There is a recurring pattern at the beginning of modern wars. Governments describe their objectives confidently, military superiority appears measurable, analysts calculate force ratios, and predictions emerge that the decisive phase will take weeks or months. Then the enemy adapts.

That has happened spectacularly in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion, launched on 24 February 2022, is now approaching four and a half years of continuous warfare. Moscow failed to capture Kyiv or destroy the Ukrainian state in the opening campaign. Yet Ukraine also failed to expel Russia, and Russian forces still occupy approximately 20% of internationally recognised Ukrainian territory. Peace negotiations exist intermittently, but on 21 August Moscow was still insisting that any settlement recognise the “realities on the ground”, while Washington acknowledged that a rapid resolution was unlikely. (Reuters)

Something remarkably similar has happened in the newer Middle Eastern war. The United States and Israel launched large-scale coordinated attacks on Iran on 28 February 2026. The operation killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior Iranian commanders and struck military and nuclear-related facilities. President Donald Trump subsequently suggested that the central objectives of the campaign could be completed within weeks. Almost six months later, the Islamic Republic remains in power, Iran retains substantial missile and regional capabilities, the nuclear question is unresolved, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted, and an attempted ceasefire has largely collapsed. (Reuters)

So who is winning?

The answer depends on what “winning” means. If it means destroying more targets, controlling more territory or possessing greater conventional military power, there are relatively straightforward answers. If it means achieving the political objectives for which the war was started, the picture becomes very different.

Ukraine: Russia has the land, but not the victory it expected

Russia remains the stronger power in conventional terms. It has a much larger population, a substantial defence-industrial base, large missile and drone inventories and the ability to sustain enormous casualties. Most importantly, it possesses territory. Roughly one-fifth of Ukraine remains under Russian occupation, including Crimea and large portions of the east and south. (Reuters)

Territory matters. A war cannot be judged entirely by percentages on a map, but possession creates bargaining power. If hostilities were frozen tomorrow along the existing line, Russia would physically retain a substantial part of Ukraine and the land corridor to Crimea.

That represents an undeniable Russian advantage.

Yet the battlefield situation is considerably less favourable to Moscow than the simple territorial figure suggests.

Russian advances since the major territorial changes of 2022 have generally been extraordinarily slow. A July 2026 CSIS assessment estimated Russian advances around some major axes at only tens of metres per day and concluded that Russian territorial control actually contracted during April and May 2026. CSIS estimated Russian battlefield casualties at around 1.4 million since February 2022, although wartime casualty statistics from all sides must be treated cautiously. (CSIS)

Ukraine has also demonstrated that Russia’s gains are not irreversible. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in August that Ukrainian forces had regained approximately 745 square kilometres during 2026. Russia, meanwhile, claimed the capture of 19 settlements during its summer campaign. Neither set of battlefield claims should be treated as perfectly precise, but together they describe something important: this is no longer a battlefield on which one army is simply advancing and the other retreating. Territory is changing hands locally while the strategic front moves very slowly. (Reuters)

Ukraine’s increasingly sophisticated drone war has become central to this change. Ukrainian forces are striking logistics centres, ammunition stores, military facilities and energy infrastructure deep inside Russia and Russian-occupied territory. ISW reported in August that Ukrainian operations against Russian logistics and the expansion of Ukrainian drone-controlled “kill zones” were reducing Russia’s operational tempo. (Institute for the Study of War)

This matters because Ukraine cannot realistically compete with Russia shell-for-shell, missile-for-missile or soldier-for-soldier indefinitely. Its answer has increasingly been engineering rather than mass: drones, automation, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, distributed manufacturing and relatively inexpensive weapons attacking expensive targets.

Russia has adapted in turn.

Its most important present advantage may therefore not be territorial movement but its growing capacity to punish Ukraine from the air. Russia has expanded long-range drone infrastructure and intensified missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Civilian casualties rose sharply during the summer. On 19 August a major attack on Kyiv killed 17 people, while Ukrainian authorities said shortages of Patriot interceptors were limiting their ability to stop ballistic missiles. Ukraine says allied deliveries of missile interceptors in 2026 have fallen to roughly one-third of their 2025 level. (Reuters)

The Middle Eastern war is actually contributing to this problem. Western and particularly American air-defence resources have competing demands elsewhere.

Ukraine also continues to face a problem Russia does not face to the same degree: dependence on outsiders. NATO and European states remain heavily committed, and mechanisms such as the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List continue financing critical American systems. Allies announced another $1 billion package in June, while European governments are again meeting to discuss increased support. (Reuters)

But dependency creates uncertainty. Moscow can reasonably calculate that political priorities in Washington, Berlin, Paris or London may eventually change. Ukraine cannot make the same calculation about Russian war production disappearing.

Russia, however, has its own clock ticking.

The wartime economic boom produced by enormous state expenditure is fading. Moscow reduced its 2026 growth forecast to only 0.4%, while high interest rates, sanctions, taxation and the diversion of resources towards military production are placing growing pressure on civilian industry. Even prominent Russian businessmen have publicly complained about economic conditions. (Reuters)

Ukraine’s strategy therefore increasingly appears to be an attempt to make time work against Russia: prevent a decisive breakthrough, destroy logistics and energy assets, keep Russian casualty rates high, maintain Western support and gradually increase the economic cost of continuing the war.

Russia’s strategy is almost the mirror image: remain militarily and politically durable for longer than Ukraine and its supporters, continue applying pressure to Ukrainian society, exploit manpower and missile advantages, and eventually force negotiations from a position in which Russian territorial possession becomes permanent.

So who is winning in Ukraine?

At present, Russia has the stronger negotiating position because it holds approximately 20% of Ukraine and can still impose enormous destruction. On that narrow measure, Russia is ahead.

But Russia is not achieving anything resembling the decisive victory envisaged in February 2022. Ukraine remains independent, heavily armed, increasingly integrated with Europe and capable of striking targets hundreds of kilometres inside Russia. Russian forces have paid an extraordinary price for relatively small additional territorial gains.

Equally, Ukraine cannot credibly claim victory while one-fifth of the country remains occupied and its cities remain vulnerable to sustained Russian bombardment.

The best description in August 2026 is therefore a strategic stalemate with a Russian territorial advantage but an increasingly contested battlefield initiative.

Russia is ahead on the map. Neither side is close to winning the war.

The US–Israel–Iran war: overwhelming firepower meets strategic survival

The Iran conflict is even more revealing because the conventional imbalance is enormous.

There is little doubt which side would win a traditional contest of air forces, intelligence systems, precision strike capabilities and high-end military technology. The United States possesses capabilities Iran cannot remotely match, while Israel has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to penetrate Iranian airspace and intelligence networks.

The opening campaign illustrated this brutally. The February attacks killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior military commanders and severely damaged Iranian infrastructure. Iran’s political leadership was decapitated to a degree that would have paralysed many states. (Reuters)

Yet Iran did not collapse.

The Islamic Republic’s deliberately layered political and military structure survived. Mojtaba Khamenei formally succeeded his father, while the Revolutionary Guards became even more important within the wartime state. Reuters subsequently reported that real power had increasingly migrated towards the IRGC and national-security apparatus. (Reuters)

That survival itself changed the definition of victory.

American and Israeli objectives have at various times included eliminating or severely restricting Iran’s nuclear programme, degrading its ballistic missiles, weakening Hezbollah and other Iranian-aligned forces, limiting Tehran’s regional power and, at the most ambitious end, encouraging regime change.

After six months, none has been decisively achieved.

Most strikingly, the nuclear question remains unresolved. The IAEA’s first post-war assessment reported little observable change in the underlying nuclear issue and said inspectors still lacked reliable knowledge of the location and condition of important enriched-uranium stocks. Destroying facilities is not the same thing as destroying technical knowledge, nuclear material or the political decision to pursue a programme. (Reuters)

Iran therefore provides a textbook example of the difference between military destruction and strategic defeat.

The US and Israel can destroy Iranian installations. Iran cannot prevent every strike. But Tehran does not need to defeat the United States Air Force to deny Washington victory. It needs to survive, retain the ability to retaliate and impose costs greater than Washington is politically willing to continue paying.

The Strait of Hormuz has become its most powerful instrument.

Before the war, roughly one-fifth of global crude oil and LNG flows passed through the strait. By August, traffic had collapsed. Reuters reported periods in which only single-digit numbers of commodity vessels crossed each day; on 21 August just seven were recorded. Oil flows through the strait have fallen dramatically from pre-war levels, although exact quantities vary and some vessels operate without normal tracking. (Reuters)

This transforms Iran’s geography into a strategic weapon.

Iran cannot economically survive indefinitely with its own exports blockaded. But neither can the wider world treat Hormuz as irrelevant. By threatening shipping, attacking vessels and creating sufficient uncertainty to deter commercial traffic, Tehran can export part of the cost of the war to countries that are not participants in it.

Oil prices have consequently remained elevated, with Brent closing above $94 a barrel on 21 August. Higher energy costs feed inflation throughout Europe, Asia and the United States. (Reuters)

That is asymmetric warfare on a global scale.

Iran is nevertheless paying an immense price.

Its economy is in severe distress. Reuters reported inflation of approximately 66% in July and food prices up dramatically year-on-year. Infrastructure has been damaged, the currency has weakened, unemployment has risen and the US naval blockade has restricted Iran’s ability to export oil and import goods. Washington is now preparing an even tougher sanctions regime. (Reuters)

If the war becomes principally a contest of economic endurance, Iran begins from a far weaker position.

But America is not fighting without costs either. The Pentagon put the direct cost of the campaign at $37.5 billion by July, with additional funding required. American personnel have been killed and hundreds injured, while the conflict is consuming expensive precision weapons and air-defence interceptors. (Reuters)

There is also a political price. A Reuters/Ipsos poll in August placed President Trump’s approval at 33%, while 80% of Americans surveyed believed the Iran war would be prolonged. High petrol prices have made a distant conflict directly visible to American voters. (Reuters)

Iran’s regional network compounds the problem. Tehran’s partners are not a single centrally controlled military alliance, and the term “Iranian proxies” can obscure significant independence among them. Nevertheless, Hezbollah, the Houthis and armed groups in Iraq give Iran multiple theatres through which pressure can be exerted.

Houthi activity around the Bab el-Mandeb creates a second threat to maritime trade. Iranian-aligned Iraqi forces create risks for American and Gulf facilities. Lebanon has intermittently become part of the confrontation. Gulf states themselves have been drawn closer to the conflict despite attempting to avoid becoming direct combatants. (Reuters)

This makes the war extraordinarily difficult to terminate because there is no single battlefield on which victory can be declared.

So who is winning the Iran war?

If one measures military dominance, the answer is unquestionably the United States and Israel. They can penetrate Iranian territory, destroy infrastructure and impose damage at a level Iran cannot reciprocate conventionally.

If one measures economic damage, Iran is also clearly losing. Its economy is being squeezed far harder than America’s or Israel’s.

But if the original objectives included eliminating Iran’s nuclear programme, neutralising its missile capability, collapsing the Islamic Republic or removing Iran as a major regional security problem, the US–Israeli campaign has not delivered victory.

Iran has survived. Its government remains functional. Its security apparatus has consolidated power. Its nuclear programme has not been verifiably eliminated. It retains the ability to threaten US bases, neighbouring states and global shipping.

A Reuters assessment following the June ceasefire described Iran as battered but intact and noted that the United States had failed to achieve its most ambitious objectives. (Reuters)

The current judgement is therefore almost the reverse of Ukraine:

The United States and Israel are winning the conventional military contest, while Iran is so far winning the more limited strategic contest of avoiding defeat.

Neither amounts to overall victory.

Why are both wars proving so difficult to end?

The two conflicts look radically different, but they share a fundamental characteristic: the stronger military power is trying to convert material superiority into political submission, while the weaker side is trying simply to remain viable long enough to make that submission too expensive.

Russia discovered this in Ukraine. Its military superiority did not make Ukrainians accept Russian political control.

The United States and Israel are discovering something similar with Iran. Destroying air-defence systems, command centres and nuclear facilities does not necessarily compel a large state of more than 90 million people to accept another country’s political terms.

Modern technology also favours survival in unexpected ways. Cheap drones threaten expensive equipment. Missiles can circumvent conventional front lines. Commercial satellites make surprise harder. Distributed production replaces destroyed factories. Electronic warfare changes tactics within weeks. A state that survives the first attack can learn remarkably quickly.

The economics of war have changed as well. Ukraine attacks Russian refineries and logistics. Russia attacks Ukrainian infrastructure. Iran attacks maritime commerce. The United States blockades Iranian exports. Wars are increasingly contests between interconnected industrial, financial, energy and information systems rather than simply armies occupying terrain.

Most importantly, neither losing side yet believes that accepting the opponent’s terms would be preferable to continuing the war.

That is the real reason there is no obvious end date.

Conclusion: who is winning?

In Ukraine, Russia is presently ahead in the most visible metric: territory. It controls approximately one-fifth of Ukraine and retains formidable missile, manpower and industrial advantages. But its original objective of subjugating Ukraine has failed, its territorial advances are extraordinarily slow, casualties and economic costs are immense, and Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to regain ground and conduct increasingly effective deep strikes.

Verdict: slight Russian advantage, but strategic stalemate.

In the US–Israel–Iran war, the United States and Israel possess overwhelming conventional superiority and have inflicted immense physical and economic damage. But Iran has accomplished the minimum requirement for an asymmetric strategic victory: it has not been defeated. Its regime survived the killing of its supreme leader, its nuclear question remains unresolved, its missiles and regional networks remain relevant, and its ability to disrupt Hormuz has imposed costs on the entire world.

Verdict: US–Israeli tactical and military superiority, but no strategic victory; Iran remains battered but undefeated.

The uncomfortable possibility is that both wars could continue for considerably longer.

Russia believes time may eventually fracture Western support for Ukraine. Ukraine believes technological adaptation and the accumulating economic cost of war can make Russia’s present strategy unsustainable. Washington believes military and economic pressure can eventually force Tehran into concessions. Tehran believes endurance, regional escalation and disruption of global energy markets can make continued American involvement politically unacceptable.

Each side therefore possesses a theory explaining why tomorrow may be more favourable than today.

And as long as every major belligerent believes that, compromise remains more frightening than another month of war.

That is why neither conflict presently looks close to ending—and why asking simply who is winning may ultimately be less important than asking which side will first decide that continuing to fight offers less than negotiating from the position it already has.

The key distinction I would retain from the paper is: Russia is currently somewhat ahead in Ukraine because territory is the ultimate bargaining asset, whereas the US and Israel are militarily dominant against Iran but have so far failed to turn that dominance into the political outcome they sought. In neither war would I describe the present leader as being close to victory.

Given how quickly both fronts are moving, I can also monitor them and produce an updated “who is winning?” assessment when the strategic balance materially changes.

The post Two Wars Without an End: Who Is Winning in Ukraine and the US/Israel–Iran Conflict? appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

Israel’s current official line is maximalist across all fronts: Hezbollah must be disarmed; Gaza must be demilitarised and Hamas disarmed; Israel intends to preserve deep security belts on multiple borders; and Prime Minister Netanyahu has said the Iran war cannot be considered over until Iran’s enriched uranium is removed, proxy support ends, and ballistic-missile capabilities are eliminated. Iran’s current official line is equally hard: the war must end on all fronts, guarantees against renewed attacks must be credible, sanctions and blockades must be lifted, Iran’s enriched uranium should remain in-country, and any renewed attack will trigger broader retaliation. Those positions are not close enough to support a durable peace; they support only coercive bargaining under threat of renewed violence. [2]

The most likely path over the next one to six months is neither comprehensive settlement nor immediate all-out regional war, but an extended period of violent bargaining: rolling ceasefires, selective assassinations, militia attacks, airstrikes, maritime coercion around Hormuz, and periodic crises in Lebanon and Gaza. The best case is a narrow diplomatic stabilisation built around an interim U.S./Iran arrangement, a continued Lebanon truce, and modest improvements in Gaza aid access. The worst case is a second, broader round of direct war involving renewed Israeli and possibly U.S. strikes on Iran, Iranian missile salvos, full Hezbollah re-entry, Iraqi militia attacks on Gulf energy sites and Western bases, and renewed Houthi-style mass disruption in the Red Sea. These scenario judgements are analytic inferences drawn from present red lines, ceasefire fragility, and observed proxy activity. [3]

For Africa, the largest near-term risks are not military contagion in the Levant itself but second-order shocks through shipping, fuel, inflation, remittances, and diplomacy. Egypt is the most exposed large African state because it combines Gaza adjacency, Suez dependence, energy import pressures, and Gulf-linked remittance exposure. Among sub-Saharan importers, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritania, and others have already seen visible fuel-price shocks; Morocco has already registered transport-cost inflation from the conflict; Somalia is highly exposed through remittance dependence and Red Sea migration/security channels; and African troop contributors to UNIFIL, though limited in number, face real force-protection risk if Lebanon relapses into war. [4]

Current strategic picture

The current regional picture is best understood as a multi-front coercive equilibrium. Israel is trying to convert battlefield gains in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and the Syrian borderlands into enduring security depth; Iran is trying to convert survival, residual missile leverage, Hormuz disruption, and proxy deterrence into a settlement that preserves regime security and at least some nuclear and regional bargaining assets. Between them sit fragile Arab mediators, damaged proxy networks, and states such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria whose sovereignty is increasingly shaped by war spillover rather than by stable internal control. [5]

A key change since 2023 is that the old “shadow war” frame is no longer adequate. The conflict has evolved from proxy harassment and covert operations into repeated direct exchange: Iran’s direct missile-drone attack on Israel in April 2024; Israel’s retaliatory strike on Iranian soil days later; Israel’s June 2025 campaign against Iranian nuclear and military targets; and the much larger U.S.–Israeli war with Iran beginning on 28 February 2026. The present question is therefore not whether Iran and Israel can fall into direct war, but whether the present pause becomes a restrained deterrent balance or collapses into a second, wider round. [6]

Recent official positions

Escalation timeline since 2023

The timeline below condenses the events that moved the regional system from a Gaza-centred war to a multi-front confrontation involving Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the Red Sea, and direct Iran–Israel war. The key pattern is cumulative: each theatre repeatedly fed the next, and each pause proved narrower than the previous one. [13]

Two features of this timeline matter most for forward assessment. First, escalation has repeatedly jumped theatres: Gaza triggered Lebanon; Lebanon and Syria provided routes and targets for Iran-linked actors; the Damascus strike triggered Iran’s first direct attack; Iran war then re-energised the Lebanon and Gulf fronts. Second, the system now has serial ceasefires without agreed end states, which is why resumption risk remains high even when headline violence falls. [14]

Ceasefires, violations and indicators of renewed fighting

Current status by theatre

Taken together, these ceasefires are operational pauses, not stable political settlements. None of the core disputes has been resolved: Hamas’s future, Hezbollah’s weapons, Israel’s buffer zones, Iran’s uranium stockpile, Hormuz’s status, or Iraq’s militia question. That is why incident rates can fall temporarily without materially reducing strategic risk. [20]

Scenarios for a wider Iran–Israel war

The most useful way to think about “wider Iran–Israel war” now is as a renewed direct phase that reactivates multiple fronts simultaneously. The pathway diagram below summarises the main contagion routes suggested by current activity in Lebanon, Iraq, the Gulf and the Red Sea. [21]

Actor and capability matrix

Scenario matrix

My overall probability judgement is therefore: best case low-to-medium, most likely high, worst case low but dangerous enough to dominate contingency planning. That judgement is an inference, but it is tightly grounded in the present mismatch between political objectives and the repeated failure of ceasefires to convert into durable settlement. [31]

Global implications and Africa

The global strategic stakes are unusually concentrated around two chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz carried about 20 million barrels per day in 2024, roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption, and around one-fifth of global LNG trade. Meanwhile, the Red Sea/Suez system remains fragile after the shipping disruptions that began in late 2023. By January 2024, UNCTAD said monthly Suez transits were down 49% from peak levels, and the World Bank later found that by October 2024 rerouted cargo and tankers were travelling 48% and 38% farther, respectively, with global supply-chain stress rising to 2.3 million TEUs in December 2024. That means a renewed Iran-centred war would strike both the Gulf energy artery and the Red Sea/Suez trade corridor at once. [32]

That risk is already visible in prices and diplomacy. Reuters reported Brent crude spiking above $126 a barrel on 30 April 2026 as the Iran war deepened, while Qatar, Türkiye and the UAE all warned that renewed fighting would threaten global security, energy markets and freedom of navigation. Reuters has also estimated that the war has already imposed at least $25 billion in corporate costs globally, even before any second round. [33]

Africa impact assessment

Africa’s exposure is highly uneven. Net oil importers face the sharpest near-term pain through fuel, transport, inflation and current-account pressure. Egypt is the single most exposed major African state because it combines direct adjacency to Gaza, reliance on Suez revenues, higher energy import costs, and substantial remittance dependence linked to Gulf labour markets. Some oil exporters, notably Nigeria, may receive a short-run revenue lift, but even there the net benefit is limited by inflation, market volatility and slower global growth. The IMF and Reuters both caution that energy importers have the least room to absorb the shock, while even exporters may not gain in net terms. [34]

Two Africa-specific channels deserve special emphasis. First, the conflict worsens the economics of moving goods to and from Africa. The World Bank found that the South and East Africa/Indian Ocean region accounted for 4.8% of global supply-chain stress in the later phase of the Red Sea crisis, meaning that rerouting around the Cape is not a simple continental windfall; it raises logistics costs even when some southern ports or bunkering points gain traffic. Second, monetary policy becomes harder almost everywhere: Reuters reports African central bankers and analysts warning that oil turbulence could halt easing cycles in Kenya, Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria, while Uganda and Angola were already reacting more cautiously. [43]

Peacekeeping is a smaller but still concrete African exposure. UNIFIL had 7,478 peacekeepers from 47 troop-contributing countries as of 1 May 2026. The February 2026 UN peacekeeping roster shows African contributions in UNIFIL from Tanzania (76 personnel), Kenya (2) and Zambia (2), while Zambia also had 3 personnel in UNDOF. Violence against peacekeepers in Lebanon in March–April 2026 — which Reuters says included deaths from fire linked preliminarily to both Israel and Hezbollah, plus a later attack likely by Hezbollah — demonstrates that a renewed Lebanon war would carry direct force-protection risks for troop contributors, even if current African numbers are modest. [44]

Uncertainties and assumptions

Several important uncertainties remain. Battlefield damage assessment inside Iran is incomplete; Reuters notes uncertainty over how much of Iran’s 60%-enriched uranium stock survived the 2025 strikes, even though the IAEA believes a little over 200 kg may remain at Isfahan. Casualty figures across Gaza, southern Lebanon and Iran are politically contested and often published with delays. Syria’s internal transition remains fluid, and precise current balances between local actors, Israel, Türkiye, former regime networks and residual Iranian influence are harder to quantify than in Gaza or Lebanon. [45]

The scenario judgements in this report therefore rest on three explicit assumptions. The first is that the current public red lines stated by Israel, Iran and mediators are genuine negotiating positions rather than mere tactical noise. The second is that the present ceasefires are best understood as reversible coercive pauses, because they have not settled the core issues of disarmament, buffer zones, sovereignty, uranium, sanctions or maritime control. The third is that Africa’s main exposure remains economic and maritime, not direct combat spillover, unless Red Sea and Horn routes deteriorate much further. These assumptions are contestable, but at present they are the most defensible reading of the evidence. [46]

The bottom line is straightforward: the region is not on a stable path to peace, but neither is it yet locked into immediate total war. The highest-confidence judgement is a prolonged phase of contested ceasefires and intermittent escalation — with the Iran front remaining the principal regional trigger, the Lebanon front the fastest military escalator, Iraq and the Gulf the most plausible routes for geographic widening, and Africa the most exposed external region through fuel, shipping, inflation and remittance channels rather than through direct combat. [47]

[1] [20] [29] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/board-peace-envoy-warns-un-that-gaza-division-risks-becoming-permanent-2026-05-21/

[2] [7] [31] [46] https://www.gov.il/en/pages/pm-netanyahu-s-statement-on-lebanon-and-iran-16-apr-2026

[3] [19] [28] [47] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tehran-reviewing-latest-us-response-trump-suggests-he-can-wait-2026-05-21/

[4] [35] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/regional-challenges-cost-egypt-around-7-bln-suez-canal-revenues-2024-sisi-says-2024-12-26/

[5] https://www.gov.il/en/pages/statement-from-pm-netanyahu-17-april-2026

[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-israels-open-warfare-after-decades-shadow-war-2024-04-14/

[8] [23] [45] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/supreme-leader-says-enriched-uranium-must-stay-iran-iranian-sources-say-2026-05-21/

[9] [27] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-president-says-future-deal-will-not-cede-territory-2026-04-17/

[10] [15] https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2026/05/18/qatar-deems-recognition-of-nakba-a-key-to-just–lasting-palestinian-peace

[11] https://ina.iq/en/politics/48637-national-security-adviser-says-weapons-control-file-will-be-highly-important-in-next-government-formation.html

[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uaes-gargash-sees-50-50-odds-us-iran-deal-warns-against-renewed-fighting-2026-05-22/

[13] [14] Israel-Lebanon border warfare: what is the history?

