportedly surrounded.
• Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhia: Russian advances continue in these key areas, with Western sources confirming that Ukrainian defenses are faltering under renewed Russian pressure. Reports indicate that Ukrainian forces are losing ground west of Orekhov, raising concerns about the stability of defenses in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

Ukrainian Response and High Command Changes

Facing growing military setbacks, the Ukrainian government has responded with command restructuring. President Zelensky has dismissed the Chief of the General Staff, replacing him with General Hnatov, the previous Land Forces Commander. This follows the earlier dismissal of the operational commander in Kursk, signaling internal turmoil within the Ukrainian high command.

A crisis meeting in Kyiv has been convened to discuss the deteriorating situation. Despite continued military aid from Western backers, Ukraine’s battlefield losses and the loss of strategic positions have placed extreme pressure on the government’s leadership.

Western and Diplomatic Response

Parallel to the battlefield developments, diplomatic maneuvering has intensified. A scheduled conversation between President Trump and President Putin is set for March 18, marking a critical moment in negotiations regarding the conflict’s future trajectory. U.S. officials have hinted that territorial discussions, nuclear power plant security, and Black Sea port access will be key points in the talks. Notably, the negotiations are occurring directly between the United States and Russia, sidelining European stakeholders, including Ukraine itself.

Meanwhile, European powers have responded with mixed strategies. The UK and France continue pushing for an operational coalition of troops to be deployed in Ukraine under the pretext of a peacekeeping mission. However, this has been met with strong Russian opposition, with Moscow warning that any foreign military presence in Ukraine would be treated as hostile and subject to attack. Internal opposition within Britain and France to such deployments is also growing, as analysts question the strategic logic and risks of such a move.

Conclusion: The Path Ahead

The military situation on the ground suggests that Ukraine is facing its most significant strategic defeat since the outset of the war. Russian forces have achieved operational success in Kursk and are positioned to make further gains in Sumy and beyond. With logistical supply lines under Russian control and Ukrainian forces suffering from high casualties, the possibility of large-scale Ukrainian military collapses in certain areas is increasing.

Diplomatically, the coming days will be critical as Trump and Putin engage in direct negotiations. If a ceasefire is to be reached, it will likely be dictated primarily by Russia and the United States, with European efforts to intervene potentially complicating the process. The fate of Ukrainian-held territories, particularly Sumy and the eastern regions, remains uncertain, as Russia appears intent on securing territorial depth and strategic dominance.

The war’s trajectory now hinges on whether diplomatic efforts can achieve a negotiated pause or whether continued Russian advances will force a broader recalibration of Ukrainian and Western strategy.

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Ukraine: The Primary Conflict

In Ukraine, the situation represents a critical existential and geopolitical struggle for Russia. Moscow portrays its actions as defensive against NATO’s expansion and as a mission to protect Russian-speaking populations in the Donbas region. However, it has faced significant pushback from Ukraine’s Western-backed forces. This prolonged conflict is characterized by:

• Resource Drains: Sustaining military operations in Ukraine has strained Russia’s financial and military reserves. Western sanctions exacerbate this by limiting access to advanced technology and economic leverage.
• Evolving Strategy: Russia has transitioned from large-scale offensives to a war of attrition, relying heavily on artillery, missile strikes, and defensive fortifications to grind down Ukrainian advances.
• Global Ramifications: The conflict has reshaped global alliances, invigorating NATO and prompting military aid to Ukraine. However, it has also deepened partnerships between Russia, China, and other states wary of Western hegemony.

Syria: Maintaining Strategic Footholds

Simultaneously, Russia is navigating a resurgence of hostilities in Syria, where it has been a crucial ally to the Assad regime since 2015. Its objectives in Syria differ markedly from Ukraine but are no less significant:

• Securing Geopolitical Influence: Russia’s presence in Syria ensures access to the Mediterranean via its naval base in Tartus and airbase in Khmeimim, affirming its status as a global power in the Middle East.
• Counteracting Adversaries: The Syrian theater provides Russia an opportunity to counterbalance U.S. influence, support Assad against rebel and jihadist groups, and indirectly challenge Turkish actions.
• Demonstrating Military Capabilities: Russia uses Syria as a testing ground for advanced weaponry, showcasing its military prowess while refining tactics and strategies under combat conditions.