[16] [21] [24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-lebanon-agree-extend-ceasefire-by-45-days-us-state-dept-says-2026-05-15/

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-watching-syria-closely-after-historic-fall-assad-2024-12-08/

[18] [25] https://www.reuters.com/investigations/iran-spent-years-fostering-proxies-iraq-now-many-arent-eager-join-war-2026-03-06/

[22] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/israel-killed-30-iranian-security-chiefs-11-nuclear-scientists-israeli-official-2025-06-27/

[26] https://www.reuters.com/world/suez-canal-authority-says-stability-returning-red-sea-2025-01-31/

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tankers-exit-hormuz-trump-vance-talk-up-iran-deal-prospects-2026-05-20/

[32] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504

[33] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-prices-extend-gains-us-iran-war-deadlock-keeps-supply-off-market-2026-04-30/

[34] https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2026/04/22/how-the-middle-east-war-has-affected-oil-exporters-and-importers

[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenya-cut-diesel-price-after-protests-against-soaring-energy-costs-2026-05-22/

[37] [38] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/fuel-prices-surge-africa-iran-war-hits-supply-2026-04-01/

[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/moroccos-inflation-rate-rises-17-april-2026-05-22/

[40] https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/nasikiliza/empowering-somalias-economy-beyond-remittances-for-long-term-stability-afe-0225

[41] [43] https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099253002102539789/pdf/IDU10b8b59671dbc814cfc19c4a1299ff54854ba.pdf

[42] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sp-lifts-nigerias-ratings-improving-macroeconomic-profile-2026-05-15/

[44] https://unifil.unmissions.org/en/unifil-troop-contributing-countries

The post SITREP: West Asia’s Cascading Conflict System & the Impact on Africa appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

The meeting has been seized upon by commentators as evidence of a major geopolitical shift: Iran, having survived the US-Israeli military campaign and retained leverage over one of the world’s most important energy corridors, is now seeking to convert battlefield resilience into diplomatic advantage. The central claim circulating on social media is that Tehran is no longer negotiating merely as a besieged state, but as a regional power setting terms with Russian backing.

Some of that framing remains political interpretation rather than confirmed fact. But the hard diplomatic signals are significant. Putin publicly praised Iran’s resistance to US and Israeli pressure and said Russia would do what it could to help Tehran. Araqchi, for his part, underlined the strategic nature of the Russia-Iran relationship, saying Moscow had consistently supported Iran. Putin also confirmed that he had received a message from Iran’s leadership shortly before the meeting. (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty)

The talks came after Araqchi’s regional diplomacy through Pakistan and Oman, two states that have become important channels in efforts to manage the crisis. According to reports, the Iranian foreign minister blamed “excessive” US demands for the continuing deadlock, while also indicating that Tehran was reviewing new American proposals. That sequence suggests Iran is widening the negotiating table, ensuring that any settlement is no longer handled solely through Washington and its allies. (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty)

At the heart of the standoff is the Strait of Hormuz. Before the war, between 125 and 140 ships normally moved in and out of the strait each day. That traffic has collapsed dramatically. Reuters reported that only seven vessels transited in a recent 24-hour period, with none carrying oil bound for the global market. The same report said the strait usually handles around 20% of the world’s daily oil and LNG supply, making its disruption a direct threat to global energy markets. (Reuters)

Iran has imposed restrictions on shipping through the strait, while the United States announced a blockade of Iran-related shipping on April 13. US forces have reportedly turned back dozens of vessels since then. This creates a dangerous dual-control situation: Iran can complicate maritime passage, while the United States can obstruct Iran-linked traffic. The result is not peace, but a tense, controlled paralysis in which both sides are using shipping as leverage. (Reuters)

The maritime problem is not simply political. It is also technical and commercial. Al Jazeera reported that Pentagon officials told US lawmakers it could take months to fully clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines, and maritime insurers warned that even a ceasefire may not be enough to restore normal traffic if the risk cannot be priced with confidence. In other words, even if diplomats announce an agreement, the strait may remain only partially usable until shipowners, underwriters and naval authorities believe the route is reliably safe. (Al Jazeera)

This gives Iran lasting leverage. A formal ceasefire may end open hostilities, but the practical reopening of Hormuz depends on guarantees, inspection, naval coordination and insurance confidence. For Tehran, that means the strait becomes not only a military pressure point, but a bargaining instrument in any wider settlement.

Russia’s role is therefore important. Moscow is not merely expressing sympathy. It is positioning itself as a necessary interlocutor. Putin has raised the possibility of Russia helping to mediate, including around the nuclear dispute, which remains a major obstacle in US-Iran talks. Analysts cited by RFE/RL suggest Russia may try to use its access to Tehran to secure nuclear concessions acceptable to Washington, while also preserving Iran as a strategic partner. (RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty)

At the same time, defence diplomacy is moving in parallel. Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov held talks in Kyrgyzstan with Iran’s Deputy Defence Minister Reza Talaei-Nik, according to Reuters. Belousov repeated Moscow’s position that the Iran conflict should be resolved through diplomacy and said he expected Moscow and Tehran to continue supporting one another. Talaei-Nik also travelled to Belarus for talks on the Middle East situation. (Reuters)

The Kyrgyzstan setting matters because it sits within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation framework, where Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and India are all present. China’s defence minister Dong Jun also attended the SCO defence meeting and called for deeper defence and security cooperation among member states. Reuters reported that Dong held sideline talks with officials from Iran, Russia, Pakistan and Belarus. (Reuters)

This points to the wider strategic picture. Iran is not only relying on missiles, ports or the Strait of Hormuz. It is embedding itself in Eurasian structures: the SCO, Russian-backed security channels, trade corridors through Pakistan and Central Asia, and the wider North-South and East-West transport logic linking Russia, Iran, India and China. The more these routes develop, the less decisive Western maritime pressure becomes.

The social-media claim that “Iran won the war” is a political judgement, not a settled historical fact. What can be said with more confidence is that Iran has not been isolated in the way Washington may have intended. Instead, the crisis has accelerated the visibility of a Russia-Iran alignment and brought Eurasian powers more directly into the Persian Gulf equation.

The emerging settlement, if one is reached, will therefore not be a simple US-Iran bargain. It will likely involve maritime guarantees, nuclear sequencing, sanctions questions, Russian mediation, Gulf security arrangements and the practical reopening of Hormuz. That is the real chessboard now taking shape: not a single battlefield victory, but a contested diplomatic order in which Iran is trying to convert survival into strategic influence, with Russia standing visibly beside it.

The post Russia Moves Into the Gulf Endgame as Iran Shapes the Post-War Settlement appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

The narrow waterway between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman is only around 21 miles, or 34 kilometres, wide at its narrowest point. Yet it carries a level of strategic weight almost impossible to exaggerate. The International Energy Agency describes it as a route through which around 20 million barrels of oil per day normally pass, equal to roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade, with around 80% of that crude destined for Asia. It also carries a major share of global liquefied natural gas, including most LNG exports from Qatar and the UAE. (IEA)

That makes Hormuz more than a regional maritime passage. It is a global economic organ. When it is obstructed, the effects do not remain in West Asia. They move into petrol prices in Europe, fertilizer costs in Africa, factory inputs in Asia, airline schedules, food prices, inflation figures and household budgets.

Recent reports suggest traffic through the strait remains severely reduced, with Reuters reporting that daily transits have fallen from a normal range of around 125–140 vessels to only a handful in recent days. Oil prices have responded accordingly, with Brent crude reported around $108.68 per barrel and WTI near $96.96 as markets absorb the continuing disruption. (Reuters)

The immediate story is energy. But the deeper story is dependency.

Hormuz is often described as an oil chokepoint, but that understates the issue. Oil is the most visible commodity, but it is not the only one. The strait is also central to LNG flows, petrochemicals, plastics, fertilizer inputs, sulfur, aluminum-related supply chains and other industrial materials. Many of these are not easily rerouted. Pipelines can shift some crude flows, but they cannot replace the maritime movement of ammonia, urea or other bulk inputs needed by agriculture and industry.

That matters because fertilizer is food before it becomes a commodity. Nitrogen fertilizers support a large share of modern agricultural output. If key inputs fail to arrive during planting or application windows, the consequences are delayed but severe: lower yields, higher prices and pressure on already vulnerable food-importing countries.

For import-dependent economies, especially in parts of Africa, South Asia and Latin America, the Hormuz crisis is therefore not just about the cost of fuel. It is about whether fertilizer arrives on time, whether food imports remain affordable and whether governments can absorb another external price shock. Brazil, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and many African countries are especially exposed to fertilizer disruptions because their agricultural systems rely heavily on imported inputs.

Europe is also feeling the shock, particularly in aviation and industry. The head of the International Energy Agency warned in mid-April that Europe had “maybe six weeks” of jet fuel left if supplies remained blocked, with flight cancellations possible if the situation did not improve. (AP News) Lufthansa has already announced cuts to around 20,000 short-haul flights through October, citing soaring jet fuel costs and the need to save fuel. (Al Jazeera)

The aviation impact is only one visible symptom. Higher oil and gas prices feed through refineries, trucking, shipping, chemicals, plastics, construction materials and consumer goods. Energy inflation rarely stays in one sector. It spreads.

This is why the closure or near-closure of Hormuz has the character of a global stress test. It exposes how much of the world economy has been built on the assumption that a few narrow maritime corridors will remain open, insured and navigable. Once insurers withdraw war-risk cover, shipping becomes not merely dangerous but commercially impossible. No insurance means fewer vessels. Fewer vessels mean fewer cargoes. Fewer cargoes mean shortages, price spikes and production delays.

There are signs of limited movement. Reuters reported that an ADNOC-managed LNG tanker recently crossed the strait, appearing off India after weeks without transmitting a signal. But analysts cautioned that one successful crossing does not prove that the route is safe or commercially reliable. (Reuters) That distinction is crucial. A chokepoint does not need to be sealed with concrete to damage the world economy. It only has to become uncertain enough for shipping, insurance and finance to hesitate.

The crisis also underlines a strategic irony. The Gulf states themselves are deeply vulnerable to disruption in the same waterway through which they export energy. Several depend heavily on imported food, consumer goods and industrial supplies. If Hormuz becomes unreliable for outgoing oil and gas, it also becomes unreliable for incoming food and essential materials.

For Asia, the stakes are direct. China, India, Japan, South Korea and other major economies depend on Gulf energy flows. If tanker traffic remains restricted, they face higher import bills, tighter supply and stronger competition for alternative cargoes. For Europe, the shock arrives through fuel, inflation and industrial costs. For the United States, even with larger domestic production, oil is priced globally. A disruption in Hormuz still reaches American petrol pumps.

Goldman Sachs has reportedly lifted its oil price expectations, warning that Brent could move toward $120 per barrel if Gulf exports recover slowly. (marketwatch.com) That is the market’s way of saying what policymakers often avoid saying plainly: the world has no simple replacement for Hormuz.

The most dangerous assumption is that this is only a temporary regional drama. The strait has always been strategic, but the modern economy has made it systemic. A disruption there does not merely interrupt trade. It tests the architecture of globalization itself: just-in-time logistics, concentrated energy supply, specialized fertilizer production, global aviation, food security and inflation management.

The world is discovering that resilience is not the same as efficiency. For decades, economies optimized for low cost, speed and concentration. Hormuz shows the price of that model. A single corridor can connect refineries, farms, hospitals, airports, factories and households across continents. When it closes, the map of dependency becomes visible.

That is the real lesson of the Strait of Hormuz. It is not simply a strip of water between Iran and Oman. It is a global pressure point where energy security, food security, industrial production and geopolitics meet.

And right now, that pressure point is under strain.

The post When Hormuz Stops, the World Stops: Inside the Chokepoint Crisis appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

This is not a conventional trade war. No formal sanctions have been announced. No multilateral resolutions have been passed. Yet the effects are being felt with startling speed. Flights are emptier. Ports are slower. Supply chains are stalling. Investment decisions are being quietly revised. And, perhaps most damaging of all, the symbolic value of “Made in USA” is being questioned in markets that once treated it as aspirational.

What is unfolding looks less like a diplomatic dispute and more like a collective market judgment: a recalibration of risk around America itself.

From Political Shock to Consumer Action

Globalisation has long conditioned governments to think in terms of treaties, tariffs, and summits. But the current disruption is emerging from a different direction. It is being driven not primarily by states, but by people—consumers making individual decisions that aggregate into systemic pressure.

In multiple regions, particularly Europe and parts of Asia, consumer behaviour has shifted sharply. Travel plans have been cancelled. American brands have become social liabilities rather than status symbols. Cultural affinity—once the United States’ most powerful export—has given way to reputational discomfort. In a hyperconnected digital environment, images and narratives travel faster than any official rebuttal, and moral judgments are increasingly embedded in purchasing choices.

This form of pressure is difficult to counter because it does not rely on enforcement. It relies on consent. And consent, once withdrawn, is extremely hard to regain.

The Speed Problem: Why This Is Different

Traditional economic sanctions work slowly. They pass through diplomatic channels, legal frameworks, and bureaucratic delays. Consumer-led economic disengagement works at network speed.

Tourism provides a clear example. The U.S. tourism sector employs millions directly and indirectly, with major concentrations in states whose economies depend on international visitors. When travel advisories change tone, or when travellers simply decide a destination feels unstable or unwelcoming, the impact is immediate. Hotels, airlines, entertainment venues, and local services feel the shock within days, not quarters.

The same applies to retail and technology. Global brands depend on perception as much as product. Once a brand becomes symbolically loaded—associated with instability, aggression, or moralRDIs or moral controversy—it carries reputational risk for the consumer as well as the producer. In such conditions, substitution happens fast.

Labour, Logistics, and the Fragility of Supply Chains

Perhaps the most underestimated element of the current moment is labour. Global supply chains do not move themselves; they are operated by people who make ethical and political judgments of their own.

When port inspections slow, when “procedural delays” become the norm, or when unions decide to apply maximum scrutiny to certain cargoes, the effect is cumulative. Modern logistics systems are optimised for efficiency, not resilience. Even small disruptions, if sustained, ripple outward into shortages, production stoppages, and inflationary pressure.

This is not theoretical. Contemporary manufacturing relies on just-in-time delivery across borders. Components often cross multiple jurisdictions before becoming finished products. If trust erodes at key nodes—ports, shipping lanes, inspection authorities—the system clogs quickly.

Capital Is Quietly Repricing America

Markets are often described as emotional, but capital is ultimately pragmatic. It seeks predictability, rule stability, and institutional reliability. When these appear compromised, capital does not protest—it migrates.

What is notable in the current environment is the absence of dramatic announcements. Instead, there is a pattern of quiet adjustment: delayed investments, paused expansions, alternative site selection, diversification away from U.S. exposure. These moves rarely make headlines, but collectively they matter more than any single market drop.

Once a country shifts from being seen as a “safe harbour” to being perceived as a volatility risk, the premium it once enjoyed evaporates. Rebuilding that trust can take years.

The Collapse of Soft Power

For decades, American influence was not sustained solely by military or financial strength, but by soft power: culture, education, technology, and the idea—carefully cultivated—that the United States represented opportunity, openness, and stability.

Soft power is fragile because it rests on belief rather than enforcement. When it breaks, there is no legal remedy.

In recent weeks, that reservoir of goodwill appears to have drained rapidly. Cultural symbols that once carried neutral or positive associations are being reinterpreted through a lens of instability and moral discomfort. For younger global consumers especially, identity and ethics are inseparable from consumption.

Once “cool” disappears, it is extraordinarily hard to manufacture.

Diplomacy by Absence

Another striking feature of the current situation is diplomatic silence. Where confrontation once dominated headlines, disengagement has taken its place. Calls go unanswered. Statements are delayed. Engagement is conditional.

In international relations, silence is rarely neutral. It is often a signal that leverage has shifted.

Countries that once relied on the United States as an anchor are now hedging more aggressively. Regional arrangements, alternative trade corridors, and non-Western financial mechanisms are receiving renewed attention—not as ideological gestures, but as risk management.

The BRICS Moment

It is in this context that the BRICS grouping takes on renewed significance.

For years, discussions about BRICS expansion, de-dollarisation, and alternative settlement systems were treated as long-term ambitions—strategic signalling rather than imminent action. What has changed is the incentive structure. Instability accelerates decision-making.

If trust in U.S. institutions, legal predictability, and monetary stewardship erodes, then diversification away from dollar dependence becomes not just desirable, but necessary. Energy pricing mechanisms, bilateral trade settlement in local currencies, and alternative reserve assets move from theory to contingency planning.

The power of the dollar has always rested less on force than on confidence. If that confidence falters, even partially, the implications are profound.

Brand USA: From Asset to Liability

Perhaps the most sobering outcome of the current crisis is the transformation of “Brand USA” itself.

A national brand functions much like a corporate one: it signals quality, reliability, and values. When that signal flips, every export, every tourist visa, every cultural product carries friction.

Reputational damage at this scale does not resolve with a single policy reversal or leadership change. It lingers. Investors remember. Consumers remember. Institutions recalibrate permanently.

In branding terms, the United States is confronting what marketers would call a category-level crisis: the product is no longer evaluated on features, but on what it represents.

Conclusion: A World Rebalancing in Real Time

What we are witnessing is not the collapse of the United States, but the end of an assumption—that America is the default centre of the global economic and cultural system.

The rise of BRICS, the diversification of trade, and the willingness of consumers and capital to disengage all point toward a multipolar reality that no longer waits for Washington to stabilise itself. Power is diffusing. Influence is being renegotiated. Loyalty is conditional.

Brand USA was built over decades and depleted in a matter of weeks. Rebuilding it will require more than rhetoric. It will demand institutional repair, cultural humility, and a recognition that in a networked world, legitimacy is granted from the outside, not asserted from within.

The markets have already voted. The consumers are following. And the rest of the world is preparing for a future in which America is no longer indispensable—just another actor competing for trust.

The post “Make America Go Away”: How the World Switched Off the U.S. Economy appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

Within 24 hours, the operation triggered sharp diplomatic division, emergency consultations at the United Nations, and intense debate about whether the United States acted within international law. Venezuela’s authorities described Maduro’s seizure as a kidnapping and insisted the state remained functional under Maduro-aligned officials, while Washington framed the episode as justice and self-defense. (Reuters)

Because events are still unfolding, many early claims circulating on social media—especially on X—should be treated as unverified unless corroborated by official statements or reputable reporting. That said, X has played a visible role in real-time diplomacy and narrative framing, with leaders and officials using it to issue reactions, demand U.N. action, and contest the legitimacy of the operation. (Reuters)

1) Context: why Venezuela became the stage for a direct U.S. raid

1.1 Long-running U.S.–Venezuela confrontation

The operation did not occur in a vacuum. Venezuela and the United States have been locked for years in a struggle that blends ideology, sanctions, oil, and contested legitimacy. U.S. governments have repeatedly accused the Maduro administration of severe repression and corruption, while Caracas has treated U.S. sanctions and support for opposition forces as economic warfare and regime-change pressure.

In parallel, U.S. prosecutors previously brought narcotics-related charges against Maduro and other figures in his circle, an element the Trump administration leaned on heavily in the public justification for this action. (Reuters)

1.2 The question of legitimacy inside Venezuela

Another layer is Venezuela’s internal political dispute. Reporting in the first day emphasized that key opposition figures remained outside the country, and that the United States and parts of the opposition have disputed recent electoral outcomes. The Financial Times reported that some government critics hoped opposition-aligned leadership would be installed, while Maduro loyalists insisted the state apparatus remained intact. (Financial Times)

This matters for two reasons:

• It shapes how external actors frame the operation (“liberation” vs “abduction”).
• It shapes what transition is even possible if the security services, courts, and administrative machinery remain dominated by Maduro-aligned officials.