Challenges of a Two-Front Strategy

Operating in two distinct and high-stakes conflicts simultaneously poses substantial challenges:

1. Resource Allocation: Balancing military supplies, personnel, and strategic focus between Ukraine and Syria stretches Russia’s capabilities. Ukraine, being nearer and of greater strategic importance, receives priority, potentially leaving Syria as a secondary concern.
2. Diplomatic Isolation: Both conflicts exacerbate Russia’s strained relations with the West. While Ukraine isolates Russia within Europe, Syria contributes to tensions with the U.S. and regional players like Turkey.
3. Domestic Pressure: The economic strain and human cost of sustained conflict risk undermining domestic support for Putin’s government, particularly as sanctions bite deeper and losses mount.

Strategic Interplay Between Fronts

While the conflicts differ, they intersect in meaningful ways:

• Military Learning Curve: Experience in Syria has provided Russia with valuable insights into modern warfare, including drone utilization and precision strikes, which have been adapted for use in Ukraine.
• Diplomatic Leverage: Russia’s engagement in Syria bolsters its influence in the Middle East, offering a counterweight to European and American pressure over Ukraine.
• Propaganda and Perception: Moscow uses success in Syria to project an image of resilience and competence, aimed at domestic audiences and allied nations.

Outlook and Risks

Russia’s strategy on both fronts reflects a high-risk, high-reward approach. In Ukraine, Moscow is betting on Western fatigue and division, while in Syria, it relies on maintaining a relatively stable Assad regime. However, potential flashpoints abound:

• Escalation Risks: In Ukraine, Western arms shipments, including advanced weaponry like tanks and long-range missiles, could push Russia toward more desperate measures. In Syria, renewed clashes with Turkey or expanded rebel offensives could strain Russian commitments further.
• Economic Pressure: Sustained sanctions and the cost of dual-theater operations may force difficult choices for Moscow, potentially leading to reduced influence or military pullbacks.
• Unpredictable Allies: Dependence on regional partners like Iran, Turkey, and Assad introduces uncertainties that could derail broader Russian objectives.

In conclusion, Russia’s simultaneous involvement in Ukraine and Syria demonstrates its ambitions to assert global influence and defend perceived national interests. However, this dual-theater approach reveals vulnerabilities that may hinder its ability to sustain long-term success. The outcome on these fronts will shape not only Russia’s geopolitical standing but also the broader international order for years to come.

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Syrian Arab Army Operations in Aleppo

As reported, Syrian forces, including elite units such as the Fourth Division and special forces, are intensifying their operations against terrorist groups in western and southern Aleppo. These groups, described as Turkish proxies and U.S.-backed factions aligned with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra), represent the remnants of a larger terrorist insurgency that once posed a significant threat to the Syrian state. The use of artillery fire, supported by Russian airstrikes targeting supply and escape routes, indicates a coordinated effort to neutralise these groups and consolidate control in strategic areas.

This offensive aligns with broader Syrian and Russian objectives to weaken opposition forces and deny them the ability to regroup or receive external support. By targeting logistical networks, the SAA and its allies aim to dismantle the operational capabilities of these groups, preventing them from prolonging the conflict or launching counteroffensives.

Geopolitical Context: The Wider Regional Implications

The military developments in Aleppo cannot be examined in isolation. They are part of a larger regional struggle involving multiple state and non-state actors. Reports suggest that these actions are linked to the aftermath of the recent Israeli-Lebanon ceasefire, which temporarily halted hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. However, this ceasefire appears to have shifted focus to Syria, a critical hub for the “Resistance Axis” comprising Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and allied groups.