2) What happened: the operation as reported in the first 24 hours

2.1 Strike-and-raid in Caracas

Multiple outlets, including Reuters, described a combined operation: airstrikes against Venezuelan military targets and a special-forces raid that “plucked” Maduro from Caracas. Reuters reported months of planning, with extensive U.S. military activity in the region leading up to the raid. (Reuters)

ABC News reported U.S. officials saying the operation used more than 150 aircraft, underscoring the scale for what the White House presented as a targeted mission. (ABC News)
Reuters published images showing smoke and explosions in Caracas during the operation. (Reuters)

2.2 Capture, extraction, and U.S. custody

By later January 3 and into January 4, reporting converged on the core outcome: Maduro and Flores were in U.S. custody and expected to appear in U.S. court, with U.S. statements emphasizing drug-trafficking allegations. (ABC News)

The U.S. government’s public posture combined two messages that do not sit comfortably together:

• This was a law-enforcement style action (capturing an indicted leader).
• The U.S. intends to direct the country’s governance temporarily (a political-administrative claim). (Reuters)

That tension became central to the legal and diplomatic fallout.

3) Who governs Venezuela now: continuity measures and competing claims

3.1 Venezuelan Supreme Court: Delcy Rodríguez as interim president

On January 4, Reuters reported that Venezuela’s Supreme Court ordered Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to assume interim presidential authority, explicitly citing the need for administrative continuity and national defense in light of Maduro’s forced absence. (Reuters)

This move signals that Maduro-aligned institutions are attempting to:

• preserve continuity of command,
• prevent fragmentation inside the state, and
• project that the U.S. raid did not collapse the government.

3.2 “United behind Maduro”: the loyalty test

Reuters also reported that Maduro’s allies said they remained united behind him even while he was in U.S. custody, and that the streets in Caracas were tense and uncertain. (Reuters)

This is a classic post-decapitation scenario: removing the leader does not automatically remove the network of loyalty, coercion, and administrative control that kept the government functioning. The crucial question becomes whether military and security elites stay cohesive, fracture into rival blocs, or cut a deal with domestic opponents and external powers.

4) International reactions: condemnation, cautious distancing, and a small band of support

4.1 The United Nations: “dangerous precedent” and an emergency meeting

Reuters reported that the U.N. Security Council would meet on Monday after Colombia—supported by Russia and China—requested an emergency session. The U.N. Secretary-General’s office described the operation as setting a “dangerous precedent.” (Reuters)

This response is significant because it frames the event not as a regional scuffle, but as a stress test for the international system’s core rule: the prohibition on the use of force except under narrow, defined circumstances.

4.2 Latin America: sovereignty fears and destabilization risk

A major regional concern is spillover: refugee flows, border militarization, economic disruption, and precedent. Reuters compiled reactions including joint and national statements emphasizing non-intervention, civilian protection, and respect for international law. (Reuters)

NPR reporting captured the regional anxiety: leaders condemning the strike, preparing for potential refugee movement, and warning about escalation. (KGOU)

4.3 Russia and China: sovereignty and the anti-hegemony frame

Reuters reported strong condemnation from China, describing the operation as hegemonic behavior violating international law and Venezuelan sovereignty. (Reuters)
For Moscow and Beijing, the event also serves as a narrative exhibit: a powerful state unilaterally removing a foreign leader—exactly what they argue the post–Cold War West has done repeatedly.

4.4 Europe: torn between opposition to Maduro and discomfort with the method

European reactions were notably conflicted. On the one hand, some European leaders have questioned Maduro’s legitimacy and supported a peaceful transition; on the other, many stressed that outcomes must still conform to international law. The Guardian described Europe as divided and uneasy, with some states criticizing the intervention’s legality and others offering more guarded comments. (The Guardian)
Le Monde reported the EU urging restraint and respect for international law, even while reiterating that it does not view Maduro as legitimate. (Le Monde.fr)

4.5 Supportive outliers: Argentina’s endorsement

Argentina’s President Javier Milei publicly welcomed Maduro’s seizure, aligning with Trump and framing it as a step toward “liberty.” (Buenos Aires Times)
This support provides Washington some regional political cover, but it does not substitute for U.N. authorization or Venezuelan consent—two factors that dominate legal assessments.

5) Public response and civil society: protests, diaspora divides, and the role of X

5.1 Demonstrations in the United States

The operation quickly produced domestic protest activity. The San Antonio Express-News reported a rally denouncing the intervention and arguing it was illegal regime change, with demonstrators pointing to the lack of congressional approval and warning of blowback. (San Antonio Express-News)
WHYY reported protests in Philadelphia as well, reflecting a wider pattern of anti-intervention mobilization in some U.S. cities. (WHYY)

These protests matter because they illustrate a persistent U.S. internal divide: some view the action as overdue accountability for an authoritarian leader, while others see it as another foreign intervention likely to generate long-term instability.

5.2 Reactions in Venezuela: fear, calm, and competing rallies

Reporting described a tense calm in Caracas, with uncertainty about what comes next. The Financial Times reported both pro-government mobilization and public anxiety, alongside hopes among some government critics for an opposition-led transition. (Financial Times)
Reuters similarly described Maduro allies still running the country and streets quiet amid anxiety. (Reuters)

5.3 Diaspora split: “justice” vs “sovereignty”

Venezuelans abroad are not a single political bloc. Some diaspora voices celebrated Maduro’s removal as liberation from repression and misrule, while others—even those critical of Maduro—worried about the precedent of a foreign power using force to remove a leader and talk about “running” the country.

This split was amplified on X, where political identity, moral judgment, and legal argument collided in real time. X posts and reposts shaped perceptions faster than formal diplomacy could, even as governments used the platform to issue official statements and demands. (Reuters)

6) Strategic and economic stakes: oil, sanctions, and regional security

6.1 Oil and “temporary control” rhetoric

A major accelerator of suspicion—especially in Latin America—was Trump’s language that the U.S. would “run” Venezuela for now. Reuters reported Venezuela’s U.N. ambassador portraying the intervention as intended to impose a puppet regime and exploit natural resources. (Reuters)

At the same time, U.S. officials emphasized narcotics allegations and security imperatives, asserting the operation was defensive and justified under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. (Reuters)
Those competing explanations created space for the harshest interpretation: that resource access and geopolitical dominance were central motives—an interpretation repeated widely in social discourse.

6.2 Regional security risks

Even if the U.S. avoids a large occupation footprint, the operation could still produce major instability:

• fragmentation within Venezuelan security services,
• armed retaliation by loyalist or irregular forces,
• border pressures on Colombia and Brazil,
• and renewed ideological polarization across Latin America.

NPR reported that Colombia began deploying forces toward the border and preparing for potential refugee inflows, illustrating how quickly neighbors were forced into contingency mode. (KGOU)

7) What happens next: three plausible pathways

Pathway A: “Raid completed, pressure continues”

The U.S. could treat the capture as the endpoint, avoiding deeper military administration while using sanctions, recognition, and oil licensing to shape the next government. The risk: Maduro-aligned institutions remain in control, presenting the U.S. with a choice between escalation or stalemate. (Reuters)

Pathway B: “Negotiated transition with external mediation”

A managed settlement could emerge if key Venezuelan power centers (military, courts, state oil leadership) accept a negotiated path toward elections and institutional reform, possibly with international monitoring. But the legitimacy damage from a foreign raid makes it harder for Venezuelan actors to publicly accept a transition perceived as externally imposed. (The Guardian)

Pathway C: “Expanded U.S. control attempt”

If Washington moves from “temporary control” rhetoric to real administrative authority on the ground, the situation could resemble occupation dynamics: insurgency risk, wider regional backlash, and a deepening international legal crisis. Critics inside and outside the U.S. have already warned about the absence of a clear exit strategy. (San Antonio Express-News)

8) Conclusion: impact on international law

8.1 The core legal issue: the prohibition on the use of force

The U.N. Charter’s baseline rule prohibits the threat or use of force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence, except under limited exceptions such as Security Council authorization or self-defense. Governments responding to the Venezuela operation repeatedly invoked these principles, and the U.N. Secretary-General’s office described the episode as a “dangerous precedent.” (Reuters)

No public reporting in the first 24 hours indicates U.N. authorization. Instead, the Security Council convened an emergency meeting, which typically signals that legality and escalation risk are central concerns, not settled questions. (Reuters)

8.2 The contested U.S. justification: Article 51 self-defense + “law enforcement”

Reuters reported that the U.S. argued self-defense under Article 51 while also presenting the mission as a targeted law-enforcement action against an indicted “narco-terrorist” leadership. International law experts cited by Reuters argued the administration muddled the legal picture and warned that drug trafficking claims do not neatly fit the Charter’s “armed attack” threshold that typically triggers self-defense. (Reuters)

This is where the precedent risk becomes sharp: if a powerful state can label a foreign leader a criminal and use military force to seize them, the barrier between extradition (a legal process) and abduction by force (a sovereignty breach) weakens.

8.3 Why the precedent matters beyond Venezuela

Even states that dislike Maduro may fear the structural implication: today it is a “narco-terrorism” rationale; tomorrow it could be a different rationale used elsewhere by other powers. The international order depends heavily on restraint because enforcement is uneven. When rules appear optional for the powerful, the incentive grows for rivals to mirror the behavior, accelerating global instability. (Reuters)

8.4 Likely legal aftershocks

Over the coming days and weeks, several legal questions are likely to dominate:

• Was there a lawful basis for force? (Security Council mandate vs self-defense threshold, necessity, and proportionality.) (Reuters)
• What legal status applies if the situation becomes a broader armed conflict? (International humanitarian law obligations and civilian protection.)
• Does “temporary administration” amount to occupation? (If so, additional legal regimes and responsibilities apply.) (Reuters)
• How does the Security Council respond in a polarized world? (Where veto politics may block binding outcomes.) (Reuters)

Bottom line

The Venezuela operation is not only a regional crisis; it is a direct challenge to the post-1945 norm that cross-border force must be exceptional, tightly justified, and collectively constrained. Whether the operation is ultimately treated as a singular episode or as a template will depend on what happens next: the depth of U.S. involvement on the ground, the credibility of any transition process, and whether international institutions can impose meaningful political—if not legal—costs for unilateral action. (Reuters)

• Reuters
• Reuters
• Financial Times
• The Guardian
• San Antonio Express-News
• nypost.com

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After nearly two years of grueling conflict, 2025 saw the scales tip decisively in Russia’s favor in Ukraine. Moscow’s forces not only held their ground but expanded control over eastern and southern territories, forcing a bitter reckoning in Kyiv. By late 2025, the Ukrainian government – starved of munitions and facing economic ruin – agreed to abandon its long-held NATO ambitions and accept a U.S.-brokered peace framework that ceded territory to Russiapresstv.irpresstv.ir. This marked a humiliating end to NATO’s campaign: Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership was “a bitter acknowledgment of the strategic dead end” after a prolonged war of attritionpresstv.ir. Western officials quietly conceded that no viable alternative remained but to strike a peace deal on Russia’s termspresstv.ir.

The implications of Russia’s assured victory reverberated globally. Russia’s former president Dmitry Medvedev, in a triumphalist speech, declared that “Moscow’s victory in the Ukraine conflict will lay the groundwork for a more just world” and even suggested a new Russian national holiday would commemorate the victorygroups.google.comgroups.google.com. Medvedev stressed that Russia’s goal was to destroy the “Kiev neo-Nazi regime” – not the Ukrainian people – and vowed no hostile Western-backed regime would ever again be allowed on Russia’s bordersgroups.google.comgroups.google.com. Such rhetoric underscored the Kremlin’s confidence that it had weathered NATO’s challenge. Indeed, by year’s end, Western unity on Ukraine had fractured. European allies, exhausted by economic strain and increasingly skeptical of an unwinnable war, threw support behind the U.S. peace plan that effectively ratified Russia’s annexations as the “lesser evil” compared to endless warpresstv.irpresstv.ir. NATO’s credibility suffered a stark blow – its promises to Kyiv were broken, and its vaunted deterrence power tarnished by Russia’s resilience.

For Ukraine, the collapse was catastrophic. President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government, once adamant about reclaiming all territory, was compelled to accept a ceasefire that freezes the conflict largely on Russia’s termspresstv.irpresstv.ir. In exchange for a pause in the fighting, Ukraine must demilitarize its army and codify neutrality – a de facto abandonment of the Western integration it had pursued since 2014presstv.irpresstv.ir. This turn of events – a “strategic vacuum” as Press TV described itpresstv.ir – laid bare the harsh reality: NATO would not – and perhaps could not – rescue Ukraine from Russia’s grinding offensive. European diplomats privately acknowledged that without U.S. military weight, Ukraine “cannot withstand Russia”presstv.ir. Yet Washington under President Donald Trump had explicitly refused to commit troops, counseling Europe to handle its own neighborhoodpresstv.irpresstv.ir. The result is a Ukraine shattered and partitioned, its economy in ruins and tens of thousands of civilians deadpresstv.ir, while Moscow tightens its grip on the Donbas and Crimea.

The assured Russian victory also accelerated a global geopolitical shift. Most of the Global South refused to isolate Moscow; major developing powers treated the outcome as a lesson in Western overreach. As Medvedev put it, Russia’s success marked “the first step toward…a multipolar world order”, one based on “mutual respect and real international law” rather than Washington’s dominancegroups.google.com. In this narrative – echoed by media like RT – NATO’s defeat in Ukraine symbolized the waning of Western unilateral power and the rise of a fairer balance. While Western officials might contest that framing, few could deny that by the end of 2025, U.S.-led attempts to weaken Moscow had failed. Ukraine’s collapse became “an epic Western strategic failure”, as even some Western observers admitted, on par with past debacles like Iraqtheguardian.com. With Russia’s security goals largely met, and NATO’s eastern expansion halted, 2025 closed with Moscow ascendant in Eastern Europe – and the post-Cold War era of unchecked NATO enlargement effectively over.

Gaza Under Siege: Israeli Genocidal Campaign and Iran’s Resistance Axis

In parallel with the showdown in Eastern Europe, the year 2025 bore witness to a devastating conflict in the Middle East that many around the world labeled a genocide. Israel’s ongoing military operations in the Palestinian territories – especially the Gaza Strip – reached unprecedented levels of destruction and civilian suffering. Israeli forces pounded densely populated Gaza cities with relentless air and artillery strikes, ostensibly targeting Hamas fighters but in practice killing thousands of men, women, and children. By autumn 2025, Palestinian casualties in Gaza since the war’s onset in October 2023 had surpassed a staggering 63,000 killed (including over 20,000 children according to one Save the Children report) and 160,000 woundedpresstv.irpresstv.ir. Entire neighborhoods lay in ruins, and Gaza’s infrastructure – from hospitals and schools to water and power systems – was pulverized. International rights groups, including within Israel, concluded that Israel’s conduct met the legal definition of genocidepresstv.irpresstv.ir.

A United Nations inquiry and the world’s leading genocide scholars delivered a damning verdict: Israel was “engaged in systematic and widespread crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide” in Gazapresstv.ir. In a nearly unanimous vote, the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) passed a resolution declaring that Israel’s actions – from the deliberate leveling of homes and destruction of food and medical infrastructure to the enforced starvation siege – fulfill the 1948 Genocide Convention criteriapresstv.irpresstv.ir. As evidence, they cited Israel’s explicit tactics: “deliberate destruction of agricultural fields, food warehouses, and bakeries” combined with choking off humanitarian aid, inflicting “unlivable conditions resulting in starvation” of the civilian populationpresstv.irpresstv.ir. By late 2025, Gaza’s malnutrition crisis had turned into a famine, with hundreds of children perishing from hunger and preventable disease under the total blockadepresstv.irpresstv.ir. The international consensus in the Global South – and among a growing chorus of Western human rights voices – was that Israel’s campaign was not mere counterinsurgency but an attempt to annihilate Gaza’s societypresstv.irpresstv.ir. The International Criminal Court moved forward on investigations, and arrest warrants were reportedly issued for top Israeli officials on charges of war crimespresstv.ir.

Such was the backdrop against which resistance forces and their backers mobilized. Far from isolating and weakening the Palestinian cause, Israel’s onslaught — widely seen as “genocidal” — galvanized a region-wide “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran. The Islamic Republic, long a patron of Palestinian and Lebanese militant groups, seized the moment to ramp up support for those fighting Israel. Tehran’s leaders framed the Gaza war as a defining battle against oppression, casting Israel as a “terror ringleader” whose aggression threatened the entire regionpresstv.irpresstv.ir. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps funneled weapons and technology to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, even as those groups waged fierce urban warfare against Israeli ground incursions. To Israel’s north, Hezbollah in Lebanon engaged in the most serious border clashes since 2006, tying down substantial Israeli forces. And in an unprecedented show of transregional solidarity, Yemen’s Houthi movement (Ansarullah) opened a new front: throughout 2025, the Houthis launched near-daily long-range drone and missile strikes against Israeli targets, from Red Sea shipping to infrastructure in Eilatpresstv.ir. In response, Israel even conducted airstrikes on Yemen’s capital Sanaa, assassinating senior Yemeni officials – a move Iran’s top commander decried as a sign of Tel Aviv’s “deep fear of the expansion of the Resistance Axis”presstv.irpresstv.ir.

Meanwhile, Iran’s regional clout hit new highs amid the chaos. As Arab publics and many Muslim-majority nations rallied to the Palestinian cause, governments traditionally aligned with Washington felt pressured to distance themselves from Israel’s actions. Iran skillfully used forums like the Islamic Cooperation Council and its diplomatic channels to call out what it termed Western hypocrisy and to demand protection for Palestinians. Tehran’s message – that Israel’s impunity is enabled by the U.S. and must be resisted collectively – resonated widelypresstv.irpresstv.ir. Even some leaders of U.S.-allied Arab states issued unusually sharp condemnations of Israel. In Syria, events underscored Iran’s growing role as a regional power-broker. Late 2024 had seen the sudden toppling of the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad – an Iranian ally – after a Turkey- and Western-backed rebel offensive reached Damascus, aided by intense Israeli airstrikespresstv.ir. A hardline Sunni coalition led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took power in Damascus with covert Western approval, fundamentally altering the balance in the Levantpresstv.irpresstv.ir. Yet Iran did not accept this fait accompli. Throughout 2025, Tehran lent quiet support to a broad Syrian resistance front against the new HTS-led regime. In Syria’s coastal and central heartland, Alawite, Shia, and other minority communities rose up in mass protests condemning the “increasing violence” of the Islamist government and its foreign patronspresstv.irpresstv.ir. A former Syrian Army officer announced the creation of a “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria,” explicitly vowing to “topple the current regime” installed in Damascus and “liberate all Syrian land from occupying terrorist forces”presstv.irpresstv.ir. This guerrilla resistance – implicitly backed by Iran and Russia – has bogged down the HTS-led authorities and their Western supporters in yet another protracted struggle.

Iran’s multifaceted support for regional resistance has enhanced its prestige among anti-colonial and anti-Zionist movements. By positioning itself as the champion of Palestinian survival and Syrian sovereignty, Tehran strengthened the Axis of Resistance as a counterweight to U.S.-Israeli hegemony. Iranian officials noted that even non-Arab countries like Turkey openly challenged Israel’s actions in Gaza, reflecting a shifting norm: Muslim-majority nations are less afraid of breaking with the West on core issues of Israel/Palestine. In Tehran’s view, the year ended with Israel more isolated and the Resistance axis more unified. “Tel Aviv’s bloodshed only deepens its strategic nightmare,” argued Iran’s military Chief of Staff, Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, pointing to the “growing unity among regional nations in defending the Palestinian cause”presstv.irpresstv.ir. If 2025 was a dark year for Gaza’s people, it was also a year that solidified a historic realignment: an empowered Iran-led bloc intent on checking Western allies’ dominance in West Asia, from the rivers of Palestine to the mountains of southern Lebanon and beyond.

China and India Reshape Global Power through BRICS and Diplomacy

While wars and turmoil rattled the West and Middle East, Asia’s two emerging superpowers – China and India – spent 2025 steadily expanding their global influence. Both nations harnessed their economic might and leadership of multilateral forums to push for a more multipolar, South-centered world order. Together with other rising powers, Beijing and New Delhi positioned themselves as champions of the “Global South,” emphasizing development, sovereignty, and non-interference – in stark contrast to what they describe as decades of Western hegemony. The BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) became the primary vehicle of this agenda. In 2025, BRICS completed a historic expansion, admitting six new members – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Indonesia – and by doing so, transformed into a true heavyweight coalition encompassing over half the world’s population and a large share of its economic outputen.chinadiplomacy.org.cnen.chinadiplomacy.org.cn. By one measure (purchasing-power parity GDP), the enlarged BRICS now accounts for roughly 44% of global economic output and 50% of humanityen.chinadiplomacy.org.cnen.chinadiplomacy.org.cn, a striking symbol of the shift in economic gravity away from the G7 West.

The geopolitical and economic rise of China and India was evident on multiple fronts. China, already the world’s second-largest economy, solidified itself as the engine of South-South cooperation. Beijing doubled down on its signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure program, which by this year connected some 150+ countries via railways, ports, and fiber-optic networksen.chinadiplomacy.org.cn. At the third Belt and Road Forum, President Xi Jinping welcomed dozens of Global South leaders and signed tens of billions in new trade and investment deals, from green energy projects in Africa to high-speed rail in Southeast Asia. China’s model of state-led development continued to attract developing nations’ admiration: the country’s success in lifting hundreds of millions from poverty and becoming a world leader in industries like clean technology was held up as “an inspiration for the Global South”, showing that alternatives to the Western neoliberal model existglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Indeed, in 2025 China led the world in green innovation, filing over 100,000 low-carbon patents – more than the next several countries combineden.chinadiplomacy.org.cn. This underscored how China is leveraging its technological prowess to shape future markets (electric vehicles, solar and battery supply chains, etc.) and help fellow developing countries leapfrog ahead.

India, for its part, emerged increasingly confident on the world stage as well. Now the world’s most populous nation and fifth-largest economy, India positioned itself as the voice of the Global South in international forums. During 2025, Indian diplomacy bridged East and West: for instance, New Delhi maintained cordial ties with Washington but also refused to join Western sanctions on Russia, insisting on strategic autonomy. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India took on leadership roles in forums like the G20 (where the African Union’s admission this year, strongly backed by India and China, symbolized a more inclusive order) and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Indian officials frequently echoed calls for multipolarity, arguing that “as major developing countries, both China and India hope to achieve world multipolarity” and must strengthen cooperation to reform global governanceglobaltimes.cn. Notably, India played host to a Global South Summit in early 2025 that brought together over 120 developing nations to coordinate positions ahead of U.N. and G20 meetings – a clear effort to present a united southern front on issues from debt relief to climate finance.

Crucially, China and India worked together within BRICS to challenge Western dominance of finance and trade architecture. A landmark achievement of the 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro was agreement on mechanisms to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar in international tradeglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. BRICS finance ministers announced the formation of a technical committee to study a potential joint currency or unit of account for the blocglobaltimes.cn. While a full “BRICS currency” remains a distant goal, the member states made concrete progress on de-dollarization: by 2025, China and Russia were conducting over 80% of their bilateral trade in yuan and rubles rather than dollarsglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn, and Brazil had sealed a pact with China to use yuan-real for all trade, bypassing the dollar entirelyglobaltimes.cn. Even India – traditionally cautious about challenging the dollar – began allowing its biggest refiner to purchase Russian crude oil in Chinese yuanglobaltimes.cn. These steps, coupled with the New Development Bank (BRICS’ own multilateral lender) raising the share of loans it issues in local currencies, show an accelerating “weaving of a non-dollar web” in global commerceglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn.

Strategically, both Asian giants also expanded their regional leadership. China took a lead role in mediating conflicts and fostering new security alignments in Asia. It notably helped de-escalate border tensions between longtime rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia (having brokered their diplomatic rapprochement in 2023) and supported peace talks in civil strife-torn Myanmar. India, meanwhile, projected influence across the Indian Ocean and into Africa – for example, investing in East African port projects and security cooperation with Indian Ocean island states. In South Asia, India’s economic weight made it a de facto guarantor for smaller neighbors’ stability (such as Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring). Both countries also found common cause in calling out Western hypocrisy on climate and trade. At U.N. climate negotiations, China and India led the G77 in demanding that the U.S. and EU deliver on climate finance pledges, arguing it was unjust for the West to expect developing nations to curb growth without adequate support.

It was not all smooth sailing: China and India still have a thorny bilateral relationship, marked by an unresolved Himalayan border dispute and competition for influence. Yet, pragmatism largely prevailed in 2025. As a Global Times editorial observed, “strengthening interaction [between China and India] is a rational choice in a multipolar world”globaltimes.cn. And indeed, at BRICS and other forums, New Delhi and Beijing found alignment on broad objectives: defending national sovereignty norms, pushing U.N. reform to give the Global South a greater voice, and developing alternative economic institutions not dominated by Washington. The rise of China and India thus went hand in hand with the rise of BRICS as a geopolitical force. With BRICS nations now spanning Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia, the group’s clout in agenda-setting grew. Collectively, BRICS pressed for “true multilateralism” as opposed to Western-led “clubs,” emphasizing that international rules should not be dictated by a single bloc’s interestsglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. By year’s end, analysts noted that the “Global South is now leading” in shaping key global debatesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn – from reforming the World Bank/IMF (where BRICS countries demanded fairer representation) to establishing technology standards and supply chains outside Western control.

The ascent of these Asian powers – working in concert at times – has undeniably shifted perceptions. Western commentators fretted that Washington’s post-Cold War dominance is steadily eroding as Beijing and New Delhi gain prominence. But from the viewpoint of much of the world, 2025’s trends were encouraging: power is becoming more diffused, and voices outside the Euro-Atlantic are finally being heard. As one Global South scholar wrote, this is “the embodiment of humanity’s collective hope for a world order that respects dignity, diversity and the planet”globaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. In other words, the rise of China, India, and their BRICS partners is seen as fostering a more inclusive multipolar world, one not only about great-power rivalry but about elevating the development priorities of billions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Whether this nascent multipolar order delivers on its promise of justice and stability remains to be seen. But 2025 made one thing clear: the era of uncontested Western dominance is ending, and new centers of power are ready to assume a leading role in global affairs.

Trump’s Second Term Turmoil: US Credibility Crumbles

The January 2025 inauguration of President Donald Trump for a second term ushered in a tumultuous year for American governance – one marked by policy whiplash, infighting, and a precipitous decline in U.S. global credibility. Campaigning on an “America First” platform redux, Trump wasted no time reversing many of his predecessor’s policies and asserting a more unilateralist, even isolationist, U.S. stance abroad. The result, as seen from allies and adversaries alike, was incoherent governance in Washington – a mix of bellicose threats, abrupt U-turns, and ad-hoc dealmaking that left other nations unsure where America stood. By year’s end, the consensus among foreign policy observers (including some in the U.S.) was that America’s international standing had deteriorated markedly under Trump’s erratic leadershippewresearch.orgre-russia.net.

One stark illustration came with the release of Trump’s new National Security Strategy (NSS), which startled even America’s closest allies in Europe. The NSS – unveiled in November – espoused a throwback neo-isolationism, focusing U.S. attention on the Western Hemisphere and framing traditional European partners as nearly an afterthought. It warned bluntly that Europe faced “civilizational decline” and lambasted EU nations for “failing to end the war in Ukraine” and not controlling their internal problemsglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. In an extraordinary public rebuke of allies, President Trump gave an interview accusing Europe of “decaying” and free-riding on U.S. security commitmentsglobaltimes.cn. Such rhetoric ruptured the veneer of transatlantic unity. European leaders bristled: Germany’s new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, blasted parts of the U.S. strategy as “unacceptable” and cautioned that Europe “must prepare to manage on its own”globaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Indeed, Trump’s withering criticism “cast a shadow over the continent,” exposing “unprecedented cracks in transatlantic relations,” according to observers in Brusselsglobaltimes.cn. Long-standing U.S. allies in NATO found themselves questioning Washington’s reliability. Was this the same America that once championed the alliance’s unity? In 2025, it seemed not.

Beyond Europe, Trump’s unorthodox approach sowed confusion and distrust. On the one hand, he talked of ending “forever wars” and pushed Ukraine into a ceasefire (as detailed earlier), positioning himself as a dealmaker for peace. On the other hand, his administration opened new fronts of aggression (for instance, against Venezuela) and ratcheted up confrontation with perceived adversaries like Iran and China in unpredictable ways. Foreign diplomats privately complained that U.S. policy could zigzag from one extreme to another on a whim – often via the President’s late-night social media pronouncements. The State Department and Pentagon frequently appeared out of sync, reflecting rival factions in Trump’s team (populist isolationists versus hawkish hardliners). This policy incoherence eroded America’s aura of leadership. Even allies in Asia-Pacific, while welcoming U.S. security presence, quietly started hedging bets – engaging China more – because they feared Washington might abruptly pull back or push them into conflict.

Quantitatively, global opinion of the U.S. under Trump II plummeted. A Pew Research Center survey across 24 countries mid-2025 found that in 19 of those countries, a majority of the public has little or no confidence in Trump’s leadership in world affairspewresearch.orgpewresearch.org. Words like “arrogant” and “dangerous” were most commonly associated with him, and majorities in most nations doubted his competence on issues from climate change to handling international conflictspewresearch.orgpewresearch.org. Strikingly, U.S. favorability ratings fell significantly in 15 countries compared to just a year prior, including a 20+ point drop in close allies like Canada and Swedenpewresearch.org. In Western Europe, confidence in Trump was only somewhat higher than during his first term (2017–2020), and still far lower than the ratings Europeans gave President Bidenpewresearch.org. A global median of just one-third of people trusted Trump to do the right thing internationallyglobaltimes.cnpewresearch.org. As the Global Times, a Chinese outlet, noted pointedly: “The US’ increasingly unilateral behavior… has led to a sharp decline in its prestige and credibility”globaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Even many Americans acknowledge this reputational hit. Far from “Making America Great Again” in the eyes of the world, Trump’s governance style appeared to be isolating the United States and diminishing its soft power.

All this translated into concrete strategic consequences. In Europe, Trump’s berating of NATO partners and refusal to fully back Ukraine pushed EU nations to explore greater strategic autonomy – essentially planning for a future where the U.S. might not be a dependable allypresstv.irglobaltimes.cn. In the Middle East, U.S. credibility as a mediator was nil; Washington was seen as green-lighting Israeli excesses in Gaza and had zero role in ceasefire negotiations, which instead fell to actors like Qatar and Egypt. In the Asia-Pacific, countries nervously watched U.S. dealings with China: Trump imposed new rounds of tariffs on Chinese goods (resurrecting the trade war) and sent mixed signals on Taiwan, at times provoking Beijing and at others claiming he’d struck “the greatest deal” with Xi (though no evidence of any grand bargain materialized, to allies’ bafflement). Such unpredictability made regional states question U.S. steadiness in a crisis. Japan and South Korea, while still allied with Washington, quietly opened back-channel talks with Beijing to insure against an American stumble. Across Latin America, Trump’s aggressive stance on leftist governments (from Cuba to Venezuela) revived memories of Yanqui meddling; Mexico, Argentina, and others distanced themselves from U.S. initiatives.

Meanwhile, at home, governance was chaotic. The Trump White House cycled through key officials at a dizzying rate (by September, Trump was on his third National Security Advisor of the year). Partisan battles led to a brief federal government shutdown in October, further tarnishing the image of U.S. stabilitypresstv.ir. Domestic turmoil – including ongoing congressional investigations into Trump’s personal legal issues – consumed bandwidth that might have been used for international leadership. The overall picture was an America absorbed in its own divisions and led by a mercurial president who often shunned multilateral cooperation. This did not go unnoticed abroad. European public opinion polls in late 2025 showed majorities in countries like France and Germany viewing the U.S. as unreliable or even a destabilizing force internationallyglobaltimes.cnpewresearch.org. Confidence in U.S. global leadership reached near post-WWII lows.

By year’s end, many analysts concluded that Trump’s second term had accelerated an ongoing trend: the decline of U.S. hegemony. Allies were openly speaking of life “after Pax Americana”, hedging their bets between East and West. Rivals were more brazen – Russia and China certainly capitalized on the leadership vacuum. And non-aligned powers in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America felt emboldened to assert independent policies without fearing U.S. retribution as before. The world’s policeman appeared not only reluctant but also inconsistent and internally conflicted. In sum, 2025 under Trump confirmed what one Asia Times commentator dubbed the “Price of Unpredictability”: America’s friends and foes alike saw the superpower as less credible, less cohesive, and less commanding than at any point in recent memoryforeignaffairs.comglobaltimes.cn. While the U.S. remains a formidable military and economic power, its ability to lead by example or by consensus was dramatically undermined – a development that has accelerated the tilt toward a multipolar world.

Washington’s Warpath in Venezuela: Blockades and “Narco-Terror” Strikes

In a year when U.S. foreign policy often appeared disengaged or erratic elsewhere, one region felt a very direct – and violent – focus of the Trump administration’s attention: Venezuela. The oil-rich South American nation, long at odds with Washington, became the target of a dramatic U.S. military campaign in late 2025 that critics likened to a low-intensity war. Under the banner of combating drug cartels and “narco-terrorism,” the United States launched a series of lethal strikes at sea, imposed a naval blockade, and even seized vessels in international waters – all actions that inflicted civilian casualties and infrastructure damage in Venezuela and its environs.

The campaign intensified through the latter half of the year. In early September, President Trump gave the green light to Joint Task Force “Southern Spear” to use force against suspected narcotics shipments allegedly linked to Venezuela. What followed was unprecedented: U.S. drones, helicopters, and patrol aircraft began tracking and destroying small boats and ships in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean, often without warning. The U.S. Defense Secretary, former Navy SEAL Pete Hegseth, touted these as “lethal kinetic strikes on vessels operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations”presstv.irpresstv.ir. In practice, many of the targets were go-fast boats and fishing vessels the U.S. claimed were moving cocaine – but the strikes frequently resulted in all aboard being killed, with no due process or opportunity to surrender. By mid-December, the Pentagon acknowledged at least two dozen such strikes since September, with a death toll of at least 99 people – most of them killed in international waters off Venezuela’s coastpresstv.irpresstv.ir. Human rights observers raised alarms that innocent fishermen or coerced traffickers were being summarily executed from the air. One particularly egregious incident saw a U.S. aircraft, after disabling a boat, fire on survivors clinging to floating debris, killing two injured men – a act widely condemned as a possible war crimepresstv.irpresstv.ir.

Image: U.S. Southern Command released footage of a so called “narco-terror” boat being targeted by American forces in the Eastern Pacific, December 2025. The Trump administration’s campaign has reportedly killed nearly 100 people in maritime strikes since Septemberpresstv.ir.

President Trump defended the offensive unabashedly. In mid-December, he stood before cameras and declared the U.S. was engaged in an “armed conflict with the drug cartels,” likening them to ISIS and Al-Qaeda. He accused Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro of turning his country into a narco-state and vowed to “smash” any networks threatening the U.S. with illicit drugs. On December 17, Trump took the extraordinary step of declaring a naval blockade on Venezuela – announcing that all sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers would be prevented from entering or leaving the country’s portspresstv.irpresstv.ir. This blockade, enforced by U.S. Navy warships and coast guard cutters, sharply escalated the economic warfare on Caracas, essentially cutting off Venezuela’s primary source of revenue (oil exports) by force. Under the blockade, at least one Venezuela-flagged tanker was boarded and seized by U.S. forces, prompting outrage from Caracas. President Maduro lambasted the move as proof that Washington’s real aim was “regime change, not drug control,” and that the U.S. sought to “turn Venezuela into its colony”presstv.irpresstv.ir. He noted that the U.S. had simultaneously assembled its largest regional military presence in decades – including carrier strike groups and thousands of troops on exercises in nearby Guyana and the Caribbean – suggesting an invasion was being contemplatedpresstv.ir.

Inside the U.S., a few voices of caution emerged. Some lawmakers in Congress – including libertarian Republicans and progressive Democrats – questioned the legal basis for what essentially looked like an undeclared war in the eastern Pacific. They pointed out that Congress had not authorized any use of force in Venezuela, and that killing foreign nationals on the high seas in peacetime could violate both U.S. and international law. These concerns led the House of Representatives to vote on measures to limit Trump’s Venezuela aggression, but in November those measures were narrowly defeated amid partisan divisionspresstv.ir. Meanwhile, human rights groups demanded transparency. They pressed Secretary Hegseth to release video from the strikes (especially the controversial September 2 incident), but he flatly refused, even as global criticism mountedpresstv.ir. The administration insisted everything was within the bounds of “lawful warfare” – a claim many legal experts contested given the lack of a clear armed-conflict legal framework for attacking civilian boats.

The impacts on Venezuelan civilians were severe. The naval blockade caused petrol and diesel shortages inland, crippling transport and agriculture. Repair parts for the electrical grid and water systems – many of which Venezuela imported – were delayed or blocked, worsening an already dire humanitarian situation stemming from years of sanctions. And while Trump’s team touted the strikes as successful (they claimed tons of drugs were intercepted), Venezuelan officials said the U.S. attacks often hit legitimate fishing boats and cost innocent lives. Even some regional neighbors voiced disapproval. Mexico and Argentina at the U.N. raised concerns about the precedent set by attacking vessels without due process. CARICOM (Caribbean community) nations worried the aggressive U.S. actions in their waters could endanger their own citizens. The Organization of American States was largely mute (reflecting U.S. influence), but CARICOM and the ALBA bloc of leftist Latin countries called emergency meetings to discuss the crisis.

Geopolitically, Trump’s Venezuela offensive further isolated Washington in Latin America. The timing was noted: it coincided with political shifts in the region. By 2025, left-leaning governments held power in a majority of Latin America’s largest countries – Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile – many of whom expressed sympathy for Venezuela’s sovereignty even if they had differences with Maduro. These countries refused to join any U.S. “coalition” against Venezuela. In the U.N. General Assembly, a resolution condemning unilateral force and blockades (clearly aimed at the U.S. campaign) was introduced by the Group of 77 and China – it garnered over 120 votes in favor, though the U.S. vetoed binding action in the Security Council. The Net effect was a further loss of U.S. moral authority. As one Latin American diplomat put it, the U.S. seemed to be re-running the 1989 Panama playbook (when Bush invaded Panama) in slow motion – “but Latin America of 2025 is not the Latin America of the 1980s”, he said, noting that many countries now openly resist U.S. dictates.

Notably, Trump’s own Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, in an off-message moment, admitted to Vanity Fair that the maritime strikes were indeed part of a broader plan to weaken and oust Maduro’s governmentpresstv.irpresstv.ir. This corroborated what Maduro and others alleged: that the war on “narco-terror” was a pretext to achieve through force what the U.S. had failed to accomplish via economic sanctions and failed coup attempts in previous years. By year’s end, Venezuela remained defiant. Maduro, bolstered by continued support from allies like Cuba, Iran, and to an extent Russia (which sent a few shipments of fuel and food despite the blockade), declared that the U.S. “will simply never” succeed in recolonizing Venezuelapresstv.ir. However, the humanitarian toll on the Venezuelan people was undeniable, raising tough questions about international law and the limits of American power. As the Press TV network bluntly concluded, “Washington’s real objective is regime change”, and in pursuit of that, the U.S. exhibited a “warmongering and colonialist pretense” that global opinion strongly criticizedpresstv.irpresstv.ir.

Europe’s Decline: Ukraine Policy Blowback and Internal Fractures

For the European Union, 2025 was a sobering year of political and economic decline that called into question Europe’s global relevance in the emerging multipolar order. Having tied its fortunes closely to the U.S.-led strategy on Ukraine, the EU found itself bruised by the outcome of the conflict and riven with internal divisions. The prolonged Ukraine war – which Europe helped finance and fuel with arms – exacted a heavy price on EU economies while yielding none of the intended results. Instead of a humbled Russia and a secure Eastern Europe, the EU got a frozen conflict on its border, a resurgent Moscow, and “a costly lesson in realpolitik” about the limits of its influenceglobaltimes.cn. Meanwhile, the sanctions blowback and energy crunch from the war pummeled Europe’s industrial base and drove inflation to record levels, just as social cohesion frayed under waves of political fragmentation.

By abandoning its initial hard-line stance and acquiescing to a negotiated peace that favored Russia, Europe implicitly acknowledged a strategic failure. As Press TV reported, by late 2025 European leaders accepted a U.S. peace framework that required recognizing Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories as fait accompli, because they saw no other choice in an “endless and devastating war with the Russian bear”presstv.ir. This capitulation undermined the EU’s credibility enormously – especially in Eastern European member states like Poland and the Baltics, which had trusted Brussels’ resolve. NATO’s inability to deliver a victory (or even a stalemate on favorable terms) for Ukraine also shattered transatlantic unity. The once-solid front between Washington and European capitals developed visible cracks: Western European powers like France and Germany became anxious to end the war to relieve economic strain, even if it meant pressuring Kyiv into painful concessionspresstv.irpresstv.ir. Eastern members felt betrayed by that pragmatism. The result was an EU more internally strained than at any time since the 2015 migrant crisis or even the Brexit saga.

Economically, the EU entered a period of stagnation. The loss of cheap Russian natural gas – pillar of German and Central European industry – had driven energy costs sky-high in 2023-2024. By 2025, the promised alternatives (LNG from the U.S., renewables, etc.) still could not fully cushion the blow. Europe’s growth flatlined; Germany narrowly avoided recession thanks only to government subsidies, while countries like Italy and Hungary saw their economies contract. “Europe is enduring a prolonged period of low growth,” observed China’s Global Times, noting that external crises (like Ukraine) and internal flaws combined to sap Europe’s economic vitalityglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Inflation in the eurozone spiked to levels not seen in decades, fueled by energy and defense spending. Meanwhile, the massive costs of supporting Ukraine – tens of billions in aid and the expense of replenishing depleted military stockpiles – strained national budgets. Despite the fanfare of EU unity for Ukraine, by late 2025 several governments were openly balking at new funding for Kyiv. A Brussels summit in December to arrange €50+ billion in long-term aid nearly collapsed, with arguments that Europe’s own reconstruction (post-COVID, post-energy shock) should take priority. As Press TV put it, Europe faced “a shortage of funds” for both supporting Ukraine and rearming itself; its finances were “already straining” under the weight of crisesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. The fundamental post-Cold War assumption – that Europe could afford both butter and guns in limitless quantity – was shattered.

Politically, 2025 saw social fragmentation intensify across Europe, feeding the rise of anti-establishment forces. The cost-of-living crisis – energy bills, food prices – ignited frequent street protests from Prague to Paris. Voters vented their anger at mainstream parties seen as out-of-touch or too subservient to Washington’s policies. In multiple EU states, far-right populist parties (some sympathetic to Russia or hostile to continued Ukraine aid) surged in polls. For instance, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany hit record popularity, while Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France capitalized on discontent with President Macron’s international priorities. “European citizens no longer buy into the ‘values wars’ touted by mainstream politicians,” wrote one analysis, noting people “bear the brunt of the energy crisis, soaring inflation and declining living standards” while elites lecture about abstract principlesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. This “democratic deficit” – a yawning gap between EU policy and public sentiment – widened dangerouslyglobaltimes.cn. Trust in national governments eroded, and identification with the EU project diminished. Eastern Europe, too, saw democratic backsliding and defiance of Brussels: Poland and Hungary, already at odds with the EU on rule-of-law issues, dug in further, emboldened by what they viewed as an EU leadership vacuum and hypocrisy (e.g. Brussels preaching rule of law but cozying up to regimes like HTS-ruled Syria for geopolitics).

Europe’s strategic impotence was most embarrassingly displayed in the Middle East. As Gaza burned under Israeli bombardment, European states were deeply divided on how to respond. Some smaller nations (Ireland, Belgium, etc.) condemned Israeli actions and called for ceasefire; but heavyweights like Germany felt constrained by guilt and U.S. pressure to support Israel publicly. The EU as a bloc could say very little of substance – a paralysis that diminished its moral standing globally. Meanwhile, Europe’s pretensions to being a diplomatic power-broker – for example in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program or mediating in African conflicts – were largely sidelined by more assertive actors (Russia, China, regional powers).

Within the EU, the structure of decision-making itself showed strain. The requirement for unanimous agreement on major issues (sanctions, budgetary moves, enlargement, etc.) led to paralysis or lowest-common-denominator outcomesglobaltimes.cn. For example, Hungary single-handedly held up an EU aid tranche to Ukraine for months, demanding unrelated concessions. On admitting new members (like Ukraine’s own EU candidacy), unity was lacking. This institutional inertia, combined with divergent national interests, led a Chinese professor to quip that Europe “finds itself in a predicament where pulling on one thread unravels the entire tapestry”globaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn – meaning every major decision risked exposing internal contradictions.

Perhaps most worrying for Brussels is the loss of global influence. Once a trendsetter in trade and regulatory policy, the EU in 2025 found itself largely reacting to agendas set by others. “Europe’s hard power and influence… are diminishing,” concluded the Global Times, citing how the EU struggled to respond to simultaneous internal and external challengesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. The United States, under Trump, sidelined Europe on key issues (making deals with Russia over Europe’s head, as seen in the Ukraine settlement negotiations run via Washington and Berlinpresstv.ir). In the Global South, Europe’s stock hit a nadir – its alignment with U.S. sanctions and its perceived neocolonial attitude (especially France’s troubles in Africa) alienated many developing countries. A telling metric: when the U.N. voted on resolutions critical of Western positions (like over Palestine or Russia’s sanctions), more countries than ever before either abstained or supported the non-West line, ignoring European exhortations. The EU’s soft power – its claim to moral high ground, democratic values, economic allure – has taken a beating in an era of rising authoritarian capitalism (exemplified by China) and Western missteps.