Syria’s strategic importance lies in its role as a conduit for weapons and supplies from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This land corridor, often referred to as the “land bridge,” has been a persistent target for Israeli airstrikes. Israel’s strategy seeks to disrupt this supply chain, weakening Hezbollah’s capabilities and, by extension, the broader Resistance Axis. Current events underscore concerns that Israel, with U.S. support, will intensify efforts to target Syrian infrastructure, air defences, and military assets under the guise of countering threats to its security.

The Role of External Powers

The conflict in Syria has always been marked by the involvement of external powers, each pursuing its strategic interests and agendas.

1. Turkey: As a supporter of certain terrorist groups, Turkey has been a key player in the Syrian conflict. The reference to Turkish proxies suggests ongoing Turkish involvement in northern Syria, where Ankara aims to counter Kurdish forces and maintain influence over border regions. Reports of coordination with Israeli intelligence further complicate Turkey’s role, indicating potential alignments that transcend traditional alliances.
2. Russia: Russia’s military and diplomatic support for the Syrian government has been pivotal in shifting the balance of power in favor of Damascus. Russian counter-terrorism operations and training programs for Syrian forces reflects Moscow’s commitment to ensuring the resilience of its ally. These efforts also serve Russia’s broader strategic interests, including maintaining a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean and countering U.S. influence in the region.
3. United States: The U.S. supports terrorist groups and facilitates the involvement of foreign mercenaries in both Syria and Ukraine. These claims reflect widespread perceptions among pro-Syrian government circles that the U.S. seeks to destabilise the region to advance its own agenda. The deployment of U.S. warplanes to Gulf state airbases and promises of increased military aid to Israel underscore Washington’s continued investment in regional security dynamics.
4. Ukraine: An intriguing aspect of recent reports is the allegation of Ukrainian involvement in Syria, providing training, drones, and support to terrorist groups. While the veracity of these claims is unclear, they highlight the interconnected nature of global conflicts and the perception of Ukraine as a proxy battleground in the broader Russia-West rivalry.

The Humanitarian Dimension

The ongoing conflict in Syria has had devastating humanitarian consequences. Current events raise concerns about the potential targeting of humanitarian supply lines that traverse the region, particularly those linking Iran, Iraq, and Syria to Lebanon. Any disruption to these routes would exacerbate the suffering of civilians, who already face challenges accessing essential goods and services due to the prolonged conflict and international sanctions.

Moreover, the intensification of hostilities risks further civilian casualties, especially if urban centres or densely populated areas become battlegrounds. Witnesses allude to the use of terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda to create diversionary fronts, a tactic that has previously resulted in significant human suffering.

The Resistance and the Future of the Region

The resilience of the Syrian Arab Army and its allies is on display. Syria is the “beating heart of the Resistance,” and ensuring its survival is crucial to the broader struggle against Western and Israeli aggression. Events underscore the ideological underpinnings of the conflict, which extend beyond territorial disputes to encompass questions of sovereignty, identity, and regional order.

The assertion that the current Syrian forces, bolstered by years of experience and Russian support, are far more capable than they were in 2011 reflects a broader narrative of defiance and determination. However, the challenges ahead remain formidable. The spectre of renewed violence, coupled with ongoing economic hardships, poses significant obstacles to Syria’s recovery and stability.

Troubled Days Ahead: A Call for Attention

The overarching message from the Syrian people is one of vigilance and solidarity with the Syrian government and its allies. While it reflects a specific perspective, it also highlights the complexities of the Syrian conflict and its implications for regional and global security. The interplay of military actions, political maneuvers, and humanitarian concerns underscores the need for a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the situation.

As the world watches these developments, the question remains: Can Syria and its allies navigate the troubled waters ahead and emerge stronger, or will external pressures and internal challenges overwhelm their efforts? The answer will have profound implications not only for Syria but for the entire West Asia region.

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