Yet, amid the gloomy assessments, some Europeans began charting a path forward. The events of 2025 gave momentum to voices calling for “strategic autonomy” – the idea that Europe must be able to act independently of the U.S. “Pressured by fragile defense frailties, political fractures and a stalling economy, [Europe] has embarked on profound self-examination,” one commentator observedglobaltimes.cn. President Macron of France (fresh off facing domestic unrest) and Chancellor Merz of Germany convened an extraordinary EU council on defense union. There, proposals were floated for joint EU military units and even a European Nuclear Deterrent (via French forces) to reduce reliance on the U.S. NATO remained, but Europeans signaled interest in a parallel security structure under EU control. Furthermore, Europe started rethinking its posture toward emerging powers. Recognizing it could not afford a new Cold War with China, the EU began cautiously rebuilding ties with Beijing. “Europe must carefully consider its relationship with China,” urged Global Times, advising Europe to balance its U.S. ties with a more pragmatic, “complementary cooperation” with Chinaglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn. Indeed, late in the year the EU sent its first delegation to Beijing to discuss investment and technology cooperation since relations soured – a tentative step toward strategic rebalancing.

Still, the road ahead is fraught. As former British PM Tony Blair bluntly warned in December, if the EU does not reform drastically, it risks global irrelevance in the new orderreuters.com. The collapse of its Ukraine strategy and the centrifugal forces pulling at its unity make that warning salient. In 2025, the European Union – long seen as a pillar of the liberal international order – appeared more as a cautionary tale of a bloc caught in transition: overstretched externally, undercoordinated internally. Whether it can renewal through integration and autonomy, or whether it declines into second-tier status on the world stage, remains one of the pressing questions as the multipolar era dawns.

Africa’s Anti-Colonial Turn: Ousting France and Embracing Sovereignty

Across Africa, 2025 was a year of empowerment and pushback – a continent-wide assertion of sovereignty that saw the expulsion of French influence from several former colonies and a bold drive toward Pan-African solidarity. This trend, building for years, reached a crescendo as one African nation after another severed military ties with Paris, ending decades (in some cases over a century) of neo-colonial dominance. In West and Central Africa especially, the message was unmistakable: the era of “Françafrique” – France’s post-colonial sphere of influence – is over.

The shift was dramatic. By 2025, six West African countries – Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and notably this year, Chad and Ivory Coast – had cut defense cooperation with France and demanded French troops departaljazeera.comaljazeera.com. In quick succession, long-standing French military bases were shut down. In February, France officially withdrew from its last base in Ivory Coast, a country once considered a cornerstone of French West Africapresstv.irpresstv.ir. A ceremonial handover in Abidjan saw the Ivorian flag raised over the base as French forces left, ending a continuous presence that dated back to Ivory Coast’s independence in 1960presstv.irpresstv.ir. French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu, presiding over the exit, admitted “the world is changing… our military relationship should change”presstv.ir. But in truth, the change was imposed on Paris by a wave of African “frexit” – a regional rejection of foreign garrisons. Chad, France’s staunchest ally in the Sahel, delivered an even bigger shock when its government announced on its Independence Day that it was ending all French military cooperationvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu. French troops that had been stationed in Chad for over 6 decades were told to pack up. And in Senegal, a new president – swept to power on a wave of youth discontent – declared it “obvious” that French soldiers would no longer be welcome on Senegalese soil eithervocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu.

By year’s end, French soldiers had been expelled or asked to leave from over 70% of their bases in Africapresstv.irpresstv.ir. From the large Sahelian outposts of Mali and Niger to coastal Senegal and Ivory Coast, the footprint of France’s once-formidable Operation Barkhane and related missions was nearly erased. Only two significant French deployments remained: about 1,500 troops in Djibouti (in the Horn of Africa) and a small force in Gabon, Central Africapresstv.ir. Those too faced uncertain futures as local sentiment grew impatient with any vestiges of foreign militarism. As a senior analyst Mucahid Durmaz observed, “Chad’s decision marks the final nail in the coffin of France’s post-colonial military dominance in the entire Sahel region”, reflecting a “wider structural transformation” in Africa’s engagement with Francevocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu. In plainer terms, France’s influence – political, military, economic – in its former African colonies has never been weaker than it is now.

What drove this sweeping change? Fundamentally, African populations and new leaders demanded sovereignty and dignity. Years of frustration had built up: French military interventions had not quelled the Islamist insurgencies plaguing the Sahel, economies remained tied to old colonial-era currencies (like the CFA franc), and political elites propped up by France were seen as corrupt and repressive. A younger generation of Africans, connected via social media, helped ignite mass protests with chants like “France dégage!” (“France get out!”). In 2025, these sentiments were translated into policy by governments – especially military juntas that took power in Mali (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023). These juntas rode populist anger to justify ejecting ambassadors and troops of the former colonial power. Even in more democratic states like Senegal and Ivory Coast, incumbent leaders pivoted to anti-French positions to maintain legitimacy in the face of public pressure and opposition gainsaljazeera.comaljazeera.com. Ivory Coast’s President Alassane Ouattara, long regarded as Paris-friendly, surprised many by announcing that French forces must withdraw because the Ivorian army is “now effective” and can handle security itselfaljazeera.comaljazeera.com. Analysts noted Ouattara likely also acted to steal the thunder of anti-French rivals ahead of elections, but whatever the motive, the outcome was clear – France was out.

The eviction of France also had an economic and symbolic dimension. Several countries moved to reclaim control over natural resources that had been dominated by French companies. Mali, for instance, revoked a French multinational’s gold mining license and invited firms from Russia and China instead. Niger, a major uranium producer, renegotiated terms with France’s Orano company amid accusations that France’s decades of mining amounted to “mass crimes” against the Nigerien peoplepresstv.irpresstv.ir. Such steps are part of a broader push to finally “decolonize” African economies – whether through establishing new currencies, diversifying trade partners, or asserting better terms for resource extraction.

The Pan-African sovereignty movement also manifested in greater cooperation among African nations themselves. Notably, the three Sahel countries under military rule – Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – formed a defensive alliance (the Liptako-Gourma Charter) pledging mutual support against external aggression or internal destabilization. When ECOWAS (the West African regional bloc) – prodded by France and the U.S. – threatened military intervention to reverse Niger’s July 2023 coup, not only did Mali and Burkina warn they’d fight in Niger’s defense, but Nigeria’s public strongly opposed their own government’s participation. ECOWAS ultimately backed down from intervention, illustrating how Western influence via African proxies has waned. Meanwhile, the African Union showed new assertiveness on the global stage. In 2025, the African Union gained a seat at the G20 table (as a permanent member), a development championed by India and China to ensure Africa’s voice is heard in major economic decisions. African leaders used that platform to press for reforms in global finance and climate funding, often in concert with BRICS partners.

Indeed, Africa gravitated toward the multipolar ethos. Many African states deepened ties with China, Russia, Turkey, and others as alternatives to Western patrons. China is now the largest trading partner and investor for most of Africa, financing infrastructure without the political strings Western aid often carried. Russia has expanded security ties – the Wagner Group, though mired in controversy, provided training and support that some regimes found valuable after kicking out French forces. As one West African analyst put it, “They want to explore options with Russia, China, Turkey and other powers” because ties with France “have not benefited the population”vocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu. Even Middle Eastern players like the UAE stepped in – for example, reportedly offering Chad security aid after it expelled the French, showing that Africans are actively diversifying partnershipsvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu.

A palpable sense of Pan-Africanism also re-emerged. Across borders, Africans cheered each other’s moves to reclaim sovereignty. When Niger expelled the French ambassador and troops in 2023, supportive rallies were held in Mali and Burkina Faso. In 2025, as Ivory Coast joined the “French troops go home” club, many across Francophone Africa hailed it as a collective victory. Social media buzzed with slogans of African unity, and cultural exchanges (through music, film, and academic forums) stressed shared identity over colonial languages or divisions. The refrain “African solutions to African problems” gained substance: from mediating regional conflicts to joint military exercises like the “African Shield 2025” that brought together forces from 10 countries (with no Western advisers involved) for disaster response and counterterror drills.

Of course, challenges remain. The security vacuum left by departing foreign forces has in some places been filled by instability. The Sahel’s jihadist insurgencies did not disappear with France’s exit; in fact, extremist attacks rose in Mali and Burkina in 2025, testing the capacity of local armiesvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cuvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu. Some critics argue that Russia or China could become new hegemons if Africa is not careful, swapping one dependency for another. But for many Africans, the immediate focus is on breaking the cycle of foreign domination. The symbolism of raising national flags over former foreign bases – as seen in Abidjan and N’Djamena – is powerful. It feeds a sense of pride and possibility: that African nations, by uniting and asserting themselves, can chart an independent course.

In summary, 2025 will be remembered as the year Africa’s post-colonial second independence truly accelerated. The strengthening of Pan-African sovereignty is evident in the way African states stood up to former metropoles, coordinated in multilateral forums, and amplified their collective voice for fairness in the international system. As Press TV noted, “the French withdrawal… reflects a broader shift in West Africa’s ties with Paris amid rising anti-French sentiment”, part of a continental trend of reclaiming agencypresstv.irpresstv.ir. In the larger multipolar narrative, Africa’s rise is essential: with 1.3 billion people and vast resources, the continent’s liberation from neo-colonial influence means a more balanced world. African nations are no longer content to be pawns in others’ games; they seek to be players in their own right. If this momentum holds, Africa’s renaissance will be a cornerstone of the emerging multipolar order – fulfilling the dreams of early pan-Africanists that a free, united Africa can stand equal among the world’s powers.

Conclusion: The New World Taking Shape

From the steppes of Ukraine to the streets of West Africa, the events of 2025 together paint a tableau of a world in transition. The unipolar moment of U.S. and Western primacy is fading, giving way to a multipolar order defined by a diverse set of powerful actors and regional blocs. This year, a resurgent Russia bluntly demonstrated that NATO’s will can be thwarted. An emboldened Iran and its allies showed that even a U.S.-backed regional hegemon like Israel could be held to account for its actions, at least in the court of global opinion. China and India underscored that economic and diplomatic leadership no longer emanates only from the West – the Global South is increasingly setting its own agenda. And across developing nations, from Latin America’s defiance of Washington’s interventions to Africa’s expulsion of European troops, there is a clear demand for sovereign equality and respect, not paternalism.

None of this is to romanticize the multipolar world as automatically peaceful or just. Indeed, 2025 also witnessed horrific bloodshed and new dangers. The collapse of old arrangements can breed instability, as seen in Syria’s turmoil after regime change or the security gaps in the Sahel after French withdrawals. Multipolarity is not a panacea; it means more centers of decision-making, which can complicate efforts to address global challenges like climate change or pandemics. But what is evident is that hegemony is being challenged on all fronts. Western powers, especially the United States and European Union, face a stark reckoning with their own shortcomings and overextensions. As even European leaders admitted, the West must adapt to a world where it “faces the risk of civilizational decline” if it fails to renew itselfglobaltimes.cn. The alternative – embracing true multilateral cooperation on the basis of mutual respect – is ironically what Western nations had long preached but not always practiced. Now, they are being held to those ideals by rising counterparts.

For the first time in generations, multiple civilizational poles – Eurasian, South Asian, Middle Eastern, African, Latin American – are asserting their interests in a way that constrains unilateral power. This “multipolar moment,” born through the trials and tragedies of 2025, could lead to a more balanced international system if managed wisely. It could force reforms in institutions like the UN Security Council and Bretton Woods financial system to be more inclusive. It could temper the impulse of any one nation to act as the world’s policeman, knowing that others can and will push back. Certainly, the Global South’s leadership, as seen in BRICS and other forums, is pushing for an order where development needs and historical justice take center stageglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn.

The key moving forward will be whether major powers avoid turning multipolar competition into a zero-sum contest. The spirit of 2025’s resistance – whether Ukraine’s survival instinct, Gaza’s steadfastness, or Africa’s unity – was ultimately about dignity and equality. If that lesson is heeded, a multipolar world could be more equitable and stable than the unipolar or bipolar eras of the past. As of the end of 2025, at least, the world has unmistakably entered a new chapter: one in which Western hegemony is no longer taken for granted, and multiple voices now write the narrative of international relations. The birth of this multipolar order has been painful, but in the eyes of many nations long marginalized, it is the overdue “rebalancing…of the world based on mutual respect” that figures like Medvedev proclaimedgroups.google.comgroups.google.com. The task ahead will be turning that proclamation into a lived reality – forging a just peace in Ukraine, real freedom for Palestine, genuine partnership with Africa, and shared prosperity rather than new great-power rivalries. The story of 2025 shows both the promise and the peril on that path, and the world will be watching how these developments unfold in the years to come.

Sources: The analysis draws on diverse independent media reports and expert commentary, including Press TV (Iran) for on-the-ground perspectives in West Asia and Latin Americapresstv.irpresstv.ir, RT (Russia) for viewpoints on the Ukraine conflict and EU politicsgroups.google.comgroups.google.com, Global Times (China) for insights on multipolar trends and European challengesglobaltimes.cnglobaltimes.cn, as well as regional outlets like Al Mayadeen and Prensa Latina for Africa’s post-colonial developmentsvocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cupresstv.ir. These non-Western sources corroborate the major events and help illuminate the growing consensus in much of the world that 2025 marked a decisive break from Western-centric narratives toward a more multipolar reality.

The post 2025: The Birth of a Multipolar World Order appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

This report examines the likelihood of a world war erupting soon (particularly in the next year), explores multiple viewpoints (Western and BRICS alike), draws historical analogies to past pre-war periods, and considers whether the world has passed the point of peace or if de-escalation is still achievable. The aim is to provide a comprehensive, balanced analysis of how close we truly are to World War III and what its outcomes might entail.

Escalating Conflicts: Flashpoints for a Global War

Multiple regional flashpoints today carry global significance. Any of these conflicts – or a combination of them – could spiral into a broader war involving the major powers. As one analysis bluntly put it, “any major war will almost certainly result from the tensions between five major players: Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and the United States”[1]. Below we examine the key theaters and how they interconnect:

The Ukraine–Russia War: Europe’s Powder Keg

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered decades of relative peace in Europe and raised the specter of direct NATO-Russia confrontation. Thus far, NATO countries have limited their involvement to arming and supporting Ukraine, but the risk of escalation is ever-present. Russian forces have periodically tested NATO’s resolve with incidents like drone incursions into Polish and Romanian territory and fighter jets violating Baltic airspace[2][3]. Each incident carries the danger of miscalculation – a Russian strike that accidentally hits a NATO member could trigger the Alliance’s mutual defense clause and spark direct conflict. Indeed, officials in frontline NATO states have warned that they are at their “closest to open conflict since the Second World War,” as Poland’s prime minister said after a series of airspace violations[4]. Western intelligence also believes Moscow is preparing for a wider war. In late 2024, the head of Germany’s BND intelligence service cautioned that “Russia is preparing for a war with the West”[5], indicating that NATO is laying contingency plans for scenarios ranging from an all-out shooting war to shadowy hybrid attacks. For many in Eastern Europe, Russian expansionism is not a distant hypothetical but a real, immediate threat[6].

Should Russia directly attack any NATO territory, it would force the alliance into all-out war, with Russia likely calling on its partners to join a global fight[7]. This is the nightmare scenario: NATO’s vast military (including the U.S.) clashing head-on with a nuclear-armed Russia. Analysts have voiced concern that the world could “sleepwalk its way into an engulfing conflict” if Kremlin aggression goes unchecked[8]. However, some experts believe Moscow might not launch a blatant invasion of NATO territory; instead, Russia could pursue ambiguous gray-zone actions intended to divide and weaken the Alliance[9]. Even so, with Russia ramping up production of long-range hypersonic missiles capable of reaching across Europe and the Western Hemisphere[10], the European theater remains extremely volatile. Eastern European nations are fortifying defenses and bracing for the worst, as evidenced by several Baltic states withdrawing from a landmine-ban treaty to remilitarize their borders[11]. In summary, the Ukraine war has already drawn in NATO indirectly, and any further escalation – deliberate or accidental – could light the fuse of a wider war.

Middle East Tinderbox: Israel, Iran and Regional Turmoil

The Middle East is another potential ignition point for global conflict. The region’s stability dramatically worsened after the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023, which saw Hamas’s surprise attack and a major Israeli military response in Gaza. That war’s reverberations have been felt across the region: skirmishes with Hezbollah in Lebanon, unrest in the West Bank, and heightened tensions involving Iran. For a tense period in mid-2024, it appeared a direct Israel–Iran war was about to erupt – a conflict that could easily drag in the world’s great powers. As one account described, “for a few days over the summer it looked as though the war between Israel and Iran would explode into an all-out regional conflict, dragging in the US and Western allies on one side, and potentially Russia and China on the other.”[12] Both Washington and Tehran seemingly came to the brink: reports indicate the United States even launched limited airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities amid that crisis, before all sides backed down within about 24 hours[13]. This close call underscores how rapidly a regional showdown — in this case between Israel and Iran — could escalate into a superpower standoff.

Several factors continue to fuel Middle Eastern volatility. Iran’s nuclear program remains a flashpoint: Tehran’s efforts to enrich uranium have brought it closer to a nuclear weapons capability, something Israel has vowed to prevent at all costs. After the 2023 Hamas–Israel war and the weakening of Iran’s proxy forces like Hezbollah (reportedly even the Assad regime in Syria fell amid the chaos, according to some analyses)[14], hardliners in Tehran have even more incentive to seek a nuclear deterrent. Iran still holds an estimated 440 kg of highly-enriched uranium, and despite covert attacks and sanctions aimed at slowing its progress, the program is seen as a growing threat[15][16]. As one researcher observed, “it all adds up to quite a dangerous situation… their capacity has been marginally degraded, but the incentives for Iran to go nuclear have gone through the roof.”[15] If Iran were to weaponize its nuclear program or if Israel were to strike preemptively, a wider war could ensue. In such a scenario, the U.S. would likely back Israel while Russia (which has ties to Iran and Syria) and China (which opposes Western interventionism) could support Iran diplomatically or even militarily, aligning along geopolitical fault lines[12].

At the same time, Israel’s own policies are a source of tension. Its government’s expansion of settlements and talk of annexing parts of the occupied West Bank have angered not just Palestinians but also sparked international backlash. In fact, numerous countries – including some Western allies like France, the UK, Canada, and Australia – have moved toward formally recognizing Palestinian statehood, especially in the aftermath of the Gaza war[17]. Israel has reacted with alarm to these recognitions, and there are fears it might retaliate by unilaterally annexing more West Bank territory[17]. Such a move would inflame the Arab world and could provoke another violent uprising or even intervention by countries like Iran. The U.S. finds itself in a delicate position: while it staunchly defends Israel’s security, it also wants to prevent a broader regional war that could draw in American forces. For now, cooler heads have prevailed – for instance, Israel, Iran and the U.S. all ultimately pulled back from the brink during that scare in 2024[13]. But the Middle East remains on a knife’s edge. Any spark – a Hezbollah missile barrage, an Iranian nuclear breakout, or an Israeli annexation attempt – could set off a chain reaction involving outside powers.

Indo-Pacific Tensions: U.S.–China Rivalry and East Asian Flashpoints

Perhaps the most significant potential trigger of a world war lies in East Asia, where a rising superpower (China) is increasingly at odds with the established one (the United States). Many analysts have long assumed that if World War III were to occur, it might begin in the Indo-Pacific region[18]. The core issue is Taiwan – the self-governing island that Beijing claims as part of Chinese territory, but which enjoys de facto independence with U.S. support. China’s President Xi Jinping has made reunification with Taiwan a central goal, and he has not renounced the use of force to achieve it. In recent years, China’s stance toward Taiwan has grown markedly more aggressive: the Chinese military (PLA) routinely conducts large-scale air and naval drills around the island as rehearsals for a potential invasion or blockade[19]. In one instance, live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait were explicitly described as a “dress rehearsal for a possible real blockade… in the future”[20]. Beijing has also tested new amphibious assault ships and even unveiled technology like deep-sea cable cutters (to sever internet links) in preparation for possible conflict[21]. These actions signal that China is actively preparing for war over Taiwan, as Taiwan’s own defense officials have warned[22][23]. In a September 2025 speech in Washington, a senior Taiwanese minister stated plainly: “China is preparing for war to take Taiwan… Beijing has been actively preparing for war,” pointing to stepped-up Chinese military activity near the island[22][23]. He cautioned that if Taiwan fell to a Chinese invasion, it would trigger a “domino effect” undermining regional security and directly threatening the U.S. [22][24]. American leaders have likewise identified a potential Chinese move on Taiwan as one of the gravest looming threats, with some intelligence estimates suggesting Beijing wants the capability to seize Taiwan by 2027 – the 100th anniversary of the PLA[25].

The United States has signaled it would not abandon Taiwan. Washington has been increasing military aid and coordination with Taipei, and U.S. officials frequently reiterate that any Chinese attack would be met with a response. This mutual posturing creates a real risk of direct superpower war. A Chinese attempt to forcibly reunify Taiwan would almost certainly draw in the U.S. and possibly U.S. allies like Japan, Australia, and others in Asia-Pacific – an event that would “shake the foundations of the world as we know it and could well trigger a Third World War”[26]. Chinese leaders are aware of this risk: invading Taiwan means “direct war with the US,” as even Chinese strategists acknowledge[27]. This acts as a deterrent, but also motivates Beijing to rapidly build up its military (including expanding its nuclear arsenal) to tilt the balance. Analysts note that China is on track to field 600+ nuclear warheads in coming years and, together with Russia, could potentially amass more nukes than the United States – a development that complicates deterrence calculations for Washington[28]. Meanwhile, China portrays U.S. involvement as the provocative factor. Chinese officials regularly warn Washington “not to play with fire” by arming or encouraging Taiwan’s independence[29]. From Beijing’s perspective, America’s network of alliances in Asia (and frequent naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait) amount to encirclement, and BRICS partners like Russia often echo the view that U.S. “hegemony” is the source of instability[30].

Beyond Taiwan, East Asia has other flashpoints that could compound a conflict. North Korea, a close partner of China (and Russia), continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Pyongyang’s dictator Kim Jong Un has modernized his arsenal and declared an end to hopes of peaceful reunification with South Korea[31]. In 2023–2024, North Korea repeatedly tested missiles (including potentially nuclear-capable ones) and even sent small contingents of troops to assist Russia in Ukraine[32][33]. The Korean Peninsula is thus a tinderbox: a North Korean attack on South Korea or Japan (both U.S.-allied) could instantly broaden any war. Western experts speculate that in a U.S.-China showdown, Beijing might encourage North Korea to open a second front. As one scenario suggests, China could prod Pyongyang into attacking southward “in order to expel U.S. troops [from the Korean Peninsula]. That would open a new front against the US so that China could more easily take Taiwan.”[34] In other words, a coordinated move by China and North Korea could stretch U.S. forces across two Asian wars simultaneously. This ominously mirrors the “axis” coordination seen in Europe during World War II, and indeed U.S. officials now openly talk about an emergent de facto alliance of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea acting in concert[35][36]. All four have been cooperating in today’s conflicts – e.g. North Korean artillery and Iranian drones aid Russia in Ukraine, while China’s trade with Russia undermines Western sanctions[37][36]. In a future war, these states could form one camp, with NATO and Indo-Pacific U.S. allies forming the opposing camp. The stage would be set for a true world war, spanning multiple theaters from Eastern Europe to the Middle East to the Pacific.

How Likely Is World War III in the Near Future?

With so many hotspots and dire warnings, is a global war actually likely to erupt in the next year? While the risk is real and growing, most analysts still consider a full-scale World War III (involving direct great-power clashes) to be improbable in the very immediate term, though not impossible. The consensus is that we are in a period of heightened danger, even if world war is not yet inevitable. A recent survey of hundreds of global strategists found that 40% expect a world war (a multifront great-power conflict) to occur by 2035[38]. Notably, historian Philip Zelikow estimated a “20 to 30 percent” probability of “worldwide warfare” breaking out “within the next one to three years”, warning that the world is entering a “period of maximum danger”[39]. These are sobering odds – effectively a coin flip over the next decade, and a non-trivial chance in the next few years. Even some prominent investors and thinkers outside the security field have sounded alarms: Billionaire Ray Dalio recently wrote that the odds of the current “contained” conflicts escalating into a “hot world war” involving major powers have risen to ~50%, up from 35% two years earlier[40]. In his words, it’s now “a coin toss” whether we transition from isolated wars (Ukraine, Israel-Hamas, etc.) into a broader global war that draws in the U.S. and China[41]. He argued in late 2023 that the Israel-Gaza war and Russia-Ukraine war are likely to be “brutal until the end” and “more likely to spread than subside”, potentially leading to “a much more horrific hot world war” if other major countries become involved[42].

That said, a world war is not a foregone conclusion and there are significant constraints on its outbreak in the near term. For one, all the major powers know that a direct war carries incalculable risks, foremost among them nuclear annihilation. The principle of nuclear deterrence has, since 1945, prevented the superpowers from fighting each other outright. Even as tensions run high, leaders in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing have strong incentives to avoid crossing the threshold into open conflict that could escalate to strategic nuclear exchange. This “balance of terror” continues to act as a moderating force. For example, Western nations have carefully calibrated their support to Ukraine – providing weapons to Kyiv but stopping short of deploying NATO troops – precisely to avoid a direct NATO-Russia shooting war. Similarly, China and the U.S. have kept channels of communication open and recently resumed high-level military dialogues to reduce the chance of accidents in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait sparking combat. Restraint and diplomacy still have a role: despite heated rhetoric, Beijing has not moved to attack Taiwan yet, and U.S. and Chinese officials periodically meet to manage the rivalry. In the Middle East, backdoor negotiations (often via third parties) have so far prevented an Israel-Iran missile exchange. And in Europe, Russia has limited its war to Ukraine, likely aware that attacking NATO would be suicidal. All these factors suggest that while war could erupt (especially via miscalculation or unintended escalation), there remains a plausible path in which the next year sees continued brinkmanship and proxy conflicts without an overt World War.

It’s also important to note that some observers believe World War III may have effectively “already begun,” but in a form distinct from past world wars. They argue that we are in a state of hybrid global conflict that hasn’t yet gone nuclear or fully mobilized. In this view, the Russia-Ukraine war, China’s military posturing, cyber warfare, economic sanctions, and clashes in places like Africa are all part of a brewing world war that is unfolding “by a thousand cuts”. National security expert Mark Toth and former intelligence officer Jonathan Sweet, for instance, contend that the third world war is already underway – not with mushroom clouds and massed armies, but with subtler means[43]. “This third global conflagration doesn’t look or feel like what Hollywood envisioned… no mushroom clouds or apocalyptic wastelands. Rather, it is war by a thousand cuts, conducted across multi-regional and multi-domain battlefields,” they told the Daily Mail[43]. In their analysis, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked the “early stages” of this conflict[44]. Since then, the war has expanded into cyberspace (with massive hacking and disinformation campaigns), outer space (ASAT weapons tests), and proxy battles in developing countries[45]. Under this paradigm, the world may already be fighting World War III in incremental ways, and the question is whether it erupts into the traditional full-scale war that people recognize. While not everyone agrees with this interpretation, it underscores the reality that the international order is at its most unstable point in decades. Even if a formal world war is not “declared” in the next year, the conflicts and rivalries at play are global in scope and could at any moment intensify.

In summary, the next 12 months will likely see continued instability and localized wars rather than an immediate leap to World War III – but the margin for error is thin. The probability of world war in any given year is difficult to quantify (some put it in the single digits percentage-wise), yet it is clearly higher now than it was a decade ago, and it continues to rise. We are essentially in a race between escalation and diplomacy: either the conflicts will be managed (or frozen) to buy time for longer-term solutions, or one of these flashpoints will escalate beyond control. The consensus among cautious experts is that outright world war is not inevitable in the very near term – but if current trends continue unchecked, the risk in the medium term (next 2–5 years and beyond) is uncomfortably high[39].

Western vs. BRICS Perspectives: Who’s to Blame, and What’s at Stake?

Interpretations of these mounting war risks vary dramatically between the Western world and the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and its sympathizers. To present a balanced view, it’s crucial to understand each side’s narrative:

• Western Perspective: From the viewpoint of the United States and its NATO/allied partners, the threat of a world war stems largely from the aggressive actions of authoritarian powers – namely Russia’s expansionism in Europe and China’s militarism in Asia. Western leaders argue that the post-World War II “rules-based international order” is under assault by nations who seek to redraw borders by force or undermine sovereign nations’ rights. For example, the U.S. and European governments see Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an unprovoked act of aggression violating international law. In their eyes, Moscow is solely responsible for the war, and Western military aid to Ukraine is a justified effort to stop Russian imperial ambitions. Analogies are often drawn to the 1930s: some Western officials compare Putin’s territorial grabs to Hitler’s annexations, warning against “appeasement” and insisting that failing to stop Russia in Ukraine will only embolden it to threaten other countries. This is why NATO’s eastern members are so on edge – a sentiment encapsulated by those Baltic and Polish warnings of being closer to war than at any time since 1945[4]. Western intelligence also frequently highlights hostile intent from the Russian side; recall the German intelligence chief’s stark warning that Russia appears to be gearing up for possible war against the West[5]. Similarly, China is viewed warily by the West. American and European officials often cite Chinese belligerence – whether it’s military build-ups near Taiwan, island-building in the South China Sea, or combative “wolf warrior” diplomacy – as evidence that Beijing is trying to subvert the status quo. The Western narrative frames the U.S.-China rivalry as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism, with Taiwan’s freedom and the security of the Pacific at stake. U.S. military leaders have openly said they must be ready to defend Taiwan if China attacks, and NATO’s latest strategy documents even mention managing the “systemic challenge” posed by China. In short, the West tends to blame the would-be aggressors (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea) for pushing the world toward war. The preferred Western solution is strength and deterrence: bolster alliances, arm the threatened democracies (Ukraine, Taiwan, Israel), and make clear that any attack on allies will be met with overwhelming force. The hope is that robust deterrence will prevent World War III by persuading adversaries they cannot win one. Western powers also emphasize international law and often seek diplomatic off-ramps, but not at the expense of what they consider core principles (like a country’s right to self-determination or freedom of navigation). From this angle, appeasement equals risk, whereas collective security and resolve offer the best chance to keep the peace.
• BRICS (Russia/China & partners) Perspective: Leading voices in Moscow, Beijing, and other BRICS capitals tell a very different story – one where the West is the instigator of global instability. Russian and Chinese leaders accuse the U.S. and NATO of hegemonic, expansionist behavior that has cornered them into reacting. For instance, President Putin portrays the Ukraine war not as an invasion but as a defensive response to NATO’s eastward expansion and Western meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere. He frequently asserts a deep historical unity between Russians and Ukrainians (infamously claiming “we are one people”), implying Moscow is reclaiming what it views as its own[46]. From the Kremlin’s perspective, NATO’s arming of Ukraine proves that Russia is really fighting “the whole Western alliance” in Ukraine. Indeed, Russian officials often refer to the conflict as “Russia’s war against the West”. Putin also couches his worldview in terms of a changing global order: he criticizes Western dominance and points to the rising economic and political clout of BRICS as “inevitable” trends reshaping power balances[30]. In a June 2025 forum, Putin warned that if regional conflicts (like Ukraine and Middle East tensions) remain unresolved, it may lead to a global war, and he insisted those conflicts “need serious attention and peaceful solutions”[47]. However, he squarely blamed the West for many of those conflicts and touted Russia and China as champions of a “more balanced” world order replacing Western unilateralism[30][48]. This rhetoric resonates with many in the Global South and within BRICS nations, who feel Western countries have long dictated terms in international affairs.

China, for its part, views U.S. actions in Asia as provocative. Beijing sees American military alliances in its neighborhood (Japan, South Korea, Australia, plus unofficial ties with Taiwan) as an attempt to contain China’s rise – analogous, Chinese officials sometimes say, to how encirclement strategies preceded past great-power wars. The Chinese government insists that Taiwan is an internal matter and that it seeks peaceful reunification, but it also vows to “take all necessary measures” to prevent Taiwan’s permanent separation or foreign interference[29]. When U.S. warships sail through the Taiwan Strait or sell arms to Taipei, China frames it as dangerous meddling that could trigger war. In Beijing’s narrative, the U.S. is “playing with fire” and creating the crisis, whereas China is simply responding to defend its sovereignty. Similar logic applies to the South China Sea, where China’s claims and militarization are, in their view, justified by history – and it’s the U.S. Navy patrols asserting freedom of navigation that raise war risks. Broadly, BRICS countries emphasize multipolarity: they argue that the era of undisputed Western (American) dominance is ending, and a new order where multiple powers (including China, India, Russia, etc.) have a say must emerge. They often cite the growing share of global GDP accounted for by BRICS and the expanding membership of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as evidence that the West can no longer call all the shots[30][48]. From this view, conflicts like Ukraine and the Israel-Palestine issue are symptoms of Western refusal to accommodate other powers’ interests. Russian and Chinese officials routinely accuse the West of hypocrisy – for example, intervening militarily around the world when it suits them (Iraq, Libya, Kosovo) but condemning Russia’s intervention; or upholding Israel’s security while ignoring Palestinian rights. Such grievances feed a narrative that a “more balanced” global order is needed to secure peace[30]. Interestingly, leaders like Putin and Xi often stop short of advocating a world war – rather, they cast themselves as trying to prevent one by correcting Western misbehavior. In practice, however, their calls for a new order sometimes serve to justify aligning together against the West. Moscow and Beijing have drawn closer in diplomatic and military cooperation, presenting a united front against Western sanctions and pressures. They insist they are not forming a hostile bloc, but Western analysts do see an “axis” of sorts emerging[35]. Other BRICS members like India and Brazil take more nuanced stances – they generally don’t want a world war and prefer diplomacy, but they also voice frustration at Western dominance and have been reluctant to sever ties with Russia or China. India, for example, continues to buy Russian oil and weapons and has not joined Western sanctions on Russia, emphasizing a neutral approach and urging dialogue in Ukraine. Yet India also has border conflicts with China and is part of the Quad with the U.S., so its loyalties in a world war scenario might be split (analysts predict India would try to stay non-committal in a WW3 situation)[49]. This underscores that “West vs BRICS” is not black-and-white – there are shades of gray. Still, for the purpose of gauging war sentiment: Western opinion sees authoritarian aggression as the chief danger, whereas the BRICS side sees Western hegemonism as the root cause of potential world war.

In a sense, both perspectives agree on one thing: the current trajectory is perilous. But they disagree on how we got here and how to avoid disaster. The West calls for upholding international norms and deterring aggressors; the BRICS call for respecting new power realities and addressing what they view as Western-caused grievances. A balanced assessment must acknowledge that each side fears the other. NATO countries fear an emboldened Russia or China will upend the peace by force; Russia/China fear the U.S.-led bloc is trying to thwart their security and rise, possibly by force. This mutual distrust is itself reminiscent of past pre-war rivalries and makes resolving crises much harder.

Historical Analogies and Lessons

History does not repeat exactly, but it rhymes. Many observers draw analogies between today’s geopolitical tensions and those in eras that preceded major wars. Such analogies can be illuminating – or cautionary – as we seek to understand if World War III is looming. Here are a few pertinent historical parallels:

• “Sleepwalking” into World War I (1914): The situation in 1914 is often invoked when discussing how a world war can start almost inadvertently. Prior to WWI, Europe was a multipolar powder keg of rising and declining empires entangled in alliances. A localized event – the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in the Balkans – triggered a chain reaction of mobilizations due to treaty obligations and strategic miscalculations. Leaders on all sides believed war could be controlled or avoided even as they took aggressive postures, but ultimately they “sleepwalked” into a catastrophic global conflict. Similarly, today we see a multipolar world with several great powers (U.S., China, Russia, etc.) and a web of alliances (NATO, security pacts in Asia) that could draw many nations into war if a single spark is not contained. It’s no coincidence that analysts warn we may “sleepwalk… into an engulfing conflict” again[8]. Like 1914, none of the major powers openly desires a world war, yet each is ramping up militarily and might feel compelled to respond to a provocation against an ally or proxy. The lesson from 1914 is the danger of overconfidence and rigid alliance commitments – something policymakers today are keenly aware of when managing, for instance, the NATO commitment to defend the Baltics if attacked. Avoiding a repeat may require flexibility, communication, and willingness to de-escalate crises before they spiral. The WWI analogy is a stark reminder that world wars can start even when no one initially intends them, due to miscalculation and the momentum of events.
• Appeasement and World War II (1930s): On the other hand, the lead-up to World War II offers lessons about the cost of failing to confront expansionism early. In the 1930s, aggressive powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan) repeatedly violated treaties and annexed territory. The Western democracies often responded weakly or tried to appease these regimes (e.g. Munich Agreement of 1938, yielding the Sudetenland to Hitler) in hopes of preserving peace. The result was that the aggressors became emboldened, seeing appeasement as a green light, and ultimately launched full-scale war that became global. Many in the West apply this analogy to today’s situations: for example, some compare Putin’s annexation of Crimea (2014) and invasion of Ukraine (2022) to Hitler’s land grabs, arguing that yielding territory or making concessions will only encourage more aggression. This viewpoint bolsters the case for firm resistance now – supplying Ukraine, drawing red lines around Taiwan, etc., to show that free nations will fight and thus deter a larger war. Critics, however, note a key difference: unlike the 1930s, today’s potential aggressors wield nuclear weapons, making direct confrontation far more dangerous. Still, the WWII analogy influences decision-makers: the fear of being seen as Chamberlain (who appeased Hitler) weighs on leaders like those in Washington or London when considering how strongly to respond to Russia or other threats. Conversely, Russia sometimes flips this analogy on its head – Putin’s propaganda absurdly labels Ukraine’s government as “Nazis” and casts Russia’s war as a righteous fight akin to WWII. While that narrative is widely rejected outside Russia, it underscores how historical memory (the Great Patriotic War in Russia’s case) is used to justify current policies. The true lesson of WWII might be that unchecked expansionism leads to bigger wars, but also that once total war starts, it is unimaginably destructive – especially now that nukes exist.
• Cold War and the Avoidance of World War III (1947–1991): The decades-long Cold War between the U.S.-led bloc and the Soviet-led bloc was in essence a world war that did not happen – or that was fought indirectly. Both superpowers had diametrically opposed ideologies and engaged in intense arms races and proxy wars, yet they scrupulously avoided direct clashes. This was largely due to the nuclear deterrent (Mutual Assured Destruction) and carefully managed diplomacy (hotlines, arms control treaties like SALT, INF, etc.). Some see today’s climate as a Second Cold War, with the U.S. and its allies on one side and a loose China-Russia partnership on the other. If so, history suggests two paths: a prolonged cold standoff with occasional proxy conflicts but no world war (the better outcome), or a failure of deterrence leading to a hot war (the worst outcome). The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) is a favorite analogy for the brinksmanship over Taiwan or Ukraine – a reminder of how close we came to WWIII and how effective communication and compromise (Kennedy and Khrushchev’s secret deal) pulled us back. Today, ensuring robust communication channels – e.g. between U.S. and Chinese militaries, or the U.S. and Russia – is likewise critical to defuse potentially catastrophic incidents (like an air collision or naval incident in disputed waters). The Cold War also teaches the value of proxy conflicts as both a risk and a safety valve: wars like Korea and Vietnam were devastating but world war was avoided because the superpowers limited their direct involvement. Ukraine resembles a proxy war in that NATO is assisting one side while Russia avoids attacking NATO directly. This might contain the conflict – but as history warns, proxy wars can also escalate or expand if mismanaged. Ultimately, the Cold War ended peacefully through negotiation and the internal collapse of one side; it shows that patient containment and vigilance can succeed without global Armageddon, albeit after many tense decades. Policymakers hoping to avoid World War III may well be trying to emulate the cold peace model rather than the hot war model.
• Thucydides Trap (Ancient Greece): A frequently cited historical concept (though not without critics) is the Thucydides Trap, referring to the ancient rivalry between Sparta (the established power) and Athens (the rising power) that led to the Peloponnesian War. Historian Thucydides wrote that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” By analogy, some fear that China’s rise and the fear it creates in the U.S. could similarly make a U.S.-China war “inevitable”. While inevitability is debated, we do see a classical security dilemma: each side’s defensive moves look offensive to the other (e.g., U.S. alliances vs. Chinese military expansion), leading to escalation. Avoiding this trap will require deliberate efforts by both Washington and Beijing to find a modus vivendi – much as Britain and the U.S. peacefully accommodated their power transition in the early 20th century, breaking the usual pattern of great-power war. The historical analogies of rising vs. ruling powers (like Germany vs. Britain pre-WWI as well) loom large in strategists’ minds and underline the importance of managing great-power competition so that it doesn’t erupt in conflict.

In applying historical lessons, one must be careful – no analogy is perfect. However, they collectively teach us that wars often seem unlikely until they suddenly happen, that balancing deterrence with diplomacy is vital, and that recognizing the perspectives and fears of all sides can sometimes avert fatal misunderstandings. History is replete with missed chances at peace and also a few extraordinary successes (as in 1962). The world today stands at a similar crossroads, and the awareness of history could be what helps current leaders navigate away from a repeat of 1914 or 1939.

At the Crossroads: Is Peace Still Possible or Have We Passed the Point of No Return?

With tensions so high, a critical question arises: Have we passed the point of “Peace,” or can escalation be halted? Some commentators grimly suggest that the world has already slid too far toward conflict – that the relative peace of the post-Cold War era is over, and an era of inevitable confrontation is upon us. Indeed, by many measures the world is less peaceful today than at any time since the Cold War: a major land war is raging in Europe, great-power military spending is surging, and international arms control regimes (like nuclear treaties) have frayed. However, acknowledging that peace is under severe strain is not the same as declaring it lost for good. De-escalation remains possible – and extremely necessary – to avoid crossing the threshold into world war.

On one hand, pessimists argue that key actors are no longer interested in compromise, making war only a matter of time. They point to rhetoric like that of Ray Dalio, who noted current conflicts seem more likely to widen than to resolve peacefully[42]. They also observe that diplomatic efforts have so far failed to resolve any of the major crises: negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have stalled or collapsed, Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects look dimmer than ever, and U.S.-China talks have yet to produce any agreement on Taiwan or the South China Sea. In this gloomy view, humanity may have crossed a Rubicon where each side is doubling down on military readiness, and “peace” as we knew it – the absence of great-power war – might be a thing of the past. The world could be likened to the late 1930s or the early Cold War 1950s, when confrontation became the new normal. If that is the case, the best we might hope for is a controlled standoff (a cold war) rather than a hot war, but even that standoff would be precarious and punctuated by proxy fights. Already, as noted, some see a form of World War III unfolding in slow motion via hybrid warfare[50][43]. Under this paradigm, true peace (where major powers genuinely trust each other and disarm) is out of reach for the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, there is a more optimistic (or at least pragmatic) camp which believes that de-escalation and diplomacy can still prevent doom. History offers examples of seemingly irreversible paths to war being turned around at the 11th hour. Even in our current conflicts, there have been moments of restraint that show war is not inevitable. For instance, despite extreme rhetoric, neither Russia nor NATO has deliberately expanded the Ukraine war beyond Ukraine’s borders – an indicator that both sides, for now, prefer to contain the fighting. The grain export deals in the Black Sea (when they were in effect) and periodic prisoner exchanges between Russia and the West showed that dialogue is possible even amid war. In the Middle East, as furious as Israel and Iran are at each other, both have avoided direct warfare for decades, often thanks to behind-the-scenes mediation (Oman, for example, has brokered messages between Tehran and Washington). As recently as 2015, major powers including the U.S. and Russia collectively negotiated the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) – proof that diplomatic solutions can be found for thorny issues when there is political will. Regarding the U.S.-China rivalry, there have been efforts to establish “guardrails,” such as the Biden-Xi summits and agreements to maintain communication hotlines. Those initiatives are aimed exactly at preventing accidental war. It’s worth remembering that domestic pressures in many countries also favor avoiding war: for example, American public opinion, scarred by long wars in Iraq/Afghanistan, is wary of new entanglements; Chinese economic ambitions are undermined by war disruptions, incentivizing Beijing to keep stability; European economies likewise desperately want to avert a wider war. These moderating forces suggest that rational self-interest could yet pull us back from the brink.

One potential path forward is renewed arms control and risk-reduction talks. Even during the Cold War’s darkest days, Washington and Moscow worked out agreements to limit nuclear weapons and manage incidents (e.g. the 1972 Incidents at Sea agreement to avoid naval collisions). In today’s context, something similar between the U.S. and China – perhaps an understanding on certain red lines around Taiwan or a mechanism to de-conflict military operations in the Western Pacific – could reduce the chance of a spark. In Europe, while formal treaties with Russia have faltered (Russia suspended the New START nuclear treaty, for instance), there are calls to eventually negotiate a settlement in Ukraine that could include security guarantees to both Ukraine and Russia. Such an outcome may seem distant now, but wars do end at the negotiating table eventually, and planning for a post-war security architecture could prevent the next war. Another hopeful sign is the involvement of third-party mediators. Countries like Turkey, India, Brazil, and South Africa (the latter three are in BRICS but also maintain ties to the West) have at various times offered to mediate the Ukraine conflict or dialogues between the U.S. and its rivals. While none of these initiatives have borne fruit yet, they could gain traction if stalemates on the battlefield make the combatants more receptive to talks. The recent Saudi-Iran rapprochement (brokered by China) shows that even long-time foes can strike a deal under the right circumstances – a reminder that surprises can happen in international diplomacy.

In weighing whether we’ve passed the point of peace, one must define “peace.” If we mean a return to the relatively harmonious international relations of the 1990s, then yes, that era appears over – the world has undeniably entered a more adversarial phase. But if “peace” means simply avoiding another world war, then it has not yet slipped out of our grasp. The coming year and beyond will be critical. As one expert panel found, about 60% of global strategists still believed the world in ten years could be as good as or better than today, while 40% feared it would be worse[51]. That indicates a substantial belief that disaster is not preordained. Ultimately, the fate of peace may rest on choices not yet made: whether leaders choose to dial down the rhetoric, engage in serious negotiations, and address the legitimate security concerns of all sides – or whether they continue on the collision course, banking on the hope that the other side blinks first.

Conclusion – A Fragile Balance: We stand at a fateful juncture. The likelihood of World War III in the next year remains low in absolute terms, but it is higher now than at any point in recent memory and rising with each uncontrolled crisis. A blend of flashpoints – in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia – have created a global tinderbox. Should these conflicts entwine or erupt simultaneously, a third world war could indeed materialize, with devastating outcomes: tens of millions of lives at risk, economies shattered, and even nuclear Armageddon if escalation runs away. Both Western and BRICS viewpoints highlight valid fears and grievances, yet if each side pursues absolute victory or dominance, all may lose. Historical analogies to 1914 and 1939 sound alarms about miscalculation and appeasement, while the Cold War offers lessons in crisis management that are urgently needed now. We have not necessarily passed the final point of no return – but we are uncomfortably close to it. De-escalation is possible through determined diplomacy, mutual compromise, and building new security arrangements that acknowledge the interests of all major powers. The coming months will test whether leaders can step back from the brink. In essence, the world is teetering between two futures: one in which it sleepwalks into an abyss of world war, and another in which it awakens to the peril and pulls back. For the sake of humanity, the latter path must prevail.

Sources:

• The Week UK – “How close are we to World War Three?” (Sept 2025)[7][8][12][18][26][34]
• Atlantic Council – Welcome to 2035: Global Foresight Survey (Feb 2025)[39][38]
• The Economic Times (India) – Putin’s SPIEF Forum remarks (June 2025)[47][30][48]
• Reuters – Taiwan Affairs Minister Chiu Chui-cheng speech (Sept 2025)[22][23]
• Newsweek – “What Would World War III Look Like?” (Dec 2024)[1][35][36]
• The Economic Times – Mark Toth & Jonathan Sweet on “WW3 already here” (Dec 2024)[43][44]
• Business Insider – Ray Dalio “50% chance of world war” comments (Oct 2023)[41][40][42]

[1] [5] [35] [36] [37] [49] What would World War III look like? – Newsweek

[2] [3] [4] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [25] [26] [27] [28] [31] [32] [33] [34] Is World War Three coming? What countries will be involved? | The Week

[22] [23] [24] [29] In US, Taiwan minister warns of ‘domino effect’ if China takes island | Reuters

[30] [46] [47] [48] Putin warns about World War III, points to war with Ukraine, Israel-Iran conflict in Middle East – The Economic Times

[38] [39] [51] Welcome to 2035: What the world could look like in ten years, according to more than 350 experts – Atlantic Council

[40] [41] [42] Ray Dalio Sees 50% Chance of World War As Israel-Hamas Conflict Rages – Business Insider

[43] [44] [45] [50] World War 3 news: “World War 3 is already here”: No mushroom clouds, but here’s when it really began – The Economic Times

The post Global Flashpoints & the Imminent Threat of World War III appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.

BRICS: Emergence and Western Underestimation

Western officials and analysts have often been skeptical of BRICS’ significance. This attitude was starkly illustrated by a recent gaffe from U.S. President Donald Trump. In mid-2025, Trump mistakenly identified Spain as the “S” in BRICS (which in reality stands for South Africa) during a televised interview – a shocking display of ignorance, as critics put it[1][2]. Trump’s erroneous statement – “They’re a BRICS nation, Spain. Do you know what a BRICS nation is?” – not only caused embarrassment in Washington but also “head-scratching and jitters” in Madrid, where officials feared the U.S. might impose punitive tariffs based on this misunderstanding[1][2]. This incident underscored how dismissively some in Washington viewed BRICS; the U.S. “dominant view” had long been that the diverse BRICS economies could not mount a real challenge to the U.S.-led international order[3].

Such complacency is now being challenged by reality. In recent years, BRICS has expanded its economic and diplomatic ambitions. The bloc admitted new members (including major regional players like Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in 2023–24) and openly explored mechanisms to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. BRICS has become “a sandbox for experimentation with various non-USD instruments” – from payment systems in local currencies to commodity trading hubs outside dollar markets[4]. These initiatives gained momentum especially after Western sanctions on Russia in 2022, as many countries in the Global South sought “more maneuvering space amid waning U.S. preeminence”[5]. In short, a growing number of nations (including some traditional U.S. partners) are “cozying up to America’s adversaries like China and Russia” and embarking on long-term projects to hedge against U.S. dominance[5].

To be sure, the BRICS coalition faces internal divisions and limitations that temper its immediate effectiveness. A recent summit in Kazan (October 2024) highlighted that simply “adding more letters doesn’t make the BRICS more functional.” The 43-page summit communiqué was filled with platitudes masking underlying tensions, and there was a noticeable lack of unified action – for example, BRICS members offered Russia little concrete help in financing its war economy despite Moscow’s hopes[6][7]. Key leaders even skipped the meeting (e.g. Brazil’s president and Saudi Arabia’s crown prince chose an EU meeting instead)[8]. Such facts caution against overestimating BRICS as a monolithic alliance. Nonetheless, Western policymakers are increasingly realizing that they cannot dismiss the BRICS challenge out of hand. Even if BRICS is not a tight strategic alliance, it provides a platform for non-Western powers to coordinate alternatives. The mere fact that world leaders like India’s Narendra Modi and even NATO-member Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan chose to attend BRICS forums hosted by Vladimir Putin – signaling Putin is “not the global pariah the West would like to believe” – points to an erosion of U.S. diplomatic clout[9]. In sum, Western hegemony now faces a credible (if slow-moving) challenge from an emerging multipolar order; initial Western flippancy toward BRICS has given way to a more sober recognition of this reality.

Weaponized Tariffs and the Backfire Effect

Under President Trump, the United States aggressively wielded tariffs and economic sanctions in an attempt to shore up its dominance – a strategy critics describe as “weaponizing” trade. Trump’s trade war with China, initiated in 2018 and escalated in his second term (2025), was meant to force concessions from the world’s second-largest economy. Instead, it appears to have galvanized China and others to resist U.S. pressure, ultimately undermining U.S. influence. In April 2025, Reuters reported that Beijing had adopted an all-of-government “wartime” footing to counter Trump’s tariffs: Chinese officials were ordered to cancel vacations and work around the clock, while propaganda channels blasted defiant messages (even invoking Mao Zedong’s vow to “never yield” to foreign coercion)[10][11]. China also launched a diplomatic charm offensive to rally other nations – including U.S. allies in Europe and Asia – against Washington’s trade measures[11]. Far from isolating China, Trump’s tariffs arguably pushed China to build alternative trade links and exploit divisions between the U.S. and its partners.

Trump did not stop at China. On January 30, 2025, he stunned many by threatening 100% tariffs on all BRICS countries unless they abandoned plans for a common BRICS currency or any move to replace the U.S. dollar in international trade[12][13]. “We will require a commitment … that they will neither create a new BRICS Currency, nor back any other currency to replace the mighty U.S. Dollar or they will face 100% tariffs,” Trump announced, vowing to make BRICS nations “say goodbye to selling into the wonderful U.S. economy” if they challenged dollar primacy[12][14]. This hardline stance was intended to protect the cornerstone of U.S. hegemony – the dollar’s global reserve status. Yet experts warned it could backfire disastrously. Imposing punitive tariffs on such a large swath of the world could “hasten the expansion of currency multipolarity”, effectively accelerating the decline of dollar dominance rather than preventing it[13][15]. As one analyst noted, BRICS nations make up well over 40% of global GDP and more than half the world’s population; forcing them to decouple from U.S. trade would inevitably spur them to trade more with each other in local currencies, thereby diminishing reliance on the U.S. dollar[15].

Indeed, objective data show the United States is not the indispensable trading partner it once was. The U.S. share of global trade has fallen to about 15% today (down from ~20% in 2018)[16]. For most BRICS members (aside from China), the U.S. market is important but not irreplaceable, and their exports could be redirected elsewhere over time[17][18]. In other words, the leverage of U.S. market access is declining. Washington’s threats thus carry less weight than before – and in some cases provoke defiance. Russia bluntly responded that any American attempt to coerce countries into using the dollar “would backfire”[19]. We have seen concrete examples of U.S. economic coercion pushing targeted states closer to U.S. rivals: for instance, after Western sanctions in 2022, Russia deepened energy ties with China and India; likewise, U.S. tariffs on China have encouraged Beijing to bolster trade with fellow BRICS and Belt & Road countries.

Not only have Trump’s tariff wars failed to achieve their strategic aims, they have also inflicted economic pain at home, undermining the very “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) promises Trump made. Higher import costs fueled by tariffs raised inflation on consumer goods and industrial inputs, disproportionately hurting American low-income households. Analysts projected that all-out tariffs on BRICS could boost core U.S. inflation by several percentage points, “with the poorest in the U.S. community… hardest hit”[20]. Rising prices for essentials (from healthcare to utilities) would hit retirees and fixed-income families especially hard[20]. In sum, as one study drily concluded, “those promised that the American Dream will be restored are likely to be disappointed, again.”[20] The MAGA pledge to revive American prosperity is belied by the fact that tariff brinkmanship has worsened inequality and burdened consumers, while manufacturing revival (the ostensible goal) remains elusive.

Beyond China and the major BRICS economies, the U.S. has also brandished economic weapons against smaller states aligning with the BRICS/non-Western camp. A telling case is South Africa. In mid-2023, as South Africa (a BRICS member) maintained a neutral stance on the Ukraine war and hosted joint naval exercises with Russia and China, bipartisan U.S. lawmakers openly demanded retaliation. A June 2023 letter from senior members of Congress urged the Biden administration to punish South Africa for its perceived support of Russia – even suggesting South Africa be deemed ineligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a vital trade preference that gave it duty-free access to the U.S. market[21][22]. The lawmakers insisted that hosting the AGOA summit in South Africa would “serve as an endorsement” of Pretoria’s pro-Russia tilt and cited a requirement that AGOA beneficiaries not undermine U.S. foreign policy[23]. In effect, Washington signaled it would use tariffs or trade sanctions to keep partners in line and discourage them from getting too close to the BRICS/Russia-China camp. South African officials bristled at these threats, and such U.S. pressure arguably pushed Pretoria even closer to its BRICS allies out of resentment. This example underscores the broader pattern: the West has tried to check BRICS’ evolution through punitive economic measures, but these measures often backfire by breeding mistrust and resolve among the targeted countries. Instead of isolating BRICS, the tariff and sanctions campaigns are accelerating the formation of alternative blocs and financial systems outside Western control[13][15].

Multipolar Reality and the Risk of Multi-Front Conflict

Underlying these economic rifts is a dawning multipolar reality in geopolitics. The United States today faces simultaneous challenges in three distinct theaters – Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East – a strategic bind unseen since World War II. If Washington refuses to accommodate a more multipolar order, it risks overextension by confronting major powers on multiple fronts. Political commentators critical of U.S. policy warn that the era of unipolar American primacy is ending, and an insistence on clinging to hegemonic dominance could lead the U.S. into “three serious war fronts” at once – against Russia, China, and Iran – with potentially ruinous consequences.

Firstly, in Europe, the Russia-Ukraine war has become a grinding test of Western resolve. The U.S. and NATO have invested heavily in Ukraine’s defense since Russia’s 2022 invasion, seeing it as a frontline struggle against Russian revisionism. Yet as of August 2025, the conflict has settled into a bloody stalemate that arguably favors Russia. After over three-and-a-half years of combat, Ukraine has been “losing ground to Russian forces” in key sectors[24]. Russia occupies large swathes of eastern and southern Ukraine, and Ukrainian counteroffensives (while valiant) have not decisively reversed those gains. European officials privately fear that if Russia can absorb parts of Ukraine and weather Western sanctions, it may grow more aggressive toward other neighbors[25]. Indeed, Moscow’s resilience is bolstered by the fact that it is not isolated globally – China, India, and others continue to buy its exports and diplomatically engage with Putin’s government[9]. Western sanctions have not crippled Russia as intended, partly because many non-Western countries refused to enforce them strictly. This diminished effectiveness of the Western “economic weapon” has exposed “the limitations of the Western sanctions toolkit” and the lack of universal support for U.S. policy goals[9]. The Ukraine war thus exemplifies a new reality: U.S. and allied power, while still immense, cannot unilaterally dictate outcomes against a major adversary when much of the Global South opts to hedge or stay neutral.

At the same time, in East Asia, tensions with China are near an all-time high. China’s rise as an economic and military peer-competitor has led the U.S. to refocus its strategy (as outlined in recent U.S. National Security Strategy documents) on countering Beijing. Flashpoints abound – most dangerously, the possibility of a war over Taiwan. The Pentagon is quietly grappling with how to deter China from attempting to reunify Taiwan by force, even as China rapidly modernizes its military. Trump’s renewed trade war in 2025, including the tariff salvos and tech export bans, has only hardened Beijing’s resolve to decouple key industries and assert its own sphere of influence. In response to U.S. pressure, Chinese leaders have adopted a defiant tone, making clear that China stands ready to “push back against hegemony” in defense of its interests[26]. Beijing’s coordination with Moscow has also tightened – the two declared a “no-limits” partnership, and their militaries conduct joint drills. American analysts openly worry that Washington may soon confront a two-front crisis: a simultaneous war with Russia in Eastern Europe and with China in the Western Pacific[27]. The U.S. military, while powerful, would be hard-pressed to fight full-scale wars in Europe and Asia at once, especially as both adversaries possess advanced arsenals (including nuclear weapons). A recent Atlantic Council assessment bluntly stated that the U.S. and its allies “are not currently well-situated to fight a two-front war” against Russia and China, nor even a limited nuclear conflict in two theaters[27]. This capacity gap is fueling urgent debates in Washington about increasing defense budgets and industrial production. The prospect of adding Iran as a third adversary in a concurrent conflict is even more daunting – effectively beyond the bounds of the longstanding U.S. “two-war” force planning construct[28]. In sum, U.S. strategists recognize that a maximalist attempt to confront all revisionist powers simultaneously could overstretch American capabilities and invite disaster.

The third front, the Middle East, saw a dramatic escalation in mid-2025 that underscores the risks of the unrestrained hegemonic approach. In June, Israel and Iran fought a short but intense 12-day war that directly drew in the United States – a conflict many observers would have thought unthinkable a few years prior. The war ignited when Israel, alarmed by advances in Iran’s nuclear program, launched preemptive airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 13, 2025[29][30]. Days later, the U.S. itself joined the hostilities at Israel’s behest: U.S. forces struck Iran’s fortified enrichment sites at Fordow and Natanz with heavy missiles, “completely obliterating” some targets (according to President Trump’s boast)[29][30]. This marked a massive U.S. escalation – the first direct American military attack on Iranian soil in the modern era. Iran retaliated by firing ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest U.S. base in the region, injuring U.S. personnel and dramatically raising the stakes[31]. For a tense period, many feared the Middle East was sliding into a full-scale regional war.

Ultimately, President Trump rushed to broker a ceasefire to halt the spiraling conflict. Within days of the U.S. strikes, Trump announced that Iran and Israel had agreed to a “Complete and Total CEASEFIRE” – what he termed “the 12 Day War … that could have gone on for years and destroyed the Middle East”[32][33]. A fragile truce took hold by late June 2025, though not without hiccups – at one point Israel violated the ceasefire with a further strike (claiming Iranian missiles had been launched post-truce), drawing an angry rebuke from Trump[34][35]. The ceasefire was re-imposed, and active hostilities ceased by the end of June. Each side claimed victory, but the outcome was murky, and the episode’s geopolitical fallout has been significant.

For Israel, this confrontation was a double-edged sword. On one hand, Israel demonstrated it could hit Tehran’s nuclear program even deep underground, and it secured unprecedented U.S. military participation in doing so[30][36]. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu touted the operation as proof of Israel’s determination and thanked Trump for “standing alongside us” in direct action[37]. On the other hand, Israel failed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capacity outright – much of Iran’s know-how and stockpile may survive. There is “no independent confirmation” yet of the extent of damage to Iran’s underground facilities; even the IAEA cannot verify how badly Fordow was hit without on-site inspections[38][39]. Iranian officials have projected confidence, with Iran’s nuclear chief asserting that “preparations for recovery had already been anticipated” and vowing an uninterrupted program despite the strikes[40]. In essence, Iran absorbed the blows and remained unbowed, if bruised. This resiliency – coupled with Iran’s immediate retaliatory capability – has led some commentators to argue that Israel gained little of strategic value from the war. A post-war analysis by New Lines Magazine noted that while Netanyahu claimed success, any victory is questionable: Israel’s campaign imposed only temporary setbacks on Iran, at the cost of inflaming regional tensions and exposing Israeli cities to potential missile strikes in return[41]. Even some Israeli and American experts privately concede that Iran’s nuclear know-how cannot be bombed away, and that the war did not definitively remove the threat that so concerns Israel[42][43]. In fact, the conflict might have hardened Iran’s resolve – Iran’s parliament responded by advancing a bill to suspend cooperation with the IAEA entirely[44] – and weakened the prospect of future diplomatic compromise. Meanwhile, Israel’s resort to large-scale force (and the humanitarian toll of such strikes, even if brief) elicited international criticism, casting Israel once again as an aggressor in the eyes of many.

For the United States, the Iran-Israel war was a stark illustration of lost credibility and complications of fighting on multiple fronts. Washington’s open siding with Israel – including joining in offensive strikes – severely damaged U.S. standing in the Arab and Muslim world. Public opinion polls across the Middle East in late 2023 (during the Gaza war) were already registering record-low approval of the U.S., and those sentiments intensified by 2025. According to Gallup-affiliated polling, a mere 7% of respondents in six key Arab countries viewed America’s role in the Israel-Gaza/Iran conflicts positively, while nearly half saw Russia positively and around 40% even saw Iran as having a positive impact[45][46]. In contrast, the perception of the U.S. was overwhelmingly negative – a direct result of U.S. support for what many viewed as Israeli aggression[47]. This collapse in goodwill (“losing Arab hearts and minds” as one analysis put it[47]) has real strategic ramifications: it bolsters America’s geopolitical competitors (who are seen as counterbalancing Israel) and risks fueling radicalization. The episode also highlighted diverging interests between the U.S. and its great power rivals: notably, Russia and China, despite their strategic ties to Iran, chose not to intervene directly. Their responses were limited to rhetoric and diplomatic moves (e.g. jointly drafting a UN ceasefire resolution)[48][49]. Privately, Iranian officials were “frustrated” that Moscow and Beijing did not offer more tangible support during the crisis[49][50]. This suggests that while Russia and China oppose U.S. actions and gave Iran political cover, they avoided being dragged into a direct war with the U.S. over Iran – a sign of caution in the nascent multipolar coalition[51]. In effect, the United States was able to act with a degree of impunity militarily, but at the cost of its moral authority and influence. The war also tied down U.S. military resources and attention in yet another theater, even as the Ukraine war and Indo-Pacific tensions continued. Critics argue that this is precisely the scenario a hegemonic U.S. must avoid: spreading itself thin in conflicts against multiple regional powers simultaneously.

Finally, it is worth noting how these multi-front pressures have fractured domestic U.S. politics and narratives. President Trump’s hardline stance on China and Iran, and his embrace of ultra-hawkish pro-Israel positions, have alienated some of his original “America First” base. Trump rose to power on promises of avoiding endless foreign wars and prioritizing domestic renewal. Yet by 2025, he had presided over deepening involvement in foreign conflicts – from Europe to the Middle East – and seemed, in the eyes of critics, to be doing the bidding of neoconservative “globalists” and pro-Israel hardliners rather than sticking to his non-interventionist instincts. Notably, a segment of right-wing populists and conservative Christians in the U.S. began voicing dissent over unqualified U.S. support for Israel as Gaza and southern Lebanon suffered devastation. Even some who “consider themselves pro-Israel” expressed concern about America being “entangled in yet another Middle Eastern war,” and questioned the “ironclad” alliance with Israel as the Gaza conflict turned into a humanitarian catastrophe[52][53]. More fervently, a wing of Trump’s evangelical base – self-described “America First” Christians – grew “seething” in their criticism of Israel and started turning on Trump for siding with what they see as a morally indefensible campaign in Gaza[54][55]. This unprecedented MAGA infighting underscores that the old neoconservative agenda of unconditional support for Israeli military action is no longer universally accepted even among American conservatives. Trump’s alignment with Israel’s most hardline policies (cheered by the pro-Israel lobby) thus splintered his coalition, with some supporters accusing him of being “owned” by those very globalist and Zionist interests he once railed against. In an ironic twist, Trump – who in 2016 lambasted foreign influence and promised to put “America First” – found himself in 2025 justifying U.S. participation in a distant war at Israel’s behest. This has, as commentators note, tarnished the MAGA brand and undercut U.S. claims to moral high ground, since America is now seen by many as complicit in the humanitarian crises resulting from its allies’ actions[47][45]. The net effect is that the United States has not only lost credibility abroad but, in some respects, the respect of the world, as even friendly populations question U.S. motives and competence in managing global stability.

Ukraine and the Alaska Summit: East Holds the Cards?

One of the clearest manifestations of BRICS-oriented power challenging the West is playing out in the resolution (or lack thereof) of the Ukraine war. As mentioned, Russia has withstood Western pressure in part thanks to the implicit support of fellow BRICS giants like China (which ramped up purchases of Russian energy) and India (which maintained neutrality and trade). With Ukraine’s counteroffensives making only modest progress and Russian forces entrenching, there is a palpable sense that Ukraine may not be able to win militarily given current dynamics. By August 2025, even U.S. officials tacitly acknowledged Ukraine’s struggles – the conflict is at best a costly stalemate, and at worst, trending in Russia’s favor[56][24].

This context set the stage for the extraordinary Trump-Putin summit in Anchorage, Alaska, scheduled for mid-August 2025 – the first such meeting of Trump’s second term. The very optics of this summit illustrate how much the geopolitical tables have turned since the early 2000s. Rather than a triumphant U.S. dictating terms, we see an American president flying to a remote location to personally negotiate with an isolated (but unyielding) Kremlin leader in hopes of ending a war that is draining Western unity and resources. Commentators note the irony that Putin now comes to the table holding considerable leverage, while the U.S. side is constrained in its options. Trump’s own advisors are publicly lowering expectations, calling the meeting a “listening exercise”[57][58]. There is open debate in Washington about which Trump will show up: will it be the tougher-sounding Trump who recently complained about Russia’s missile strikes, or the Trump who historically flattered Putin and might be “bamboozled” into a deal favoring Moscow[59]? European allies, for their part, are alarmed at the prospect of a separate peace that sacrifices Ukrainian territory. A former U.S. diplomat warned it’s a “reasonable concern” that Trump might be outplayed and “cut a terrible deal at Ukraine’s expense.”[59] The fact that such warnings are issued underscores that U.S. credibility and leverage have waned – it is Russia, through battlefield realities, that holds many of the cards.

Trump’s approach since regaining office hints at concessions to Russian interests. Earlier in 2025, his administration eased pressure on Russia and even echoed some of Moscow’s narratives: for example, a special envoy in March implied Russia had a legitimate claim to parts of Ukraine because those regions are Russian-speaking[60][61]. Such statements delighted the Kremlin and dismayed Kyiv. Moreover, when Trump floated a possible second summit including Ukraine’s President Zelensky, it was framed as conditional on Putin’s goodwill and the success of the initial talks[62] – again suggesting that Moscow’s cooperation is the linchpin. All of this reflects a power inversion: a U.S. president is effectively pleading with a Russian president to negotiate, in order to extricate the U.S. from a costly proxy war. As one Reuters analysis put it, Trump’s history of placating Putin has raised concerns, but even if he tries a harsher line now, the U.S. has limited tools left beyond persuading Russia with inducements[59][63]. Simply put, Washington cannot dictate terms to Moscow as it might have in the unipolar moment – instead, it must engage in realpolitik bargaining. The Alaska summit symbolizes how Eastern powers “hold the cards” in ways they haven’t for decades: Putin comes to talks not as a defeated pariah, but as the leader of a nation that has survived everything the West threw at it, buoyed by trade with China and diplomatic support from much of the non-Western world[9].

It would be an exaggeration to say the U.S. holds “none, zero” of the cards – the West still has significant economic and military might, and Ukraine’s brave resistance has not collapsed. But there is no doubt that the multipolar dynamic (with Russia and China in particular aligning) has circumscribed U.S. power. American threats are less fearsome when adversaries have alternative markets and allies; American offers carry less allure when many countries are exploring financial systems beyond U.S. control. The Ukraine conflict’s trajectory – ending not in a clear Western victory, but in fraught negotiations – may be the first major post-Cold War crisis where the U.S. cannot unilaterally shape the outcome. BRICS’ influence is indirect but crucial here: Russia’s ability to wage war this long is partly because BRICS economies softened the blow of sanctions[9], and international fatigue with U.S. sanctions has grown. For the future, the outcome in Ukraine will set a precedent for U.S. credibility. If Trump is seen as “holding none of the cards” and essentially ceding to a Russian fait accompli, it will validate the view that American hegemony has decisively eroded. If, conversely, the U.S. manages to secure a just peace (one that preserves Ukraine’s core sovereignty) through deft diplomacy, it might salvage some leadership prestige – but even that would require acknowledging Russia’s security concerns to a degree unthinkable a few years ago. Either way, the era of total Western primacy in setting global security terms is being supplanted by genuine multipolar bargaining. The Alaska summit is a microcosm of that new reality.

Middle East Aftershocks: Israel’s Position and Global Perceptions

The fallout of the Iran-Israel 12-day war is still unfolding, but it offers a vivid case study in the changing global order. Historically, Israel – backed by the U.S. – could count on quick military dominance over any regional foe, as seen in past conflicts. This time, while Israel dealt serious blows to Iran’s nuclear facilities, it did not emerge as an unambiguous victor. Iran’s ability to retaliate (striking a U.S. base in the Gulf) and to force a ceasefire after less than two weeks showed that even a regional middle power like Iran can withstand a confrontation with the U.S.-Israel duo, at least to a draw[64][32]. From Iran’s perspective, simply emerging from the war with its regime and core capabilities intact was a strategic success: Tehran proved that an attack on its soil would be met with fire (deterring future strikes), and it likely bolstered nationalist support at home for its nuclear stance. In the wider Muslim world, Iran’s stock rose for having stood up to Israel. Surveys indicate that across Arab countries, many people viewed Iran’s role in the war positively, in contrast to Israel and the U.S.[45][46]. This is a remarkable turnaround from a decade ago, when Iran was often seen with suspicion by Sunni Arab publics; U.S. and Israeli actions have effectively driven much of Arab public opinion to see Iran as a heroic resistor against Western aggression. Such public perception shifts highlight a loss of U.S./Israeli soft power. When only 2% of Jordanians, for example, think the U.S. had a positive role in the war, but a third praise China and nearly half praise Russia[45][46], it underscores how the narrative of who is “on the right side” has flipped in many eyes. The West no longer automatically commands the moral high ground.

For Israel itself, the war exposed some strategic vulnerabilities. Israel remains militarily powerful, but its limitations were laid bare: it needed U.S. help to carry out the most critical strikes (particularly the bunker-busting of Fordow), indicating that Israel alone might lack the capability or confidence to strike Iran’s hardened sites[30][36]. Moreover, once Iran retaliated directly against U.S. forces, the conflict’s escalation had to be contained by Washington – Israel could not simply continue pounding Iran without risking a wider conflagration that even the U.S. did not want. In essence, Israel’s freedom of action was circumscribed by the risk of Iranian escalation. The quick ceasefire, enforced by Trump’s pressure on Netanyahu (Trump went so far as to publicly order “ALL planes” to stand down and “head home” after Israel violated the truce[35]), signaled that Israel could not dictate the course of the war once other great powers (the U.S., and potentially Russia/China diplomatically) became involved. This was a humbling moment: Israel, often seen as the Middle East’s preeminent military, had to abide by terms set in part by others.

Unsurprisingly, some analysts have dusted off the old epithet of “paper tiger” to describe Israel’s predicament. Years ago, a U.S. military analyst warned that if Israel got into a full-scale war (say with Hezbollah in Lebanon, or with Iran), it could be exposed as “nothing more than a ‘paper tiger’ … all bluster and threat with no ability to back them up,” likely to “lose catastrophically” in a drawn-out fight[65][66]. While “catastrophic loss” is an overstatement in the recent war (Israel was not defeated on the battlefield), the spirit of that warning resonates – Israel’s deterrence has taken a hit. Its enemies saw that Israel hesitated to launch a ground invasion or prolonged strikes on Iran, likely out of fear of missile barrages on Israeli cities or a regional missile war involving Hezbollah. In Gaza (2023) and Lebanon (with Hezbollah skirmishes in 2024), Israel also encountered protracted resistance that made quick victory elusive. All this contributes to a new image: Israel can inflict tremendous damage, but it struggles to decisively crush well-prepared adversaries, especially without incurring unacceptable costs. For a state whose survival strategy hinges on appearing invulnerable, this perceptual shift is dangerous. It encourages Iran and militant groups to be bolder, and it even stokes debate within Israel about the wisdom of perpetual conflict. A senior Iranian official gloated after the ceasefire that Israel failed to destroy Iran’s program and had been “taught a lesson”; conversely, Israel’s hardliners insist they must rearm and be ready to hit Iran again, lest Tehran rebuild its nuclear capability. This cycle sets the stage for future showdowns – but next time, Israel may find even less international tolerance for its preventative strikes, and an even more emboldened set of adversaries.

Netanyahu’s government, dominated by ultranationalists, continues to talk of expanding Israeli settlements and power – the so-called “Greater Israel” vision. If Israel interprets the 12-day war as merely a pause before the next confrontation (rather than a signal to seek a diplomatic modus vivendi), it could launch further military operations (for instance, a renewed campaign in Gaza or a strike on Hezbollah). However, any such moves would now carry higher risk. The Gaza war of 2023 already severely tarnished Israel’s global standing, with numerous countries (including in Europe) condemning the scale of Palestinian civilian casualties. Another round could trigger even harsher international blowback, possibly sanctions or arms embargoes that Israel has long avoided. Furthermore, Israel’s reliance on U.S. backing has come under scrutiny. Trump’s unequivocal support gave Israel leeway in 2023–25, but U.S. politics are volatile – and as noted, even Trump’s own base showed signs of war-weariness and discontent with blank-check support to Israel[53][67]. A future U.S. administration (especially if leadership changes in 2028 or if Congress shifts) might not be so obliging. Thus, if Netanyahu continues on a maximalist path – rejecting compromises and pursuing dominance over Palestinians and neighbors – he might be courting “deadly” outcomes for Israel itself, as some commentators warn. In a worst-case scenario, an overstretched Israel could trigger a multi-front war (Iran, Hezbollah, perhaps others) that it cannot win without devastating losses. Such warnings echo inside Israel too: many security professionals have cautioned that the country’s current trajectory (escalating conflicts, eroding democratic norms internally) is unsustainable and endangers Israel’s long-term viability.

In balanced perspective, Israel is not about to disappear – it remains a regional superpower with nuclear weapons and advanced technology. But the myth of invincibility that surrounded the “Western hegemon’s sheriff” in the Middle East has been punctured. The recent war showed that even with U.S. support, Israel had to halt at the brink of a wider abyss. And critically, the rest of the world did not uniformly rally behind Israel. Instead, major powers like China positioned themselves as neutral peace-brokers (Beijing quickly called for ceasefire and offered to mediate)[48], enhancing their image as responsible stakeholders. Russia condemned U.S.-Israeli strikes as “irresponsible…unprovoked aggression” (with some irony, given Russia’s own behavior in Ukraine)[68], but then pointedly kept negotiating with the U.S. on other issues, signaling it would not let Iran derail its broader agenda[69]. Europe was split – some NATO countries quietly supported the idea of curbing Iran, but the EU as a whole tried (unsuccessfully) to dissuade Trump and Netanyahu from military action, preferring a return to the Iran nuclear deal framework[43][70]. Thus, the West was not monolithic either.

The bigger picture is that the Middle East is no longer an exclusive Western sphere where the U.S. and its ally Israel can operate unchecked. Other actors – Russia, China, Iran, Turkey – now exert significant influence, and global public opinion heavily factors in. The war illustrated that if the West overplays its hand (e.g. by supporting actions that look like aggression or neo-colonial intervention), rivals will pounce on the PR opportunity and much of the “Global South” will side with those rivals or at least not side with the West. This is a fundamental change from the early 1990s unipolar moment. It means any future attempts by the U.S. to project force (be it to contain China, confront Russia, or support allies like Israel) will be viewed with far more skepticism internationally, and may spur counter-coalitions. In essence, Western hegemonic actions now incur higher reputational and strategic costs, accelerating the multipolar dynamic further.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the current state of global politics is one of transition and profound tension between old power structures and new realities. The points raised by various political commentators – that Western hegemony is faltering, that Trump’s unilateralist tactics backfired, that the world is moving inexorably toward multipolarity – are grounded in observable trends, though they sometimes overstate the immediacy of U.S. “insignificance.” The West, led by the United States, still possesses vast economic and military strength and retains close alliances (e.g. NATO, G7) that collectively outmatch any rival bloc in many metrics. The U.S. dollar remains, for now, the primary global reserve currency and has even seen its dominance reinforced in some aspects by recent turmoil[71]. However, it is equally true that Western dominance is no longer unchallenged or unchallengeable. Efforts to prevent the rise of alternative centers of power – whether via tariffs, sanctions, or military intervention – have yielded diminishing returns and often unintended consequences. Trump’s attempt to bully BRICS into submission with tariff threats arguably strengthened BRICS resolve and hastened moves away from the dollar[13][15]. Western sanctions and ostracism drove Russia deeper into partnership with China and spurred a wave of de-dollarization talks. Military overreach in the Middle East eroded Western moral authority and made space for Russia and China to present themselves as responsible mediators. Meanwhile, countries like South Africa, India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have asserted their strategic autonomy, refusing to simply “choose sides” as the West often demands.

The war between the “West” and the emergent BRICS-led coalition is not a traditional war – it is a complex mix of economic competition, proxy conflicts, information battles, and diplomatic realignments. Washington’s attempt to maintain its post-Cold War primacy by force or coercion has indeed pushed some countries closer to the Sino-Russian camp. If the U.S. continues down a path of trying to “keep BRICS from evolving” primarily through threats and punitive measures, it may accelerate the very outcomes it fears: fragmentation of the global financial system, formation of parallel institutions, and the loss of U.S. influence over large portions of the globe[13][19]. A more sustainable strategy, many suggest, would be to adapt to multipolarity – accepting a reality of multiple power centers and seeking new arrangements of coexistence. That could mean negotiating arms control and spheres of influence (however politically unpalatable that sounds in the West), revitalizing international institutions with greater input from non-Western powers, and focusing on multilateral diplomacy rather than ultimatums.

In the specific arenas discussed: the resolution of the Ukraine war will likely require acknowledging some Russian security concerns (short of fully validating aggression) in exchange for peace – a purely “winner-takes-all” approach is unrealistic now. In trade and finance, the U.S. might need to find a modus vivendi with China and BRICS on currency and trade rules, rather than attempting to sanction away every alternative (which is impractical in the long run). In the Middle East, addressing root causes – such as rethinking the stalled Israel-Palestine peace process and Iran’s legitimate security interests – could reduce the frequency of wars that tarnish everyone’s reputation. Western hegemony, in essence, must evolve into Western leadership within a multipolar partnership, rather than hegemony maintained by force. If not, the cycle of conflict and counter-coalition will continue, potentially to the detriment of global stability and with the West finding itself increasingly isolated.

The critical tone of the commentators’ points is understandable – recent U.S. missteps have been costly. However, a nuanced academic perspective recognizes that we are in a fluid moment: the unipolar era is ending, but a new equilibrium is still forming. The U.S.-led “West” and the BRICS/”East” are not strictly binary enemies; there is overlap and room for negotiation. Europe, for one, remains caught in the middle – a traditional Western pillar that also seeks engagement with BRICS giants for economic reasons. Countries like Saudi Arabia or Turkey float between camps. This flux means outright “war” between West and BRICS can likely be avoided if cooler heads prevail, but it also means both sides will test each other’s resolve. In 2025, the tests have been fierce: tariff wars, proxy shooting wars, and diplomatic snubs. Going forward, the measure of global leadership will be who can steer these tests toward peaceful settlements and mutual respect. The West, if it wants to retain global respect, will have to demonstrate humility and a willingness to share power – accepting a multipolar world as the reality that it is, rather than fighting against the tide. Otherwise, as the events discussed demonstrate, attempts to impose unipolar dominance will only hasten its demise, with potentially dangerous consequences for all sides.

Sources:

• Associated Press – Trump’s BRICS gaffe and tariff threats[1][2]
• Carnegie Endowment – U.S. views on BRICS and its expansion[3][9]
• China-US Focus – Analysis of Trump’s 100% tariff threat and multipolar currency impacts[13][15]
• Reuters (Aug 14, 2025) – Preview of Trump-Putin Alaska meeting, Ukraine war status[24][59]
• Reuters (Jan 31, 2025) – Trump warning BRICS against dollar replacement, Russian response[14][19]
• Reuters (Apr 14, 2025) – China’s hardline response to Trump’s tariffs (“wartime” footing)[10][11]
• CBS News – U.S. lawmakers threaten South Africa’s trade benefits over Russia ties[21][22]
• Atlantic Council (Fikra Forum) – Polling of Arab public opinion on U.S. vs. China/Russia/Iran during Gaza war[45][46]
• CNA (Analysis, July 2025) – Russia and China’s limited support to Iran during 12-day war, Iranian frustration[49][50]
• Al Jazeera – Explainer on the 12-day Israel-Iran war and its aftermath (ceasefire, claims)[32][40]
• New Lines Magazine – U.S. Christian conservative base turning critical of Trump’s pro-Israel stance amid Gaza war[53][67]
• Tasnim News Agency – “Israel a ‘paper tiger’” comments by U.S. analyst (context for military limitations)[65][72]

[1] [2] Trump mistakes Spain for a member of the BRICS bloc and repeats the threat of massive tariffs | AP News

[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] The U.S. Shouldn’t Dismiss BRICS Challenge | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

[10] [11] [26] How China went from courting Trump to ‘never yield’ tariff defiance | Reuters

[12] [13] [15] [16] [17] [18] [20] Shortcutting our way to multipolarity: Trump, tariffs and BRICS – Warwick Powell – CHINA US Focus

[14] [19] [71] Trump repeats tariffs threat to dissuade BRICS nations from replacing US dollar | Reuters

[21] [22] [23] U.S. lawmakers want South Africa to face consequences for “support for Russia” amid Ukraine war – CBS News

[24] [25] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [63] Which Donald Trump will negotiate with Putin in Alaska? | Reuters

[27] Toplines: The United States and its allies must be ready to deter a …

[28] Ukraine and the New Two War Construct – RAND

[29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [42] [43] [44] [64] [70] Is the 12-day Israel-Iran war really over – and who gained what? | Donald Trump News | Al Jazeera

[41] What Did Israel Achieve With Its 12-Day War Against Iran?

[45] [46] [47] The United States Is Rapidly Losing Arab Hearts and Minds Through Gaza War, While Competitors Benefit | The Washington Institute

[48] [49] [50] [51] [68] [69] Russia and China Respond to the 12-Day War in Iran | CNA

[52] [53] [54] [55] [67] MAGA Zionism and Its Discontents – New Lines Magazine

[62] Live updates: Trump raises possibility of Zelensky joining him and Putin in Alaska – The Washington Post

[65] [66] [72] Israel Nothing but A ‘Paper Tiger’: US Analyst – World news – Tasnim News Agency

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Modern economic development began in the West — Britain led the way with the steam engine, followed by the U.S. and Europe in electricity, automobiles, and the information age. This created an immense technological and economic gap between the West and the rest of the world, a gap widened not just by innovation but also by colonialism and empire. By the end of World War II, however, the European empires were spent. The world wars had eviscerated them, paving the way for independence movements across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Once free from imperial chains, these countries began a long process of catching up. They prioritized education, built infrastructure, and gradually developed their economies. And now, many are transitioning from imitators to innovators. China is the most prominent example, having leapfrogged from a developing nation to a global technological powerhouse. But this rise is a natural consequence of freedom and investment, not some grand conspiracy against the West.

Yet, instead of embracing this multipolar future, the West—especially the United States—has responded with paranoia, protectionism, and a dangerous nostalgia for its unipolar heyday. The result is an increasingly erratic and confrontational foreign policy driven not by facts but by fear, arrogance, and, frankly, racism. We see it in the vitriol directed toward China. We see it in the hostile posture toward BRICS countries. We see it in the desperate effort to hold on to a version of global dominance that no longer exists.

The U.S., in particular, has convinced itself that being “first” means being supreme. This worldview is fueled by centuries of exceptionalism—religious, racial, and economic. It’s a myth that the West is inherently better, that its dominance is deserved, and that any challenge to its supremacy must be met with resistance. That mindset is deeply embedded in American politics, especially among the elite. And it’s currently embodied in the deeply flawed behaviour of our highest office.

US foreign policy has been reduced to the whims of a single individual, issuing executive decrees like royal edicts. Congress is feeble. The courts have abdicated oversight. And now the US has a president whose directives are shaped more by ego than strategy. He flips from claiming Russia should be negotiated with to declaring Putin a villain. He publicly bullies other nations on social media. He unilaterally imposes tariffs on Brazil because its president dares to reject American imperial attitudes. This is not diplomacy; it’s delusion.

What makes this even more dangerous is that the world is no longer obligated to follow America’s lead. Nations are forming their own alliances—BRICS is a prime example—built not on anti-Americanism but on a desire for mutual respect, sovereignty, and multilateral cooperation. Anyone interested in the truth should read the BRICS declaration from Rio de Janeiro. There is no anti-American rhetoric—just calls for adherence to international law, UN principles, and sustainable development. Yet because the U.S. has rejected these very principles, even neutral language sounds hostile to Washington.

It is not the world that is turning away from America; it is America that has abandoned the world. The US walked out of the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization, and refuses to pay their UN dues.The US opposes sustainable development goals. The US has become the outlier on issues that should unite humanity. So when other countries band together around these shared goals, the US calls them adversaries. Why? Because they dare to exist outside the US orbit.

Even more disturbing is the posture toward war and peace. The US had a fleeting moment where it seemed possible the it might acknowledge NATO’s expansion as a legitimate concern for Russia—a moment when diplomacy and realism nearly prevailed. That moment is gone. Now the rhetoric is back to good vs. evil, with no room for political settlement or compromise. NATO will expand to Ukraine, full stop. Any resistance is villainized. And anyone calling for dialogue is labelled weak or disloyal.

This isn’t strategy; it’s a temper tantrum. And when global affairs are personalized—as they now are in the United States—you get impulsive and catastrophic decisions. One man can now declare trade war, order drone strikes, or upend treaties with a tweet. This is more autocratic than many of the so-called authoritarian regimes the West criticizes. In most countries, decisions go through councils or collective leadership. In the USA, it’s just the president and his phone.

The rest of the world sees through this. They may not say it publicly, but global leaders are increasingly skeptical of American intentions. They recognize that U.S. diplomacy is no longer grounded in reality or respect, but in a desperate bid to preserve an outdated hierarchy. They’re bracing for conflict not because they want one, but because they no longer believe the West, particularly the U.S., is acting in good faith.

All of this brings the world to the brink. The United States, untouchable by conventional threats, is steering itself toward the one existential danger it cannot afford: nuclear war. And it is doing so not out of necessity, but out of hubris. The US needs a radical reassessment of its place in the world. It needs to accept that being one of many powers is not a failure. It’s the natural, healthy progression of a world becoming more equitable, more interconnected and more just.

This isn’t a zero-sum game. The rise of China, India, Brazil or Africa doesn’t mean the fall of America. It just means the US is no longer the only one at the table. And instead of flipping it over, the US ought to pull up a chair and start listening. Because the world is no longer waiting for the US to lead—it’s moving forward with or without the US.

Editorial viewpoint based on Professor Jeffrey Sachs‘ analysis of current events.

The post The Illusion of Western Decline & the Reality of Global Rebalancing appeared first on FREENET AFRICA.